印度與巴基斯坦於一九九八年五月相繼進行核子試爆成為事實上的核武國家。兩國從一九九０年為了喀什米爾再度爆發軍事衝突迄今，並未見衝突層次的提升及衝突範圍的擴大，核武應扮演了一個迫使隻方自制的重要角色。同時印巴雙方已非單純的認為核武是用來防備兩國在喀什米爾的衝突，而進一步認為核武關係到本身的國家安全。例如，印度認為必須防備來自北京及伊斯蘭馬巴德的軍事威脅，巴基斯坦則以使用核武的威脅來嚇阻印度對巴基斯坦的功擊。因此，謀求印巴之間的核子平衡及穩定，聯合國及五大核武強國似乎須從如何引導印巴邁向核武戰略穩定，及如何和平解喀什米爾衝突雙管齊下的途徑來加以思考。 Since India and Pakistan conducted their nuclear tests in May 1998, the international community has been concerned about a possible nuclear exchange between the two countries should their conflict over Kashmir intensify. Some fear that a nuclear arms race between India and Pakistan might result from their respective nuclear tests. Yet, drawing upon nuclear deterrence theory and considerations of why states developnuclear weapons, this paper argues that the fact that both India and Pakistan possess nuclear weapons may further restrain both countries in their military conflict over Kashmir. This is because domestic politics, scientific and technological achievements, as well as a concern for national security have become driving forces for developing nuclear weapons in India. Pakistan, moreover, “went nuclear” very much for the same reason. In order to maintain a muclear balance between India and Pakistan, the five nuclear powers need to adopt a new way of thinking to deal with the development of nuclear weapons in both countries. At the same time , it is also important for the United Nations and regional organizations such as the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation to mediate the dispute between India and Pakistan over Kashmir.