Loading...
|
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/141720
|
| Title: | 政體與經濟成長關係的再思考：官僚視角的比較分析
Rethinking the Nexus between Political Regime and Economic Growth: A Comparative Perspective from Bureaucrats |
| Authors: | 楊光
Yang, Guang |
| Contributors: | 蔡宗漢
Tsai, Tsung-Han
楊光
Yang, Guang |
| Keywords: | 政體
經濟成長
官僚品質
時間序列橫斷面資料
複層次中介分析
Political regime
Economic growth
Bureaucratic quality
Time-series cross-sectional data
Multilevel mediation analysis |
| Date: | 2022 |
| Issue Date: | 2022-09-02 15:22:02 (UTC+8) |
| Abstract: | 經濟發展的關鍵因素是什麼？過去研究制度的政治學者強調政體的作用。然而，儘管在兩者關係這一主題上已累積大量理論與實證文獻，但尚無確定答案。此外，經濟發展的實際情形也存在與既有理論相悖之處。鑒於此，本文試圖通過建立一個新架構，來重新檢視政體與經濟成長之間的關聯。
本文認為，政體對經濟發展重要但並非萬能，而納入官僚品質可以更好地解釋經濟成長的異質性。受政體與經濟成長關係之近期研究趨勢的啟發，本文認為通過區分政體的直、間接影響來重新思考兩者關係是合理的。更重要的是，鑑於官僚在國家經濟發展中的重要作用，官僚品質在解釋力上會優於政體間接影響經濟成長的其他中介途徑。
因此，本文從官僚的比較視角提出理論架構：在整個政策過程中，經濟發展作為一系列公共政策的結果，是政治家決策與官僚執行的共同產物。除政體的直接效應外，該架構強調官僚品質在政體與經濟成長的連結中扮演的中介角色，即三者的因果關係應為政體到官僚品質，再到經濟發展。首先，官僚品質受政體影響。在一個更民主的體制下，政治家的權力受到較多約束，因此更傾向以正式制度而非個人意願來處理官僚人事；同時更高的資訊透明度與問責性使公民與社會能更有效地自下而上監督官僚，此兩者有助於增加官僚嚴謹、公正履行職責的能力與意願，即官僚品質更高。
其次，鑑於官僚在國家經濟發展中的關鍵角色，官僚品質對經濟成長至關重要。當政策生效後，負責政策執行官僚機構是否運轉良好，對於能否取得令人滿意的政策結果則變得特別關鍵。較高的官僚品質提供了一個良性循環：官僚嚴謹、公正履行職責確保了投資者對政府的信任，進而增加其投資於有利經濟發展之長期項目的誘因。此外，作為政治家與經濟行為者之間的協調者，公正嚴謹履行職責的官僚往往有更強的能力與誘因來匯集並向政治家傳達有關政策執行的資訊，這能夠幫助政治家修改公共政策，進而提高政策應對不斷變化形勢時的適應能力。因此，基於政體對官僚品質的正向效應及官僚品質對經濟成長的積極影響，本文預期民主體制會通過增加官僚公正、嚴格履行其職責的可能性，間接加快發展的速度。
此外，政體也會通過影響政治家做出有利於經濟發展之決策的誘因，直接影響經濟成長。相較於非民主國家，越民主的體制問責性較高，無論是民眾自下而上的問責，還是不同制度、機構之間的水平監督，都使政治家更有動機去制定支撐長期發展的制度與政策，最終促進國家經濟成長。
為了檢驗上述論述，本文構建了一筆覆蓋全球國家的時間序列橫斷面資料，其中納入品質更高的最新測量指標。複層次模型的結果表明，在過去兩個世紀(1820–2019)中，政體對官僚品質有顯著的積極影響，即在更民主的體制下，官僚更有可能嚴謹、公正地履行職責。此外，涵蓋1900 至 2006 年 202 個國家及地區的複層次中介分析清楚表明，在7個主要大國及全球範圍內，官僚品質在政體與經濟成長之連結中均產生了穩健的中介效應。具體而言，在控制其他可能的影響因素後，政體對經濟成長具有總體效應，其中政體並無顯著的直接影響，但會經由官僚品質產生顯著且穩健的間接影響。
經驗結果證實，官僚品質在政體與經濟發展之連結中的確發揮著關鍵的中介作用。換言之，政體應被視為經濟成長的深層因素，而非直接來源。從此意義上而言，一個政體是否會促進發展，很大程度上取決於其能夠保證官僚在日常工作中嚴謹、公正地履行職責的程度。民主國家之所以較可能出現快速的經濟成長，是因為民主體制下的官僚品質往往更高。
本文從理論與經驗上重新檢視政體與經濟成長之關聯，具有理論及實踐價值。理論層面，通過從官僚的比較角度分析整個政策過程，將大量但分離的研究整合到一個更加連貫的研究議程中，同时對包含政治制度與經濟成長之關係在內的、有關發展的辯論有所貢獻。此外，鑑於官僚對國家發展的重要性，本文的初步分析為未來研究指引了方向，譬如延伸至更多元的官僚特徵、解釋一國內不同區域間的差異與時間趨勢，以及探討官僚如何影響其他社會經濟結果。基於實證結果，本文也建議在實踐中更多地關注官僚與官僚品質，並充分發揮其優勢以作為經濟發展的推動力。
What key factors account for economic development? The political regime, emphasized by many scholars who study institutions in the field of political science, is one common answer. However, the nexus between the political regime and economic growth has sizeable theoretical and empirical literature without a settled answer. Moreover, the reality of economic development seems to go against conventional wisdom. Given these, this dissertation seeks to rethink the nexus between the political regime and economic growth by establishing a new framework.
This dissertation argues that the political regime matters to growth but is not omnipotent, whereas it can help us better understand the variation in growth by considering the role of bureaucratic quality. Inspired by an impressive recent research trend, this dissertation claims that it is reasonable to rethink the political regime and growth nexus by distinguishing the direct and indirect impacts of the political regime. More importantly, bureaucratic quality should be superior to other mediated channels through which the political regime indirectly influences economic growth in view of the important role of bureaucrats in national economic development.
This dissertation proposes a theoretical framework via a comparative perspective from bureaucrats. In this framework, economic growth, as an outcome of a package of public policies, is a co-production of politicians’ policy-making and bureaucrats’ policy implementation. In addition to the direct effect of the political regime on growth, this framework emphasizes that bureaucratic quality plays a role as the key mediator of the nexus between the political regime and economic growth. In other words, the causal arrow should run from the political regime to bureaucratic quality to economic development.
First, bureaucratic quality is shaped by the political regime. A more democratic system tends to have a higher level of bureaucratic quality, because more restrictions on politicians’ power concerning bureaucratic personnel, as well as bottom-up effective monitoring from citizens based on a higher level of information transparency and accountability, increase the capability and incentives of bureaucrats to perform their duties rigorously and impartially.
Second, considering the role of bureaucrats in national economic development, bureaucratic quality is vital to growth. When policies come into effect, a well-functioning bureaucracy responsible for their implementation becomes especially important for a satisfactory policy outcome. Higher bureaucratic quality provides a virtuous circle, in which rigorous and impartial bureaucrats secure investors’ trust in the government and give them stronger incentives to invest in economically conducive long-term programs. In addition, as coordinators between politicians and economic actors, bureaucrats who impartially perform their duties often have greater ability and motivation to collect and convey information about policy implementation to politicians, which in turn can help politicians to modify public policies and improve their adaptability to changing situations. Therefore, in view of the positive effect of the political regime on bureaucratic quality and the positive impact of bureaucratic quality on growth, the political regime is supposed to indirectly boost the tempo of development by increasing the possibility that bureaucrats perform their duties impartially and rigorously.
Furthermore, the political regime directly impacts economic growth by shaping the incentives of politicians to make decisions conducive to national economic development. Compared with non-democratic regimes, more democratic regimes tend to have higher levels of accountability, both vertical and horizontal, which in turn provides greater incentives for politicians to initiate and reform institutions and policies that support long-term development, and ultimately spur economic growth.
This dissertation constructs a global panel to test these claims empirically. The time-series cross-sectional data compose the latest indicators with higher levels of measurement quality. The results drawn from multilevel models show that the political regime positively affects bureaucratic quality during the past two centuries (1820–2019): Bureaucrats under more democratic regimes are more likely to rigorously and impartially perform their duties. Moreover, multilevel mediation analyses of data from 202 countries over the period 1900–2006 clearly demonstrate a robust mediated effect of bureaucratic quality, both in seven great powers and globally. More specifically, after controlling for other determinants, the political regime has a total impact on economic growth, including an insignificant direct impact and a significant, robust, and indirect effect through bureaucratic quality.
These empirical findings confirm that bureaucratic quality plays a crucial role as a mediator in the nexus between the political regime and economic development. In other words, the political regime should be considered a deep determinant of growth rather than an immediate source. In this sense, whether a political regime can enhance growth largely depends on the extent to which it ensures that bureaucrats impartially and rigorously perform their duties in day-to-day work. Rapid economic growth is more likely to be observed in more democratic countries because higher levels of democracy can promote bureaucratic quality.
This dissertation makes contributions to the academic and practical fields. Using a comparative perspective from bureaucrats, this framework brings a large but disparate collection of research together into a coherent research agenda. It contributes to the debates about development, including but not limited to the nexus between the political regime and growth. Furthermore, this preliminary analysis offers several directions for future research, including the effects of various bureaucratic characteristics, regional variations and time trends within a specific country, and how bureaucrats influence other socio-economic outcomes. Regarding political practice, this dissertation proposes that bureaucrats should be given more attention and their advantages fully utilized. |
| Reference: | Acemoglu, Daron. 2008. Introduction to Modern Economic Growth. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Acemoglu, Daron, Camilo García-Jimeno, and James A. Robinson. 2015. “State Capacity and Economic Development: A Network Approach.” American Economic Review 105 (8): 2364–409.
Acemoglu, Daron, Suresh Naidu, Pascual Restrepo, and James A. Robinson. 2019. “Democracy Does Cause Growth.” Journal of Political Economy 127 (1): 47–100.
Acemoglu, Daron, Davide Ticchi, and Andrea Vindigni. 2011. “Emergence and Persistence of Inefficient States.” Journal of the European Economic Association 9 (2): 177–208.
Acemoglu, Daron, and James A. Robinson. 2006. Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Adams, Samuel, and Edem Kwame Mensah Klobodu. 2017. “Urbanization, Democracy, Bureaucratic Quality, and Environmental Degradation.” Journal of Policy Modeling 39(6): 1035–51.
Adserà, Alícia, Carles Boix, and Mark Payne. 2003. “Are You Being Served? Political Accountability and Quality of Government.” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 19 (2): 445–90.
Aghion, Phillipe, Alberto Alesina, and Francisco Trebbi. 2008. “Democracy, Technology, and Growth.” In Institutions and Economic Performance, ed. Helpman Elhanan, 511–43. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Agresti, Alan. 2018. Statistical Methods for the Social Sciences, 5th ed. Boston: Pearson.
Akaike, Hirotogu. 1973. “Information Theory and an Extension of the Maximum Likelihood Principle.” In Second International Symposium on Information Theory, eds. Boris Nikolaevich Petrov and Frigyes Csaki, 267–81. Budapest: Akademiai Kiado.
Alesina, Alberto, Sule Ozler, Nouriel Roubini, and Phill Swagel. 1996. “Political Instability and Economic Growth.” Journal of Economic Growth 1 (June): 189–211.
Alesina, Alberto, and Dani Rodrik. 1994. “Distributional Politics and Economic Growth.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 109 (May): 465–90.
Allison, Paul D. 2009. Fixed Effects Regression Models. London: Sage.
Almeida, Heitor, and Daniel Ferreira. 2002. “Democracy and the Variability of Economic Performance.” Economics and Politics 14 (3): 225–57.
Alvarez, Mike, José Antonio Cheibub, Fernando Limongi, and Adam Przeworski. 1996. “Classifying Political Regimes.” Studies in Comparative International Development 31 (2): 3–36.
Anckar, Carsten, and Cecilia Fredriksson. 2019. “Classifying Political Regimes 1800–2016: A Typology and a New Dataset.” European Political Science 18 (1): 84¬–96.
Andersen, David Delfs Erbo. 2018. “Does Meritocracy Lead to Bureaucratic Quality? Revisiting the Experience of Prussia and Imperial and Weimar Germany.” Social Science History 42 (2): 245¬–68.
Andersen, David Delfs Erbo. 2021. “The Limits of Meritocracy in Stabilizing Democracy and the Twin Importance of Bureaucratic Impartiality and Effectiveness.” Social Science History 45 (3): 535–59.
Andersen, David Delfs Erbo, and Jonathan Doucette. 2022. “State First? A Disaggregation and Empirical Interrogation.” British Journal of Political Science 52 (1): 408–15.
Andersen, David Delfs Erbo, and Suthan Krishnarajan. 2019. “Economic Crisis, Bureaucratic Quality and Democratic Breakdown.” Government and Opposition 54 (4): 715–44.
Andersen, David Delfs Erbo, Jørgen Møller, Lasse Lykke Rørbæk, and Svend-Erik Skaaning. 2014. “State Capacity and Political Regime Stability.” Democratization 21(7): 1305–25.
Andrews, Matt. 2008. “The Good Governance Agenda: Beyond Indicators without Theory.” Oxford Development Studies 36 (4): 379–407.
Arif, Babur Wasim, Farrukh Nawaz Kayani, and Mr Umar Nawaz Kayani. 2012. “The Interrelationship between Democracy and Economic Growth: Theories and Empirics.” Pakistan Journal of Social Sciences 32 (1): 199–208.
Ashworth, Scott. 2012. “Electoral Accountability: Recent Theoretical and Empirical Work.” Annual Review of Political Science 15: 183–201.
Aucoin, Peter. 2012. “New Political Governance in Westminster Systems: Impartial Public Administration and Management Performance at Risk.” Governance 25 (2):177–99.
Bäck, Hanna, and Axel Hadenius. 2008. “Democracy and State Capacity: Exploring a J-Shaped Relationship.” Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration and Institutions 21 (1): 1–24.
Baron, Reuben M., and David A. Kenny. 1986. “The Moderator–Mediator Variable Distinction in Social Psychological Research: Conceptual, Strategic, and Statistical Considerations.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 51 (6): 1173¬–82.
Barro, Robert J. 1996. “Democracy and Growth.” Journal of Economic Growth 1 (1): 1–27.
Barro, Robert J. 2003. “Determinants of Economic Growth in a Panel of Countries.” Annals of Economics and Finance 4: 231–74.
Barro, Robert J. 2013. “Democracy, Law and Order, and Economic Growth.” In 2013 Index of Economic Freedom, eds. Terry Miller, Kim R. Holmes, and Edwin J. Feulner, 41–58. Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation and Dow Jones & Company, Inc.
Barro, Robert J., and Xavier Sala-i-Martin. 1992. “Convergence.” Journal of Political Economy 100 (2): 223–51.
Bates, Douglas, Martin Maechler, Ben Bolker, Steven Walker, Rune Haubo Bojesen Christensen, Henrik Singmann, Bin Dai, Fabian Scheipl, Gabor Grothendieck, Peter Green, John Fox. 2022. lme4 ver. 1.1-29 (R package). URL: https://github.com/lme4/lme4/.
Bates, Robert H. 1981. Markets and States in Tropical Africa: The Political Basis of Agricultural Policies. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Bates, Robert H., Ghada Fayad, and Anke Hoeffler. 2012. “The State of Democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa.” International Area Studies Review 15 (4): 323–38.
Baum, Matthew A., and David A. Lake. 2003. “The Political Economy of Growth: Democracy and Human Capital.” American Journal of Political Science 47 (2): 333–47.
Beck, Nathaniel. 2001. “Time-Series-Cross-Section-Data: What Have We Learned in The Past Few Years?” Annual Review of Political Science 4: 271–93.
Beck, Nathaniel, and Jonathan N. Katz. 2001. “Throwing out the Baby with the Bath Water: A Comment on Green, Kim, and Yoon.” International Organization 55 (2): 487–95.
Beck, Nathaniel, and Jonathan N. Katz. 2007. “Random Coefficient Models for Time-Series-Cross-Section Data: Monte Carlo Experiments.” Political Analysis 15 (2): 182–95.
Bell, Andrew, and Kelvyn Jones. 2015. “Explaining Fixed Effects: Random Effects Modeling of Time-Series Cross-Sectional and Panel Data.” Political Science Research and Methods 3 (1): 133–53.
Berry, William D., Matt Golder, and Daniel Milton. 2012. “Improving Tests of Theories Positing Interaction.” Journal of Politics 74 (3): 653–71.
Besley, Timothy and Masayuki Kudamatsu. 2008. “Making autocracy work.” In Institutions and Economic Performance, ed. Helpman Elhanan, 452–510. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Best, Henning, and Christof Wolf. 2015. “Logistic regression.” In The SAGE Handbook of Regression Analysis and Causal Inference, eds. Henning Best and Christof Wolf, 153–72. Los Angeles: Sage Reference.
Bhalla, Surjit. 1994. “Freedom and Economic Growth: A Virtuous Cycle?” In Democracy’s Victory and Crisis, ed. Axel Hadenius, 195–241. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bjørnskov, Christian, and Martin Rode. 2020. “Regime Types and Regime Change: A New Dataset on Democracy, Coups, and Political Institutions.” Review of International Organizations 15 (2): 531–51.
Bogaards, Matthijs. 2012. “Where to Draw the Line? From Degree to Dichotomy in Measures of Democracy.” Democratization 19 (4): 690–712.
Boix, Carles. 2003. Democracy and Redistribution. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Boix, Carles. 2011. “Democracy, Development, and the International System.” American Political Science Review 105 (4): 809–28.
Boix, Carles, Michael Miller, and Sebastian Rosato. 2012. “A Complete Data Set of Political Regimes, 1800–2007.” Comparative Political Studies 46 (12): 1523–54.
Boix, Carles, Michael Miller, and Sebastian Rosato. 2018. Boix–Miller–Rosato Dichotomous Coding of Democracy, 1800–2015. Harvard Dataverse.
Boix, Carles, and Susan C. Stokes. 2003. “Endogenous Democratization.” World Politics 55 (4): 517–49.
Bollen, Kenneth A. 1980. “Issues in the Comparative Measurement of Political Democracy.” American Sociological Review 45 (3): 370–90.
Bollen, Kenneth A., and Robert W. Jackman. 1989. “Democracy, Stability, and Dichotomies.” American Sociological Review 54 (4): 612–21.
Bolt, Jutta, and Jan Luiten van Zanden. 2020. “Maddison Style Estimates of the Evolution of the World Economy. A New 2020 Update.” Maddison–Project Working Paper WP–15. Groningen, The Netherlands: University of Groningen.
Boräng, Frida, Agnes Cornell, Marcia Grimes, and Christian Schuster. 2018. “Cooking the Books: Bureaucratic Politicization and Policy Knowledge.” Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration and Institution 31 (1): 7–26.
Bowman, Kirk, Fabrice Lehoucq, and James Mahoney. 2005. “Measuring political democracy: Case expertise, data adequacy, and Central America.” Comparative Political Studies 38 (8): 939–70.
Brambor, Thomas, William Roberts Clark, and Matt Golder. 2006. “Understanding Interaction Models: Improving Empirical Analyses.” Political Analysis 14 (1): 63–82.
Burkhart, Ross E., and Michael S. Lewis-Beck. 1994. “Comparative Democracy: The Economic Development Thesis.” American Political Science Review 88 (4): 903–10.
Cardoso, Fernando H. 2001. Charting a New Course: The Politics of Globalization and Social Transformation. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
Casper, Gretchen, and Claudiu Tufis. 2003. “Correlation Versus Interchangeability: The Limited Robustness of Empirical Findings on Democracy Using Highly Correlated Data Sets.” Political Analysis 11 (2): 196–203.
Chandra, Debnath Sajit, and Kenji Yokoyama. 2011. “The Role of Good Governance in the Knowledge-Based Economic Growth of East-Asia: A Study on Japan, Newly Industrialized Economies, Malaysia and China.” 社會システム研究 22: 23–49.
Charron, Nicholas, and Victor Lapuente. 2010. “Does Democracy Produce Quality of Government?” European Journal of Political Research 49 (4): 443–70.
Charron, Nicholas, and Victor Lapuente. 2011. “Which Dictators Produce Quality of Government?” Studies in Comparative International Development 46 (4): 397–423.
Cheibub, José Antonio, Jennifer Gandhi, and James Raymond Vreeland. 2010. “Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited.” Public Choice 143 (1–2): 67¬–101.
Chen, Shuo, Xue Qiao, and Zhitao Zhu. 2021. “Chasing or Cheating? Theory and Evidence on China’s GDP Manipulation.” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 189: 657–71.
Christensen, Rune Haubo Bojesen. 2019. ordinal ver. 2019.12-10 (R package). URL: https://github.com/runehaubo/ordinal.
Clague, Christopher, Philip Keefer, Stephen Knack, and Mancur Olson. 1996. “Property and Contract Rights in Autocracies and Democracies.” Journal of Economic Growth 1 (2): 243–76.
Clague, Christopher, Philip Keefer, Stephen Knack, and Mancur Olson. 1997. “Democracy, Autocracy and the Institutions Supportive of Economic Growth.” In Institutions and Economic Development: Growth and Governance in Less-Developed and Post-Socialist Countries, ed. Christopher Clague, 91–119. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.
Clio-Infra. 2018. “Clio-Infra Project (Database).” URL: http://www.clio-infra.eu/.
Coggan, Philip. 2020. More: The 10000-year Rise of the World Economy. London: Profile Books.
Cohen, Youssef. 1985. “The Impact of Bureaucratic-Authoritarian Rule on Economic Growth.” Comparative Political Studies 18 (April): 123–36.
Colagrossi, Marco, Domenico Rossignoli, and Mario A. Maggioni. 2020. “Does Democracy Cause Growth? A Meta-Analysis (of 2000 Regressions).” European Journal of Political Economy 61: 101824.
Collier, David, and Robert Adcock. 1999. “Democracy and Dichotomies: A Pragmatic Approach to Choices about Concepts.” Annual Review of Political Science 2: 537–65.
Collier, David, and Steven Levitsky. 1997. “Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research.” World Politics 49 (3): 430–51.
Collier, Ruth, and David Collier. 1991. Shaping the Political Arena: Critical Junctures, the Labor Movement, and Regime Dynamics in Latin America. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Collins, Linda M., John J. Graham, and Brian P. Flaherty. 1998. “An Alternative Framework for Defining Mediation.” Multivariate Behavioral Research 33 (2): 295¬¬–312.
Colonnelli, Emanuele, Mounu Prem, and Edoardo Teso. 2020. “Patronage and Selection in Public Sector Organizations.” American Economic Review 110 (10): 3071–99.
Comeau, Ludovic. 2003. “Democracy and Growth: A Relationship Revisited.” Eastern Economic Journal 29 (1): 1–21.
Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Jan Teorell, Nazifa Alizada, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Lisa Gastaldi, Haakon Gjerløw, Adam Glynn, Sandra Grahn, Allen Hicken, Garry Hindle, Nina Ilchenko, Katrin Kinzelbach, Joshua Krusell, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya, Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Oskar Rydén, Johannes von Römer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundström, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson and Daniel Ziblatt. 2022a. “V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v12.” Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. URL: https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemds22.
Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Jan Teorell, Nazifa Alizada, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Lisa Gastaldi, Haakon Gjerløw, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Garry Hindle, Nina Ilchenko, Joshua Krusell, Anna Luhrmann, Seraphine F. Maerz, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von Römer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundström, Ei-tan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2021. “V-Dem [Country–Year/Country–Date] Dataset v11.1” Varieties of Democracy Project. Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. Gothenburg, Sweden: V-Dem Institute. URL: https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemds21.
Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Lisa Gastaldi, Haakon Gjerløw, Adam Glynn, Sandra Grahn, Allen Hicken, Katrin Kinzelbach, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Johannes von Römer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jeffrey Staton, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2022b. “V-Dem Codebook v12.” Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project.
Coppedge, Michael, Staffan Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, and Jan Teorell. 2016. “Measuring High Level Democratic Principles Using the V-Dem Data.” International Political Science Review 37 (5): 580–93.
Cornell, Agnes. 2014. “Why Bureaucratic Stability Matters for the Implementation of Democratic Governance Programs.” Governance 27 (2):191¬–214.
Cornell, Agnes, Carl Henrik Knutsen, and Jan Teorell. 2020. “Bureaucracy and Growth.” Comparative Political Studies 53 (14): 2246–82.
Cornell, Agnes, and Victor Lapuente. 2014. “Meritocratic Administration and Democratic Stability.” Democratization 21 (7): 1286–304.
Cutright, Phillips. 1969. “National Political Development: Measurement and Analysis.” American Sociological Review 28 (2): 253–64.
Dahl, Robert A. 1971. Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Dahlström Carl, and Victor Lapuente. 2017. Organizing Leviathan: Politicians, Bureaucrats, and the Making of Good Government. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Dahlström, Carl, Victor Lapuente, and Jan Teorell. 2012. “The Merit of Meritocratization: Politics, Bureaucracy, and the Institutional Deterrents of Corruption.” Political Research Quarterly 65 (3): 656–68.
Dahlström, Carl and Jan Teorell, and Stefan Dahlberg, Felix Hartmann, Annika Lindberg, and Marina Nistotskaya. 2015. “The QoG Expert Survey Dataset II (2015): Codebook.” University of Gothenburg: The Quality of Government Institute. URL: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3569570.
de Haan, Jakob, and Clemens L. J. Siermann. 1995. “A Sensitivity Analysis of the Impact of Democracy on Economic Growth?” Empirical Economics 20 (2): 197–215.
Dethier, Jean-Jacques, Hafez Ghanem, and Edda Zoli. 1999. “Does Democracy Facilitate the Economic Transition? An Empirical Study of Central and Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union.” Policy Research Working Paper No. 2194. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Diamond, Larry. 2002. “Elections without Democracy: Thinking about Hybrid Regimes.” Journal of Democracy 13 (2): 21–35.
Dick, G. William. 1974. “Authoritarian versus Nonauthoritarian Approaches to Economic Development.” Journal of Political Economy 82 (4): 817–27.
Dixit, Avinash K. 2010. “Democracy, Autocracy and Bureaucracy.” Journal of Globalization and Development 1 (1): 1–45.
Dobbs, Richard, James Manyika, Jaana Remes, and Jonathan Woetzel. 2015. Is GDP the Best Measure of Growth? McKinsey and Company. URL: https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/employment-and-growth/is-gdp-the-best-measure-of-growth.
Dollar, David, and Aart Kraay. 2004. “Trade, Growth, and Poverty.” The Economic Journal 114 (493): F22¬–49.
Doucouliagos, Hristos, and Mehmet Ali Ulubaşoğlu. 2008. “Democracy and Economic Growth: A Meta-Analysis.” American Journal of Political Science 52 (1): 61–83.
Elkins, Zachary. 2000. “Gradations of Democracy? Empirical Tests of Alternative Conceptualizations.” American Journal of Political Science 44 (2): 293–300.
Evans, Peter B. 1989. “Predatory, Developmental and Other Apparatuses: A Comparative Political Economy Perspective on the Third World State.” Sociological Forum 4 (4): 561–87.
Evans, Peter B. 1995. Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Evans, Peter, and James E. Rauch. 1999. “Bureaucracy and Growth: A Cross-National Analysis of the Effects of ‘Weberian’ State Structures on Economic Growth.” American Sociological Review 64 (5):748–65.
Evans, Peter B., Dieter Reuschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds. 1985. Bringing the State Back In. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Ezrow, Natasha M., and Erica Frantz. 2011. Dictators and Dictatorships: Understanding Authoritarian Regimes and Their Leaders. New York: The Continuum International Publishing Group.
Fariss, Christopher J., Charles D. Crabtree, Therese Anders, Zachary M. Jones, Fridolin J. Linder, and Jonathan N. Markowitz. 2017. “Latent Estimation of GDP, GDP per capita, and Population from Historic and Contemporary Sources.” Working paper. URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1706.01099.
Fariss, Christopher J., Therese Anders, Jonathan Markowitz, and Miriam Barnum. 2021. “Replication Data for: New Estimates of Over 500 Years of Historic GDP and Population Data.” Harvard Dataverse, V4. URL: https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/DC0ING,
Fariss, Christopher J., Therese Anders, Jonathan N. Markowitz, and Miriam Barnum. 2022. “New Estimates of Over 500 Years of Historic GDP and Population Data.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 66 (3): 553–91.
Farr, W. Ken, Richard A. Lord, and J. Larry Wolfenbarger. 1998. “Economic Freedom, Political Freedom, and Economic Well-Being: A Causality Analysis.” Cato Journal 18 (2): 247–62.
Fearon, James. 1999. “Electoral Accountability and the Control of Politicians: Selecting Good Types versus Sanctioning Poor Performance.” In Democracy, Accountability, and Representation, eds. Adam Przeworski, SusanStokes, and Bernard Manin, 55–97. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Feng, Yi. 1997. “Democracy, Political Stability and Economic Growth.” British Journal of Political Science 27 (3): 391–418.
Feng, Yi. 2003. Democracy, Governance and Economic Performance: Theory and Evidence. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Fishman, Robert M. 1990. “Rethinking State and Regime: Southern Europe’s Transition to Democracy.” World Politics 42 (3): 422–40.
Fortunato, Piergiuseppe and Ugo Panizza. 2015. “Democracy, Education and the Quality of Government.” Journal of Economic Growth 20 (4): 333–63.
Frankel, Jeffrey, and David Romer. 1999. “Does Trade Cause Growth?” American Economic Review 89 (3): 379–99.
Frantz, Erica. 2018. Authoritarianism: What Everyone Needs to Know. New York: Oxford University Press.
Freedom House. 2019. Freedom in the World 2019 Methodology. Washington, DC: Freedom House. URL: https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2020-02/Methodology_FIW_2019_for_website.pdf.
Freedom House. 2022a. Freedom in the World 2022. Washington, DC: Freedom House. URL: https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2022-02/FIW_2022_PDF_Booklet_Digital_Final_Web.pdf.
Freedom House. 2022b. Freedom in the World 2022 Methodology. Washington, DC: Freedom House. URL: https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2022-02/FIW_2022_Methodology_For_Web.pdf.
Fukuyama, Francis. 2013. “What is Governance?” Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration and Institutions 26 (3): 347–68.
Gailmard, Sean, and John W. Patty. 2007. “Slackers and Zealots: Civil Service, Policy Discretion, and Bureaucratic Expertise.” American Journal of Political Science 51
(4): 873–89.
Gailmard, Sean, and John W. Patty. 2012. “Formal Models of Bureaucracy.” Annual Review of Political Science 15: 353–77.
Gallup, John Luke, Jeffrey D. Sachs, and Andrew D. Mellinger. 1999. “Geography and Economic Development.” International Regional Science Review 22 (2): 179–232.
Gandhi, Jennifer. 2008. Political Institutions under Dictatorship. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Gasiorowski, Mark J. 1996. “An Overview of the Political Regime Change Dataset.” Comparative Political Studies 29 (4): 469¬–83.
Gastil, Raymond D., Charles R. Beitz, Grace Goodell, Stephen J. Morris, John P. Powelson, Roy L. Prosterman, Jeffrey M. Riedinger, Leonard R. Sussman, George Weigel, and Lindsay M. Wright. 1982. Freedom in the World: Political Rights and Civil Liberties 1982. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
Gastil, Raymond D., William A. Douglas, June Teufel Dreyer, Jerome B. Grieder, Liang Heng, Mab Huang, Peter R. Moody, Jr., Lucian W. Pye, James D. Seymour, Norris Smith, Lawrence R. Sullivan, Leonard R. Sussman, and Lindsay M. Wright. 1984. Freedom in the World: Political Rights and Civil Liberties 1983–1984. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
Geddes, Barbara, Joseph Wright, and Erica Frantz. 2014. “Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions: A New Data Set.” Perspectives on Politics 12 (2): 313–31.
Gelman, Andrew, and Jennifer Hill. 2007. Data Analysis Using Regression and Multilevel/Hierarchical Models. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Gerring, John., Philip Bond, William T. Barndt, and Carola Moreno. 2005. “Democracy and Economic Growth: A Historical Perspective.” World Politics 57 (3): 323–64.
Ghardallou, Wafa, and Dorsaf Sridi. 2020. “Democracy and Economic Growth: A Literature Review.” Journal of the Knowledge Economy 11 (3): 982–1002.
Gibson, John, Susan Olivia, and Geua Boe‐Gibson. 2020. “Night Lights in Economics: Sources and Uses.” Journal of Economic Surveys 34 (5): 955–80.
Gisselquist, Rachel M. 2014. “Developing and Evaluating Governance Indexes: 10 Questions.” Policy Studies 35 (5): 513–31.
Glaeser, Edward L., Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer. 2004. “Do Institutions Cause Growth?” Journal of Economic Growth 9 (3): 271–303.
Greif, Avner. 2008. “The Impact of Administrative Power on Political and Economic Developments Toward a Political Economy of Implementation.” In Institutions and Economic Performance, ed. Elhanan Helpman, 17–63. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Grier, Kevin B., and Gordon Tullock. 1989. “An Empirical Analysis of Cross-National Economic Growth, 1951–80.” Journal of Monetary Economics 24 (2): 259–76.
Grossman, Guy, and Tara Slough. 2022. “Government Responsiveness in Developing Countries.” Annual Review of Political Science 25: 5.1–5.23.
Gründler, Klaus, and Tommy Krieger. 2016. “Democracy and Growth: Evidence from a Machine Learning Indicator.” European Journal of Political Economy 45: 85–107.
Gründler, Klaus, and Tommy Krieger. 2021. “Using Machine Learning for Measuring Democracy: A Practitioners Guide and A New Updated Dataset for 186 Countries from 1919 to 2019.” European Journal of Political Economy 70: 102047.
Gründler, Klaus, and Tommy Krieger. 2022. “Should We Care (more) about Aggregation?” European Economic Review 142: 104010.
Gupta, Dipak K., M. C. Madhavan, and Andrew Blee. 1998. “Democracy, Economic Growth and Political Instability: An Integrated Perspective.” Journal of Socio-Economics 27 (5): 587–89.
Haber, Stephen, and Victor Menaldo. 2011. “Do Natural Resources Fuel Authoritarianism? A Reappraisal of the Resource Curse.” American Political Science Review 105 (1): 1–26.
Hadenius, Axel, and Jan Teorell, 2007. “Pathways from Authoritarianism.” Journal of Democracy 18 (1): 143–57.
Hadenius, Axel, and Jan Teorell. 2005. “Cultural and Economic Prerequisites of Democracy: Reassessing Recent Evidence.” Studies in Comparative International Development 39 (4): 87¬–106.
Hall, Richard H. 1963. “The Concept of Bureaucracy: An Empirical Assessment.” American Journal of Sociology 69 (1): 32¬–41.
Halperin, Morton, Joe Siegle, and Michael Weinstein. 2005. The Democracy Advantage: How Democracies Promote Prosperity and Peace. New York: Routledge.
Helliwell, John E 1994. “Empirical Linkages Between Democracy and Economic Growth.” British Journal of Political Science 24 (April): 225–48.
Helpman, Elhanan. 2004. The Mystery of Economic Growth. Cambridge: The Belknapp Press of Harvard University Press.
Henderson, J. Vernon, Adam Storeygard, and David N. Weil. 2011. “A Bright Idea for Measuring Economic Growth.” American Economic Review 101 (3): 194–99.
Henderson, J. Vernon, Adam Storeygard, and David N. Weil. 2012. “Measuring Economic Growth from Outer Space.” American Economic Review 102 (2): 994–1028.
Hendrix, Cullen S. 2010. “Measuring State Capacity: Theoretical and Empirical Implications for the Study of Civil Conflict.” Journal of Peace Research 47 (3): 273–85.
Hill, R. Carter, William E. Griffiths, and Guay C. Lim. 2018. Principles of Econometrics, 5th ed. Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons.
Högström, John. 2013. “Does the Choice of Democracy Measure Matter? Comparisons between the Two Leading Democracy Indices, Freedom House and Polity IV.” Government and Opposition 48 (2): 201–21.
Holmbeck, Grayson N. 1997. “Toward Terminological, Conceptual, and Statistical Clarity in the Study of Mediators and Moderators: Examples from the Child-Clinical and Pediatric Psychology Literatures.” Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology 65 (4): 599–610.
Hox, Joop J., Mirjam Moerbeek, and Rens Van de Schoot. 2010. Multilevel Analysis: Techniques and Applications. New York: Routledge.
Huang, Chi. 2015. “Endogenous Regressors in Nonlinear Probability Models: A Generalized Structural Equations Modeling Approach.” Journal of Electoral Studies 22 (1): 1¬–33.
Huang, Chi, and Todd G. Shields. 2000. “Interpretation of Interaction Effects in Logit and Probit Analyses: Reconsidering the Relationship between Registration Laws, Education, and Voter Turnout.” American Politics Quarterly 28 (1): 80–95.
Huber, John D. and Nolan McCarty. 2004. “Bureaucratic Capacity, Delegation and Political Reform.” American Political Science Review 98 (3): 481–94.
Huber, John D., and Michael M. Ting. 2021. “Civil Service and Patronage in Bureaucracies.” Journal of Politics 83 (3): 902–16.
Huntington, Samuel P. 1968. Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Huntington, Samuel P. 1991. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
Huntington, Samuel P., and Jorge I. Dominguez. 1975. “Political Development.” In Handbook of Political Science Vol. 3, eds. Fred I Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, 1–114. Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co.
Isham, Jonathan, Michael Woolcock, Lant Pritchett, and Gwen Busby. 2005. “The Varieties of Resource Experience: Natural Resource Export Structures and the Political Economy of Economic Growth.” World Bank Economic Review 19 (2): 141–74.
Jacob, Jeffry A., and Thomas Osang. 2020. “Democracy and Growth: A Dynamic Panel Data Study.” Singapore Economic Review 65 (1): 41–80.
Jiang, Junyan. 2018. “Making Bureaucracy Work: Patronage Networks, Performance Incentives, and Economic Development in China.” American Journal of Political Science 62 (4): 982–99.
Johnson, Chalmers A. 1982. MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925–1975. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Johnson, Chalmers. 1999. “The Developmental State: Odyssey of a Concept.” In The Developmental State, ed. Meredith Woo-Cumings, 32–60. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Kabir, M. Adnan, and Najib Alam. 2021. “The Efficacy of Democracy and Freedom in Fostering Economic Growth.” Emerging Economy Studies 7 (1): 76–93.
Kaufmann, Daniel, and Aart Kraay. 2008. “Governance Indicators: Where Are We, Where Should We Be Going?” The World Bank Research Observer 23 (1): 1–30.
Kaufmann, Daniel, and Aart Kraay. 2021. “Worldwide Governance Indicators.” URL: http://www.govindicators.org.
Kaufmann, Daniel, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi. 2004. “Governance Matters III: Governance Indicators for 1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002.” The World Bank Economic Review 18 (2): 253–87.
Kaufmann, Daniel, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi. 2005. “Governance Matters IV: Governance Indicators for 1996-2004.” Policy Research Working Paper No. 3630. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Kaufmann, Daniel, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi. 2006. “Governance Matters V: Governance Indicators for 1996-2005.” Policy Research Working Paper No. 4012. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Kaufmann, Daniel, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi. 2007. “Governance Matters VI: Governance Indicators for 1996–2006.” Policy Research Working Paper No. 4280. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Kaufmann, Daniel, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi. 2008. “Governance Matters VII: Governance Indicators for 1996¬¬–2007.” Policy Research Working Paper No. 4654. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Kaufmann, Daniel, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi. 2009. “Governance Matters VIII: Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators, 1996-2008.” Policy Research Working Paper No. 4978. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Kaufmann, Daniel, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi. 2011. “The Worldwide Governance Indicators: Methodology and Analytical Issues.” Hague Journal on the Rule of Law 3 (2): 220–46.
Kaufmann, Daniel, Aart Kraay, and Pablo Zoido-Lobatón. 1999a. “Governance matters.” Policy Research Working Paper No. 2196. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Kaufmann, Daniel, Aart Kraay, and Pablo Zoido-Lobatón. 1999b. Aggregating Governance Indicators. Policy Research Working Paper No. 2195. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Kaufmann, Daniel, Aart Kraay, and Pablo Zoido-Lobatón. 2002. “Governance Matters II: Updated Indicators for 2000-01.” Policy Research Working Paper No. 2772. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Kenny, David. A., Kashy, Deborah. A., and Bolger, Niall. 1998. “Data Analysis in Social Psychology.” In Handbook of Social Psychology, 4th ed. (Vol. 1), eds. Daniel T. Gilbert, Susan T. Fiske, and Gardner Lindzey, 233–65. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Kenny, David A., Josephine D. Korchmaros, and Niall Bolger. 2003. “Lower Level Mediation in Multilevel Models.” Psychological Methods 8 (2): 115–28.
Kenyon, Thomas, and Megumi Naoi. 2010. “Policy Uncertainty in Hybrid Regimes: Evidence from Firm-Level Surveys.” Comparative Political Studies 43 (4): 486–510.
Kinder, Donald R., and D. Roderick Kiewiet. 1981. “Sociotropic Politics: The American Case.” British Journal of Political Science 11 (2): 129–61.
Klenow, Peter J., and Andres Rodriguez-Clare. 1997. “The Neoclassical Revival in Growth Economics: Has It Gone Too Far?” NBER Macroeconomics Annual 12: 73–103.
Knack, Stephen. 2000. “Social Capital and the Quality of Government: Evidence from the United States.” Policy Research Working Paper No. 2504. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Knutsen, Carl Henrik. 2011a. The Economic Effects of Democracy and Dictatorship. Ph. D. dissertation. Oslo: Department of Political Science, University of Oslo.
Knutsen, Carl Henrik. 2011b. “Democracy, Dictatorship and Protection of Property Rights.” Journal of Development Studies 47 (1): 164–82.
Knutsen, Carl Henrik. 2012. “Democracy, Technological Change and Economic Growth.” Technical Report, Department of Political Science, University of Oslo.
Knutsen, Carl Henrik. 2013. “Democracy, State Capacity, and Economic Growth.” World Development 43: 1–18.
Knutsen, Carl Henrik. 2021. “Autocracy and Variation in Economic Development Outcomes.” In Research Handbook on Democracy and Development, eds. Gordon Crawford and Abdul-Gafaru Abdulai, 117–34. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Kormendi, Roger C., and Philip G. Meguire. 1985. “Macroeconomic Determinants of Growth: Cross-Country Evidence.” Journal of Monetary economics 16 (2): 141–63.
Kosack, Stephen, and Archon Fung. 2014. “Does Transparency Improve Governance?” Annual Review of Political Science 17: 65–87.
Krause, George A., David E. Lewis, and James W. Douglas. 2006. “Political Appointments, Civil Service Systems, and Bureaucratic Competence: Organizational Balancing and Executive Branch Revenue Forecasts in the American States.” American Journal of Political Science 50 (3): 770¬–87.
Krieckhaus, Jonathan. 2004. “The Regime Debate Revisted: A Sensitivity Analysis of Democracy’s Economic Effect.” British Journal of Political Science 34 (4): 635–55.
Krieckhaus, Jonathan. 2006. “Democracy and Economic Growth: How Regional Context Influences Regime Effects.” British Journal of Political Science 36 (2): 317–40.
Krull, Jennifer L., and David P. MacKinnon. 1999. “Multilevel Mediation Modeling in Group-Based Intervention Studies.” Evaluation Review 23: 41–44.
Krull, Jennifer L., and David P. MacKinnon. 2001. “Multilevel Modeling of Individual and Group Level Mediated Effects.” Multivariate Behavioral Research 36 (2): 249–77.
Kucharčíková, Alţbeta. 2011. “Human Capital–Definitions and Approaches.” Human Resources Management & Ergonomics 5 (2): 60–70.
Kurtz, Marcus, and Andrew Schrank. 2007a. “Growth and Governance: Models, Measures, and Mechanisms.” Journal of Politics 69 (2): 538–54.
Kurtz, Marcus, and Andrew Schrank. 2007b. “Growth and Governance: A Defense.” Journal of Politics 69 (2): 563–9.
Kurzman, Charles, Regina Werum, and Ross E. Burkhart. 2002. “Democracy’s Effect on Economic Growth: A Pooled Time-Series Analysis, 1951–1980.” Studies in Comparative International Development 37 (1): 3–33.
Kuznets, Simon. 1973. “Modern Economic Growth: Findings and Reflections.” American Economic Review 63 (3): 247–58.
La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny. 1999. “The Quality of Government.” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 15 (1): 222–79.
Landau, Daniel. 1986. “Government and Economic Growth in the LDC’s: An Empirical Study for 1960-1980.” Economic Development and Cultural Change 35 (October): 35–75.
Lane, Jan-Erik. 2013. “The Principal-Agent Approach to Politics: Policy Implementation and Public Policy-Making.” Open Journal of Political Science 3 (2): 85–9.
Langbein, Laura, and Stephen Knack. 2010. “The Worldwide Governance Indicators: Six, One, or None?” Journal of Development Studies 46 (2): 350–70.
Lawson, Stephanie. 1993. “Conceptual Issues in the Comparative Study of Regime Change.” Comparative Politics 25 (2): 183¬–205.
Leblang, David A. 1996. “Property Rights, Democracy and Economic Growth.” Political Research Quarterly 49 (1): 5–26.
Leblang, David A. 1997. “Political Democracy and Economic Growth: Pooled Cross Sectional and Time-Series Evidence.” British Journal of Political Science 27 (July): 453¬–72.
Leeper, Thomas J. 2021. “Interpreting Regression Results using Average Marginal Effects with R’s margins.” URL: https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/margins/vignettes/TechnicalDetails.pdf.
Leeper, Thomas J., Jeffrey Arnold, Vincent Arel-Bundock, andJacob A. Long. 2021. margins ver. 0.3.26 (R package). URL: https://github.com/leeper/margins.
Levitsky, Steven, and Lucan A. Way. 2002. “Elections without Democracy: The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism.” Journal of Democracy 13 (2): 51–65.
Levitsky, Steven, and Lucan A. Way. 2010. Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Levitsky, Steven, and Lucan A. Way. 2020. “The New Competitive Authoritarianism.” Journal of Democracy 31 (1): 51¬–65.
Lewis, David E. 2008. The Politics of Presidential Appointments: Political Control and Bureaucratic Performance. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Lewis-Beck, Michael S. 1988. Economics and Elections: The Major Western Democracies. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Lewis-Beck, Michael S., Richard Nadeau, and Angelo Elias. 2008. “Economics, Party, and the Vote: Causality Issues and Panel Data.” American Journal of Political Science 52 (1): 84–95.
Lewis-Beck, Michael S., and Mary Stegmaier. 2007. “Economic Models of Voting.” In The Oxford Handbook of Political Behavior, eds. Russell J. Dalton and Hans-Dieter Klingemann, 518–37. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Libman, Alexander. 2012. “Democracy and Growth: Is the Effect Non-Linear?” Economic Research Guardian 2 (1): 99–120.
Lind, Jo Thori, and Halvor Mehlum. 2010. “With or without U? The appropriate test for a U‐shaped relationship.” Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 72 (1): 109–18.
Linz Juan J., and Alfred Stepan. 1996. Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Lipset, Seymour Martin. 1959. “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy.” American Political Science Review 53 (1): 69¬–105.
Lipsky, Michael. 2010. Street-level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Service, 30th anniversary expanded edition. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
Lockwood, Chondra M., and David P. MacKinnon. 1998. “Bootstrapping the Standard Error of the Mediated Effect.” Proceedings of the 23rd annual meeting of SAS Users Group International. Cary, NC: SAS Institute. 997–1002.
Long, J. Scott. 1997. Regression Models for Categorical and Limited Dependent Variables. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Long, J. Scott, and Jeremy Freese. 2014. Regression Models for Categorical Dependent Variables Using Stata, 3rd ed. College Station, TX: Stata Press.
Lüdecke, Daniel, Frederik Aust, Sam Crawley, and Mattan S. Ben-Shachar. 2022. ggeffects ver. 1.1.2 (R package). URL: https://strengejacke.github.io/ggeffects/.
Lührmann, Anna, Marcus Tannenberg, and Staffan I. Lindberg. 2018. “Regimes of the World (RoW): Opening New Avenues for the Comparative Study of Political Regimes.” Politics and Governance 6 (1): 60¬–77.
MacKinnon, David P., Amanda J. Fairchild, and Matthew S. Fritz. 2007. “Mediation Analysis.” Annual Review of Psychology 58: 593–614.
MacKinnon, David P., and Chondra M Lockwood. 1997. “The Power to Detect Mediated Effects in Experimental and Correlational Studies.” Unpublished manuscript.
MacKinnon, David P., Chondra M. Lockwood, Jeanne M. Hoffman, Stephen G. West, and Virgil Sheets. 2002. “A Comparison of Methods to Test Mediation and Other Intervening Variable Effects.” Psychological Methods 7 (1): 83.
Macridis, Roy C. 1986. Modern Political Regimes: Institutions and Patterns. Boston: Little, Brown & Company.
Magee, Christopher S. P., and John A. Doces. 2015. “Reconsidering Regime Type and Growth: Lies, Dictatorships, and Statistics.” International Studies Quarterly 59 (2): 223–37.
Mainwaring S., Brinks D., Pérez-Liñán A. 2007. “Classifying Political Regimes in Latin America, 1945–2004.” In Regimes and Democracy in Latin America: Theories and Methods, ed. Munck, Gerardo L., 123–60. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Marsh, Robert M. 1979. “Does Democracy Hinder Economic Development in the Latecomer Developing Nations?” Comparative Social Research 2 (2): 215–48.
Marsh, Robert M. 1988. “Sociological Explanations of Economic Growth.” Studies in Comparative International Development 23 (4): 41¬–76.
Marshall, Monty G., and Ted Robert Gurr. 2020. POLITY5: Dataset Users’ Manual. Polity5 Project, Center for Systemic Peace. URL: http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p5manualv2018.pdf.
Martin, Lucy, and Pia J. Raffler. 2021. “Fault Lines: The Effects of Bureaucratic Power on Electoral Accountability.” American Journal of Political Science 65 (1): 210¬–24.
Martinez, Luis R. 2018. “How Much Should We Trust the Dictator’s GDP Estimates?” SSRN Working Paper No. 3093296.
Mayhew, David R. 2004. Congress: The Electoral Connection. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Mearsheimer, John J. 2014. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: W.W. Norton & Company.
Merton, Robert K. 1940. “Bureaucratic Structure and Personality.” Social Forces 17: 560–68.
Michalopoulos, Stelios, and Elias Papaioannou. 2014. “National institutions and subnational development in Africa.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 129 (1): 151–213.
Minier, Jenny. 1998. “Democracy and Growth: Alternative Approaches.” Journal of Economic Growth 3 (3): 241–66.
Mohtadi, Hamid, and Terry L. Roe. 2003. “Democracy, Rent Seeking, Public Spending and Growth.” Journal of Public Economics 87 (3–4): 445–66.
Monteforte, Fabio, and Jonathan R. W. Temple. 2020. “The Autocratic Gamble: Evidence from Robust Variance Tests.” Economics of Governance 21 (4): 363¬–84.
Muller, Edward N. 1985. “Income Inequality, Regime Repressiveness, and Political Violence.” American Sociological Review 50 (February): 47–61.
Munck, Gerardo L. 1996. “Disaggregating Political Regime: Conceptual Issues in the Study of Democratization.” Working Paper 228. Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies.
Munck, Gerardo L., and Jay Verkuilen. 2002. “Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy: Evaluating Alternative Indices.” Comparative Political Studies 35 (1): 5–34.
Murtin, Fabrice, and Romain Wacziarg. 2014. “The Democratic Transition.” Journal of Economic Growth 19 (2): 141–81.
Nabli, Mustapha K., and Carlos Silva-Jáuregui. 2007. “Democracy for Better Governance and Higher Economic Growth in the MENA Region?” In Breaking the Barriers to Higher Economic Growth: Better Governance and Deeper Reforms in the Middle East and North Africa, ed. Mustapha K. Nabli, 103–33. Washington, DC: World Bank Publications.
Nee, Victor, and Sonja Opper. 2009. “Bureaucracy and Financial Markets.” Kyklos 62 (2): 293–315.
Nelson, Michael A, and Singh, Ram D. 1998. “Democracy, Economic Freedom, Fiscal Policy and Growth in LDCs: A Fresh Look.” Economic Development and Cultural Change 46 (4): 677–96.
Niemi, Richard, Herbert Weisberg, and David C. Kimball. 2011. “Are Economic Factors Weakening as Vote Determinahti?” In Controversies in Voting Behavior, eds. Richard Niemi, Herbert Weisberg, and David C. Kimball, 167–82. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press.
Nistotskaya, Marina, and Luciana Cingolani. 2016. “Bureaucratic Structure, Regulatory Quality, and Entrepreneurship in A Comparative Perspective: Cross-Sectional and Panel Data Evidence.” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 26 (3): 519¬–34.
Nistotskaya, Marina, Stefan Dahlberg, Carl Dahlström, Aksel Sundström, Sofia Axelsson, Cem Mert Dalli, and Natalia Alvarado Pachon. 2021. “The Quality of Government Expert Survey 2020 (Wave III): Report.” University of Gothenburg: The QoG Working Paper Series 2: 1–56.
North, Douglass C. 1979. “A Framework for Analyzing the State in Economic History.” Explorations in Economic History 16 (3): 249–59.
North, Douglass C. 1981. Structure and Change in Economic History. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc.
North, Douglass C. 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
North, Douglass C. 2005. Understanding the Process of Economic Change. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
North, Douglass C., John Joseph Wallis, and Barry R. Weingast. 2009. Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
North, Douglass C., and Barry R. Weingast. 1989. “Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England.” Journal of Economic History 49 (4): 803–32.
O’Donnell, Guillermo A. 2001. “Democracy, Law, and Comparative Politics.” Studies in Comparative International Development 36 (1): 7–36.
O’Donnell, Guillermo A., and Philippe Schmitter. 1986. Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
O’Reilly, Colin W., and Ryan H. Murphy. 2022. “An Index Measuring State Capacity, 1789–2018.” Economica forthcoming. URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/ecca.12411.
Olsen, Johan P. 2005. “Maybe It Is Time to Rediscover Bureaucracy.” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 16 (1): 1–24.
Olsen, Johan P. 2008. “The Ups and Downs of Bureaucratic Organization.” Annual Review of Political Science 11: 13–37.
Paldam, Martin. 2021. “Measuring Democracy - Eight indices: Polity, Freedom House and V-Dem.” Economics Working Papers 2021-10, Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University.
Papaioannou, Elias, and Gregorios Siourounis. 2008. “Democratisation and Growth.” The Economic Journal 118 (532): 1520–51.
Pemstein, Daniel, Kyle L. Marquardt, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Juraj Medzihorsky, Joshua Krusell, Farhad Miri, and Johannes von Römer. 2022. “The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data”. V-Dem Working Paper No. 21. 7th edition. University of Gothenburg: Varieties of Democracy Institute.
Pepinsky, Thomas B., Jan H. Pierskalla, and Audrey Sacks. 2017. “Bureaucracy and Service Delivery.” Annual Review of Political Science 20: 249–68.
Perotti, Roberto. 1996. “Growth, Income Distribution, and Democracy: What the Data Say.” Journal of Economic Growth 1 (2): 149–87.
Persson, Torsten, and Guido Tabellini. 2008. “The Growth Effect of Democracy: Is It Heterogenous and How Can It be Estimated?” In Institutions and Economic Performance, ed. Helpman Elhanan, 544–85. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Peters, B Guy. 2010. The Politics of Bureaucracy: An Introduction to Comparative Public Administration, 6th edition. New York: Routledge.
Pilling, David. 2014. “Has GDP Outgrown Its Use?” Financial Times. July 4, 2014. URL: https://www.ft.com/content/dd2ec158-023d-11e4-ab5b-00144feab7de.
Plasser, Fritz, Peter A. Ulram, and Harald Waldrauch. 1998. Democratic Consolidation in East-Central Europe. New York: St. Martin’s Press.
Plümper, Thomas, and Christian W. Martin. 2003. “Democracy, Government Spending, and Economic Growth: A Political-Economic Explanation of the Barro-Effect.” Public Choice 117 (1): 27–50.
Pollitt, Christopher, and Geert Bouckaert. 2004. Public Management Reform: A Comparative Analysis, 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press
Pourgerami, Abbas. 1988. “The Political Economy of Development: A Cross-National Causality Test of Development-Democracy-Growth Hypothesis.” Public Choice 58 (2): 123–41.
Pourgerami, Abbas. 1992. “Authoritarian vs. Nonauthoritarian Approaches to Economic Development: Update and Additional Evidence.” Public Choice 74 (3): 365–77.
Povitkina, Marina. 2015. “Democracy, Bureaucratic Capacity and environmental Quality.” QoG Working Paper Series 13: 1–33.
Preacher, Kristopher J., and Andrew F. Hayes. 2004. “SPSS and SAS Procedures for Estimating Indirect Effects in Simple Mediation Models.” Behavior Research Methods, Instruments, & Computers 36 (4): 717–31.
Przeworski, Adam. 2004. “Institutions matter?” Government and Opposition 39 (4): 527–40.
Przeworski, Adam, Michael E. Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi. 2000. Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Przeworski, Adam, and Fernando Limongi. 1993. “Political Regimes and Economic Growth.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 7 (3): 51–69.
Przeworski, Adam, Susan Stokes, and Bernard Manin, eds. 1999. Democracy, Accountability, and Representation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Raadschelders, Jos C. N., and Mark R. Rutgers. 1996. “The evolution of Civil Service Systems.” In Civil Service Systems in Comparative Perspective, eds. Hans A.G.M. Bekke, James L. Perry, and Theo A. J. Toonen, 67–99. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.
Rae, Douglas. 1968. “A Note on the Fractionalization of Some European Party Systems.” CPS 1 (3): 413–8.
Raftery, Adrian. 1996. “Bayesian Model Selection in Social Research.” Sociological Methodology 25: 111–63.
Rauch, James E. 1995. “Bureaucracy, Infrastructure, and Economic Growth: Evidence from U.S. Cities During the Progressive Era.” American Economic Review 85 (4): 968–79.
Rauch, James E., and Peter B. Evans. 2000. “Bureaucratic Structure and Bureaucratic Performance in Less Developed Countries.” Journal of Public Economics 75 (1): 49–71.
Rivera‐Batiz, Francisco L. 2002. “Democracy, Governance, and Economic Growth: Theory and Evidence.” Review of Development Economics 6 (2): 225–47.
Rock, Michael T. 2009. “Has Democracy Slowed Growth in Asia?” World Development 37 (5): 941¬–52.
Rodrik, Dani. 1995. “Getting Interventions Right: How South Korea and Taiwan Grew Rich.” Economic Policy 10 (20): 55–97.
Rodrik, Dani. 1999. “Democracies Pay Higher Wages.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 114 (3): 707–38.
Rodrik, Dani. 2002. “Institutions, Integration, and Geography.” In Search of the Deep Determinants of Economic Growth. Princeton: Princeton University Press. URL: http://www.tinyurl.com/y6y5es6d.
Rodrik, Dani. 2008. One Economics, Many Recipes: Globalization, Institutions, and Economic Growth. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Rodrik, Dani, and Romain Wacziarg. 2005. “Do Democratic Transitions Produce Bad Economic Outcomes?” American Economic Review 95 (2): 50–55.
Romer, Paul. 1990. “Endogenous Technological Change.” Journal of Political Economy 98: 71–102.
Rothstein, Bo. 2011. The Quality of Government: Corruption, Social Trust, and Inequality in International Perspective. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Rothstein, Bo, and Jan Teorell. 2008. “What is Quality of Government? A theory of Impartial Government Institutions.” Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration and Institutions 21 (2): 165–90.
Rothstein, Bo, and Jan Teorell. 2012. “Defining and Measuring Quality of Government.” In Good Government: The Relevance of Political Science, eds. Sören Holmberg and Bo Rothstein, 13–39. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.
Russett, Bruce M., and R. Joseph Monsen. 1975. “Bureaucracy and Polyarchy as Predictors of Performance: A Cross-National Examination.” Comparative Political Studies 8 (1): 5–31.
Sachs, Jeffrey D. 2005. The End of Poverty: How We Can Make It Happen in Our Lifetime. London: Penguin.
Sachs, Jeffrey D., and Andrew M. Warner. 1995. “Economic Reform and the Process of Global Integration.” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1: 1–95.
Sager, Fritz, and Christian Rosser. 2021. “Weberian Bureaucracy.” Oxford Research Encyclopedias. URL: https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.166.
Saha, Shrabani, and Kunal Sen. 2021. “The Corruption–Growth Relationship: Does the Political Regime Matter?” Journal of Institutional Economics 17 (2): 243¬–66.
Sartori, Giovanni. 1987. The Theory of Democracy Revisited. Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House Publishers.
Schedler, Andreas. 2010. “Democracy’s Past and Future: Authoritarianism’s Last Line of Defense.” Journal of democracy 21 (1): 69–80.
Schmidt-Hebbel, Klaus. 2009. “Chile’s Growth and Development: Leadership, Policy-Making Process, Policies and Results.” Working Paper No. 52, Commission on Growth and Development. World Bank, Washington, DC.
Schmitter, Philippe C., and Terry Lynn Karl. 1991. “What Democracy Is ... and Is Not.” Journal of Democracy 2 (3): 74¬–88.
Schumpeter, Joseph A. 1942. Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. New York: Harper & Row.
Schurer, Stefanie, and Jongsay Yong. 2012. “Personality, Well-being and the Marginal Utility of Income: What Can We Learn from Random Coefficient Models?” Health, Economics and Data Group Working Paper. Department of Economics, University of York. URL: https://ideas.repec.org/p/yor/hectdg/12-01.html.
Scully, Gerald W. 1988. “The Institutional Framework and Economic Development.” Journal of Political Economy 96 (3): 652–62.
Searle, Shayle R., George Casella, and Charles E. McCulloch. 2006. Variance Components. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
Sen, Amartya K. 1999. Development as Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Shrout, Patrick E., and Niall Bolger. 2002. Mediation in Experimental and Nonexperimental Studies: New Procedures and Recommendations. Psychological Methods 7 (4): 422–45.
Sirowy, Larry, and Alex Inkeles. 1990. “The Effects of Democracy on Economic Growth and Inequality: A Review.” Studies in Comparative International Development 25 (1): 126–57.
Skaaning, Svend-Erik. 2006. “Political Regimes and Their Changes: A Conceptual Framework.” CDDRL Working Papers No. 55. Stanford: Stanford University.
Skocpol, Theda. 1985. “Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research.” In Bringing the State Back In, eds. Peter B. Evans, Dieter Reuschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, 1–37. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Sloan, John, and Kent L. Tedin. 1987. “The Consequences of Regime Type for Public Policy Outputs.” Comparative Political Studies 20 (April): 98–124.
Slough, Tara. 2021. “Bureaucratic Quality and the Observability of Electoral Accountability.” Unpublished manuscript.
Sobel, Michael E. 1982. “Asymptotic Confidence Intervals for Indirect Effects in Structural Equation Models.” Sociological Methodology 13: 290–312.
Solow, Robert M. 1956. “A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 70 (1): 65–94.
Sørensen, Georg. 1991. Democracy, Dictatorship and Development. London: Macmillan.
Steinmo, Sven. 1993. Taxation and Democracy: Swedish, British and American Approaches to Financing the Modern State. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Stepping, Katharina MK, and Lilli Banholzer. 2017. “Autocratic Angels? Democratic Demons? The Impact of Regime Type, State Capacity and economic Development on Reaching Environmental Targets.” Discussion Paper. No. 26. German Development Institute, Bonn.
Suleiman, Ezra N. 2003. Dismantling Democratic States. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Sundaram, Jomo Kwame, and Anis Chowdhury, eds. 2012. Is Good Governance Good for Development? New York: Bloomsbury Academic.
Suzuki, Kohei, and Mehmet Akif Demircioglu. 2017. “Rediscovering Bureaucracy: Bureaucratic Professionalism, Impartiality, and Innovation.” QoG Working Paper Series 7: 1–36.
Tavares, Jose, and Romain Wacziarg. 2001. “How Democracy Affects Growth.” European Economic Review 45 (8): 1341–78.
Teorell, Jan, Michael Coppedge, Staffan I. Lindberg, and Svend-Erik Skaaning. 2019. “Measuring Polyarchy Across the Globe, 1900–2017,” Studies in Comparative International Development 54 (1): 71–95.
Teorell, Jan, Michael Coppedge, Svend-Erik Skaaning, and Staffan I. Lindberg. 2016. “Measuring electoral democracy with V-Dem data: Introducing a new polyarchy index.” V-Dem Working Paper No. 25. University of Gothenburg: Varieties of Democracy Institute.
Teorell, Jan, Aksel Sundström, Sören Holmberg, Bo Rothstein, Natalia Alvarado Pachon, and Cem Mert Dalli. 2022. “The Quality of Government Standard Dataset, version jan22.” University of Gothenburg: The Quality of Government Institute. URL: https://www.gu.se/en/quality-government doi:10.18157/qogstdjan22.
The PRS Group. 2021. “The ICRG Methodology.” URL: https://www.prsgroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/ICRG-Method-2021.pdf.
Thomas, Melissa A. 2010. “What Do the Worldwide Governance Indicators Measure?” European Journal of Development Research 22 (1): 31–54.
Tingley, Dustin, Teppei Yamamoto, Kentaro Hirose, Luke Keele, Kosuke Imai, Minh Trinh, and Weihuang Wong. 2019. mediation ver. 4.5.0 (R package). URL: https://imai.princeton.edu/projects/mechanisms.html.
Treier, Shawn, and Simon Jackman. 2008. “Democracy as A Latent Variable.” American Journal of Political Science 52 (1): 201–17.
Vaccaro, Andrea. 2021. “Comparing Measures of Democracy: Statistical Properties, Convergence, and Interchangeability.” European Political Science 20: 666–84.
Van de Walle, Steven. 2005. “Measuring Bureaucratic Quality in Governance Indicators.” Paper presented at the 8th Public Management Conference, Los Angeles, USA.
Van den Bosch, Jeroen. 2013. “Political Regime Theory: Identifying and Defining Three Archetypes.” Copernicus Journal of Political Studies 2 (4): 78–96.
Van den Bosch, Jeroen. 2014. “Mapping Political Regime Typologies.” Przegląd politologiczny 4 (8): 111–24.
Vanhanen, Tatu. 2019. Measures of Democracy 1810–2018 Version 8.0 (2019-06-17). Finnish Social Science Data Archive. URL: https://services.fsd.tuni.fi/catalogue/FSD1289/PIP/cbF1289e.pdf.
Wahman, Michael, Jan Teorell, and Axel Hadenius. 2013. “Authoritarian Regime Types Revisited: Updated Data in Comparative Perspective.” Contemporary Politics 19 (1): 19–34.
Waldner, David. 1999. State Building and Late Development. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Weber, Max. 1978. Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Weede, Erich. 1983. “The Impact of Democracy on Economic Growth.” Kyklos 36 (February): 21–39.
Weede, Erich. 1993. “The Impact of Democracy or Repressiveness on the quality of Life, Income Distribution and Economic Growth Rates.” International Sociology 8 (2): 177–95.
Weiss, Linda. 1998. The Myth of the Powerless State: Governing the Economy in a Global Era. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Welzel, Christian, and Ronald Inglehart. 2008. “The Role of Ordinary People in Democratization.” Journal of Democracy 19 (1): 126¬–40.
Wilson, James Q. 1989. Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It. New York: Basic Books.
Woo-Cumings, Meredith, ed. 1999. The Developmental State. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Wu, Chin-en. 2012. “When is Democracy Better for Economic Performance and When Is It Not: The Interaction Between Polity and Structural Factors.” Studies in Comparative International Development 47 (4): 365–88.
Xu, Guo. 2018. “The Costs of Patronage: Evidence from the British Empire.” American Economic Review 108 (11): 3170–98.
Zuvanic, Laura, and Mercedes Iacoviello. 2010. “The Weakest Link: The Bureaucracy and Civil Service Systems in Latin America.” In How Democracy Works: Political Institutions, Actors, and Arenas in Latin American Policymaking, eds. Carlos Scartascini, Ernesto Stein, Mariano Tommasi. Washington, D.C.: Inter-American Development Bank; Cambridge: David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies, Harvard University. |
| Description: | 博士
國立政治大學
政治學系
106252502 |
| Source URI: | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0106252502 |
| Data Type: | thesis |
| DOI: | 10.6814/NCCU202201167 |
| Appears in Collections: | [政治學系] 學位論文
|
Files in This Item:
| File |
Description |
Size | Format | |
|---|
| 250201.pdf | | 5197Kb | Adobe PDF2 | 101 | View/Open |
|
All items in 政大典藏 are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved.
|
