English  |  正體中文  |  简体中文  |  Post-Print筆數 : 27 |  Items with full text/Total items : 109951/140887 (78%)
Visitors : 46266548      Online Users : 1070
RC Version 6.0 © Powered By DSPACE, MIT. Enhanced by NTU Library IR team.
Scope Tips:
  • please add "double quotation mark" for query phrases to get precise results
  • please goto advance search for comprehansive author search
  • Adv. Search
    HomeLoginUploadHelpAboutAdminister Goto mobile version
    政大機構典藏 > 商學院 > 會計學系 > 學位論文 >  Item 140.119/131465
    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/131465


    Title: 法人董監事特性與公司治理品質之關聯性
    Authors: 卓彥儒
    Cho, Yen-Ju
    Contributors: 林宛瑩
    卓彥儒
    Cho, Yen-Ju
    Keywords: 法人董監
    股權結構
    董事會結構
    公司治理品質
    Board Representative of Juristic Persons
    Ownership Structure
    Board Structure
    Corporate Governance Quality
    Date: 2020
    Issue Date: 2020-09-02 11:40:43 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 本研究探討法人董監事特性與我國上市櫃企業的公司治理品質關聯性。具體而言,本研究以上市櫃公司治理評鑑等級作為衡量公司治理品質的代理變數,以法人董監持股比率及法人董監席次衡量法人董監特性,實證分析法人董監特性是否影響公司治理品質。本研究之實證結果顯示,法人董監席次比例與公司治理品質呈顯著負向關係,法人董監席次較高之公司其公司治理品質較差。納入集團控制觀點,本研究之分析顯示,集團企業法人董監席次比例亦與公司治理品質呈顯著負向關聯性。亦即,集團企業法人董監比例較高之公司其公司治理品質較差。此外,本研究亦發現,集團企業法人董監持股比例與公司治理品質呈顯著正向關聯性,顯示集團法人董監持股比例越高之公司,其公司治理品質較佳。
    Using companies listed in Taiwan Stock Exchange, this study empirically explores the association between characteristics of board representatives of juristic persons and the quality of corporate governance. The empirical results indicate that the proportion of seats occupied by juristic director and supervisor on the board is significantly and negatively associated with corporate governance quality. The result also shows that the proportion of internal juristic directors and supervisors has a significantly and negatively related to the quality of corporate governance. These findings imply that the system for board representatives of juristic persons may have a negative impact on corporate governance quality. However, this study also finds that the shareholding ratio held by the juristic directors and supervisors is significantly and positively associated with the quality of corporate governance. This result indicates that firms with higher proportion of shareholding held by the juristic directors and supervisors have better corporate governance quality.
    Reference: 方俊儒、李秀英與龍春伶,2008,獨立董監事對公司績效與盈餘品質之影響-控制股東之調節效果,會計與公司治理,第5卷,第1期:55-80。
    仇心怡,2013,股權結構、公司治理與負債程度對盈餘管理之影響,國立高雄應用科技大學財富與稅務管理系碩士論文。
    邱垂昌與莊清騄,2010,獨立董監事、公司資訊透明度與公司價值之關聯性,中山管理評論,第18卷,第4期:949-1008。
    金成隆、林美鳳與梁嘉紋,2008,公司治理結構和法人說明會之關連性研究,管理學報,第25卷,第2期:221-243。
    林仁光,2011,公司法第二十七條法人董監事制度存廢之研究,台大法學論叢,第40卷,第1期:255-349。
    林宛瑩與許崇源,2008,台灣集團企業之控股型態及公司治理衡量指標之研究與建議,交大管理學報,第28卷,第1期:269-312。
    林俊傑、劉梧柏與黃華瑋,2018,公司治理評鑑與財務績效及公司價值之關聯性探討:以台灣上市櫃企業公司治理評鑑為例,商略學報,第10卷,第1期:23-46。
    柯承恩、陳耀宗與吳姍穎,2010,董監事治理與盈餘管理之關連性研究,會計學報,第2卷,第2期:25-60。
    高蘭芬與邱正仁,2002,董監事股權質押對會計盈餘與股票報酬相關性之影響,臺大管理論叢,第13卷,第1期:127-162。
    高藍芬、盧正壽、黃冠智與陳安琳,2012,公司治理、公司績效與投資策略,中山管理評論,第20卷,第3期:851-880。
    陳瑞斌、許崇源與翁慈青,2007,公司治理架構與財務報導透明度之關聯性研究,中華管理評論國際學報,第10卷,第1期:1-41。
    陳安琳、高蘭芬、陳怡凱與陳烷鈺,2013,董監事股權質押與公司治理之研究,中山管理評論,第21卷,第2期:299-337。
    陳雪如、黃劭彥、史雅男與蕭鎮臺,2009,再探財務報表舞弊-風險因子新鑑識,中華管理評論國際學報,第12卷,第4期:1-21。
    陳渭淳,2001,上市公司失敗預測之實證研究,國立台北大學企業管理系博士論文。
    陳瑞斌、翁慈青與朱全斌,2009,揭露水準對於信用評等與負債資金成本之影響,財務金融學刊,第17卷,第2期:71-110。
    陳逸仲,2009,審計委員會與資訊透明度、財務報導品質與股價反應之探討,國立成功大學會計學研究所碩士論文。
    張椿柏、王育偉、陳振傑與莊明哲,2018,公司治理對財務危機之影響,財金論文叢刊,第29期:14-36。
    曾宛如,2018,公司法全盤修正重要議題-探討資訊揭露與法人犯罪防制、經營權爭奪及董事會功能,月旦法學雜誌,第276期:249。
    閆冰,2006,代理理論與公司治理論述,當代經濟科學,第28卷,第6期:80-85。
    許文馨,2014,審計委員會是否較監察人更能提升盈餘品質,臺大管理論叢,第24卷,第S1期:203-232。
    蔡灝,2012,台灣集團企業控制股東控股能力與資訊透明度之攸關性,東海大學會計學研究所碩士論文。
    張瑞當,方俊儒與曾玉琦,2007,核心代理問題與盈餘管理:董事會結構與外部監督機制之探討,管理學報,第24卷,第1期:17-39。
    張瑞當與方俊儒,2006,資訊揭露評鑑系統對企業盈餘管理行為之影響,會計評論,第42期:1-22。
    葉銀華、李存修與柯承恩,2002,公司治理與評等系統,初版,台北:商智文化出版社。
    廖秀梅、李建然與吳祥華,2006,董事會結構特性與公司績效關係之研究-兼論台灣家族企業因素的影響,東吳經濟商學學報,第54期:117-160。
    廖益興與楊清溪,2007,公司治理機制與財務報表品質之關聯性研究,財務金融學刊,第15卷,第3期:67-112。
    廖益興,2010,探討董事會組成、股權結構與年報資訊揭露水準,臺大管理論叢,第20卷,第2期:209-250。
    劉福運、吳宗翰與林岳喬,2018。公司治理與盈餘品質:公司治理評鑑級距的影響,台灣管理學刊,第18卷,第2期:29-47。
    劉韻僖與林玉娟,2008,董事會規模與獨立性對董事會功能影響之研究,東海管理評論,第10卷,第1期:187-224。
    劉若蘭、劉政淮與游博凱,2016,審計委員會對公司績效與資訊揭露品質之影響,評價學報,第10期:1-30。
    薛敏正、邱彥毅與邱詩婷,2017,公司治理評鑑與盈餘品質,會計審計論叢,第7卷,第2期:57-83。
    Ariff, A. M., M. K. Ibrahim, and O. Radiah. 2007. Determinants of firm level governance: Malaysian evidence. Corporate Governance 7(5): 562-573.
    Baek, H. Y., D. R. Johnson and J. K. Kim. 2005. Managerial Ownership, Corporate Governance and Voluntary Disclosure. Journal of Business & Economic Studies 15(2): 44-61.
    Beasley, M. 1996. An empirical investigation of the relation between board of director composition and financial statement fraud. Accounting Review 71(4): 443-460.
    Beiner, S., W. Drobetz, M. Schmid, and H. Zimmerman. 2004. An integrated framework of corporate governance and firm valuation – evidence from Switzerland. Working Paper no34, European Corporate Governance Institute Finance.
    Brickley, J. A., J. L. Coles and G. Jarrell. 1997. Leadership Structure: Separating the CEO and Chairman of the Board. Journal of Corporate Finance, 3, 189-220.
    Chen, G. M. Firth, D. N. Gao and O. M. Rui. 2006. Ownership structure, corporate governance, and fraud: Evidence from China. Journal of Corporate Finance 12 (3): 424-448.
    Claessens, S., S. Djankov, J. Fan, and L. H. P. Lang. 2002. Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholdings. Journal of Finance 57: 2741-2771.
    Coles, J. L., N. D. Daniel, and L. Naveen. 2008. Boards: Does one size fit all? Journal of Financial Economics 87: 329-356.
    De Andres P., V. Azofra. and F. Lopez. 2005. Corporate Boards in OECD Countries: Size, Composition, Functioning and Effectiveness. Corporate Governance: An International Review 13: 197-210.
    Dechow, P. M., R. G. Sloan and A. P. Sweeney. 1996. Detecting earnings management. The Accounting review 70(2): 193-225.
    Dechow, P. M., R. G. Sloan, and A. P. Sweeney. 1996. Cause and consequence of earnings manipulation: an analysis of firms subject to enforcement actions by the SEC. Contemporary Accounting Research 13(Spring): 1-36.
    DeFond, M. L. and J. Jimbalvo. 1994. Debt covenant violation and manipulation of accruals. Journal of Accounting and Economics 17 (1-2): 145-176.
    Drobetz, W., A. Schillhofer, and H. Zimmerman. 2004. Corporate governance and expected stock returns: evidence from Germany. European Financial Management 10 (2): 267-293.
    Fama, E. and M. C. Jensen. 1983. Separation of Ownership and Control. Journal of Law and Economics 26: 327-349.
    Fan, J. P. H and T. J. Wong. 2002. Corporate ownership structure and the informativeness of accounting earning in East Asia. Journal of Accounting and Economics: 401-425.
    Finkelstein, S. and R. A. D’aveni. 1994. CEO Duality as a Double-Edged Sword: How Boards of Directors Balance Entrenchment Avoidance and Unity of Command. Academy of Management Journal, 37(5), 1079-1108.
    Kiel, G. C. and G. J. Nicholson. 2003. Board Composition and Corporate Performance: how the Australian experience informs contrasting theories of corporate governance. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 11, 189-205.
    Hermalin, B. E., and M. S. Weisbach. 1998. Endogenously Chosen Boards of Directors and Their Monitoring of the CEO. American Economic Review 88(1): 96-118.
    Huson, M. R., R. Parrino, and L. T. Starks. 2001. Internal Monitoring Mechanisms and CEO Turnover: A Long-Term Perspective. Journal of Finance 55: 2265-2297.
    Jensen, M. C.1986. Agency Cost of the Free Cash Flow. Corporate Finance and Takeovers. American Economic Review 79: 323-329.
    Jensen, M. C. and W. H. Meckling. 1976. Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior-Agency Cost and Ownership Structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3: 305-360.
    Jensen, M. C. and Ruback, R. 1983. The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence. Journal of Financial Economics 11(1-4): 5-50.
    Kanagaretnam, K., G. Lobo, and D. Whalen. 2007. Does Good Corporate Governance Reduce Information Asymmetry around Quarterly Earnings Announcements? Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 26: 497-522.
    Kiel, G. C. and G. J. Nicholson. 2003. Board Composition and Corporate Performance How the Australian Experience Informs Contrasting Theories of Corporate Governance. Corporate Governance An International Review, 11, 189-205.
    Klein, A. 2002. Audit Committee, Board of Director Characteristics, and Earning Management. Journal of Accounting and Economics 33: 375-400.
    La Porta, R., F. Lopez-De-Silanes, and A. Shleifer. 1999. Corporate ownership around the world. Journal of Finance 54(2): 471-518.
    Lee, T. S. and Y. H. Yeh. 2004. Corporate Governance and Financial Distress: Evidence from Taiwan. Corporate Governance: An International Review 12(3): 378-388.
    Liu, Q. and Z. Lu, 2007. Corporate Governance and Earnings Management in the Chinese Listed Companies: A Tunneling Perspective. Journal of Corporate Finance 13(5): 881-906.
    Peasnell, K.V., Pope P. F. and Young, S. 2005. Board Monitoring and Earnings
    Management: Do Outside Directors Influence Abnormal Accruals?, Journal of Business Finance & Accounting 32(7) & (8): 1311-1345.
    Shleifer, A. and R. W. Vishny. 1997. A Survey of Corporate Governance. Journal of Finance 52(2): 737-783.
    Warfield, T. D., J. J. Wild and K. L. Wild. 1995. Managerial Ownership, Accounting Choices and Informativeness of Earnings. Journal of Accounting and Economics 20(1): 61-91.
    Description: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    會計學系
    107353016
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0107353016
    Data Type: thesis
    DOI: 10.6814/NCCU202001353
    Appears in Collections:[會計學系] 學位論文

    Files in This Item:

    File Description SizeFormat
    301601.pdf7395KbAdobe PDF20View/Open


    All items in 政大典藏 are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved.


    社群 sharing

    著作權政策宣告 Copyright Announcement
    1.本網站之數位內容為國立政治大學所收錄之機構典藏,無償提供學術研究與公眾教育等公益性使用,惟仍請適度,合理使用本網站之內容,以尊重著作權人之權益。商業上之利用,則請先取得著作權人之授權。
    The digital content of this website is part of National Chengchi University Institutional Repository. It provides free access to academic research and public education for non-commercial use. Please utilize it in a proper and reasonable manner and respect the rights of copyright owners. For commercial use, please obtain authorization from the copyright owner in advance.

    2.本網站之製作,已盡力防止侵害著作權人之權益,如仍發現本網站之數位內容有侵害著作權人權益情事者,請權利人通知本網站維護人員(nccur@nccu.edu.tw),維護人員將立即採取移除該數位著作等補救措施。
    NCCU Institutional Repository is made to protect the interests of copyright owners. If you believe that any material on the website infringes copyright, please contact our staff(nccur@nccu.edu.tw). We will remove the work from the repository and investigate your claim.
    DSpace Software Copyright © 2002-2004  MIT &  Hewlett-Packard  /   Enhanced by   NTU Library IR team Copyright ©   - Feedback