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    政大機構典藏 > 商學院 > 財務管理學系 > 學位論文 >  Item 140.119/136056
    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/136056


    Title: 企業偏離目標槓桿與被併購之關係
    The relation between leverage deviation and the likelihood of being acquired
    Authors: 鄭薇彤
    Cheng, Wei-Tung
    Contributors: 湛可南
    Chan, Ko-Nan
    鄭薇彤
    Cheng, Wei-Tung
    Keywords: 兼併與收購
    資本結構
    目標槓桿
    Mergers and Acquisitions
    Capital Structure
    Optimal Leverage
    Date: 2021
    Issue Date: 2021-07-03 00:43:26 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 本文研究企業偏離目標槓桿對於其被併購的影響。從實證結果發現偏離目標槓桿將會增加企業成為被併購對象的機率,同時,偏離目標槓桿較少的企業較容易以股票作為支付工具被收購。再者,基於被併方財務上的限制以及較高的破產風險,偏離目標槓桿越多的被併方在購併中獲得的購併溢價較少,對於併購宣告效果的影響也較為負面。本研究證實抵換理論中目標槓桿的存在,也推論被併方會以重新調整資本結構以及避免破產作為尋求併購的可能原因。
    I examine the impact of leverage deviation on the likelihood of being acquired and the decision of mergers and acquisitions. My empirical results show that the leverage deviation of a firm increases the likelihood to become a target. Target firms with lower leverage deviation tend to receive more stocks in the offer. Moreover, firms with more leverage deviation often obtain lower acquisition premiums and lower announcement returns, possibly due to financial constraints and bankruptcy risk. Overall, my evidence validates the trade-off theory that supports the existence of optimal capital structure. My paper also suggests that target firms seek mergers to rebalance their capital structure and avoid bankruptcy.
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    Description: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    財務管理學系
    108357015
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0108357015
    Data Type: thesis
    DOI: 10.6814/NCCU202100557
    Appears in Collections:[財務管理學系] 學位論文

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