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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/23295


    Title: Evolutionarily Stable Coalition Structure
    Authors: 何靜嫺
    Keywords: coalition structure, evolutionarily stable, folk theorem
    Date: 2002-04
    Issue Date: 2009-01-09 12:19:04 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: We analyze the formation andstability of coalitions for a situation where
    finitely many individuals form different coalitions and their payoffs depend on the consequence of a
    noncooperative game with different coalitions, and examine the moving path of individuals among
    various coalitions. Our main finding is to show that there exists at least one evolutionarily stable
    coalition equilibrium in fnπ . When addressing the evolving path of coalitions, we conclude that in
    the case of symmetric strategies and symmetric population shares, if each coalition`s population
    share is too small, the equilibrium requires a reduction of the number of coalitions, but if each
    coalition share is too large, the equilibrium requires an increase of the number of coalitions.
    Furthermore, when ui(.)s are symmetric but x is asymmetric, then (i) the
    highest payoffs are oscillatory across time still stability happens. (ii)In the
    evolutionarily stable structure, each group share the same population and the coalition numbers is
    hence IDt(x, 1ft)I.
    Relation: Nonlinear Dynamics Psychology and Life Sciences,6(2),160-170
    Data Type: article
    Appears in Collections:[經濟學系] 期刊論文

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