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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/22328

    Title: Fine enough or don't fine at all
    Authors: 林忠正;楊建成
    Keywords: Social norm;Psychological cost;Deterrence hypothesis
    Date: 2006-02
    Issue Date: 2009-01-06 15:24:26 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: This paper explores the results discussed in “A fine is a price” by Gneezy and Rustichini [2000a. A fine is a price. Journal of Legal Studies 29, 1–17] regarding the effect of fines on parents who collect their children late from day-care centers. We suggest a complementary explanation, analyzing a formal model that qualifies but does not lose the predictive power of the deterrence hypothesis. Our main policy implication can be summarized as “Fine enough or don’t fine at all.” We suggest that the Gneezy and Rustichini finding may represent a more general result and that our formal model is potentially applicable to a variety of situations.
    Relation: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization ,59(2),195-213
    Data Type: article
    DOI 連結: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2004.04.006
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2004.04.006
    Appears in Collections:[財政學系] 期刊論文

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