Electorate sizes of 20, 40, and 70 subjects are used to test the paradox of voter turnout.
Payoff schemes are designed to induce subjects to vote instrumentally. Our experimental
evidence indicates that subjects do vote instrumentally, but instrumental voting may not fully
explain voter turnouts in some real elections. In addition, theoretical studies associated with
instrumental voting, e.g., the expected utility maximization model, the minimax regret model, and
game-theoretic models cannot successfully explain the resulting voter turnouts. Our
experimental evidence also shows that subjects are more willing to vote when the problem is
framed as they will lose something if they make wrong decisions rather than they will gain
something if they make right decisions, but only in relatively small sizes of electorates. This
suggests that as the subject perceives himself to be less pivotal, the asymmetric incentive
attributable to framing provides less influence on his voting decisions.