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Managerial Ability and the Shareholder Tax Sensitivity of Dividends – Evidence from Taiwan
Dividend Tax Penalties
Dividend Payout Policy
|Issue Date: ||2020-07-01 13:55:25 (UTC+8)|
|Abstract: ||本文探討股東股利稅負懲罰(Tax Penalty)與企業股利策略關聯性；此外，探討經理人能力(Managerial Ability)與企業股利策略關聯性；最後，探討經理人能力與股東股利稅負敏感度關聯性，並分析影響股利發放率之企業特性與營運策略制定。|
過去文獻對於影響股利發放策略的因素未有一個定論，Guan, Li, and Ma (2018)特此考量經理人能力對股利稅負懲罰與股利發放率影響，而本文參考Guan et al. (2018)考量經理人能力對股東股利稅負敏感度的影響，並根據臺灣的股利稅制情況做調整，也因不同股東類型適用不同的稅率，故以加權平均的方式計算整體股利稅負懲罰。
This paper aims to examine the relationship between shareholder dividend tax penalties and dividend payout policy, to explore the relationship between managerial ability and dividend payout policy, and to examine the relationship between managerial ability and the shareholder tax sensitivity of dividends. This paper also analyzes the factors that affect the dividend payout ratio, such as enterprise characteristics and business strategy.
In prior literature, there was no conclusion on the factors that affect the dividend payout policy. Guan, Li, and Ma (2018) considered the effect of managerial ability on the dividend tax penalty and dividend payout ratio. According to Guan et al. (2018), this paper measures the influence of managerial ability on the shareholder tax sensitivity of dividends and adjusts with the dividend taxation system in Taiwan. Also, different types of shareholders apply to different tax rates, so this paper measures the tax penalty with the shareholding-weighted tax penalty.
This paper collects publicly available data of dividend payouts by publicly traded companies in Taiwan between 1995 and 2014. The empirical results show that without considering managerial ability, there is a negative correlation between the dividend tax penalty and the dividend payout ratio. Second, without considering the dividend tax penalty, the correlation between managerial ability and the dividend payout ratio is positive. Third, the reflection of the dividend tax penalty and the managerial ability on the dividend payout ratio is negative, which indicates that high-ability managers would consider the shareholder's tax burden when making the dividend payment policy. Fourth, the managerial ability is positively correlated with the shareholder tax sensitivity of dividend-repurchase substitutions. Finally, there is the effect of tax cuts in two tax reform periods took place in 1998 and 2010. High-ability managers would increase the distribution of dividends. Therefore, the following conclusions can be drawn: high-ability managers can make dividend payment policies that are tax-efficient.
|Reference: ||徐偉初、羅時萬與陳國樑，2017，我國股利所得課稅及兩稅合一制度之檢討，105年度委託研究計畫(編號: 105mof006)。臺北市：財政部。|
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|Source URI: ||http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0107255006|
|Data Type: ||thesis|
|Appears in Collections:||[財政學系] 學位論文|
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