過去有關中國與MTCR互動這個範疇的研究，拘泥於單一面向的分析，而沒有把「聯合國常規武器登記冊」、「聯合國政府專家小組」、「中東五國軍控會談」和「海牙反導彈準則」等相關作為一併討論。換言之，由於缺乏一組對照組，其分析頗有見樹不見林的侷限性。對於中國有關「建制遵循」(Regime Compliance)的解釋不易周延，並且無從正確的分辨中國在建制遵循上的本質為何。本文則將擴充討論的縱深，針對一九八七年至二○○二年這段期間，就中國對各種類型導彈建制(Missile Regime)立場及對策進行分析，以收見樹又見林之功效。本文主要目的在於探究並分析中共對於上述國際導彈建制規範遵循的挑戰與反應，本文首先提出一個整合型的分析架構，亦即一個三足鼎立式的中共策略模式；其次、本文將說明中國「原則性不遵循」(Principled Noncompliance)策略的內涵及動力；第三、本文將闡釋中國在「脅迫下遵循」(Compelling Compliance)模式，並勾勒中國導彈輸出週而復始的矛盾本質；第四、本文將分析中國「管理式遵循」(Managing Compliance)運作並檢視中國「管制條例」和「管制清單」，並比較其與MTCR之異同，本文最後將說中國與國際導彈建制互動意涵提出一個綜合性的引申。 Past studies of China's interactions with the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) have been constrained by an unilateral perspective that failed to take into account the related functions of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms (UNRCA), the United Nations Experts Group (UNEG), the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HOCC) and their impact on China. In other words, without such comparison groups, accounts for China's records on regime compliance tend to be limited in scope. By enlarging the scope of study, this article examines the viability of China's strategy and policy towards the missile regimes during 1987-2002 and provides a viable basis for systematic analysis. The principal purposes of this article are to explore China's responses to the norms and regulations stipulated by these missile regimes. This article will analyze and construct first an analytical framework of China's strategy on regime compliance, namely using a three- pillar scheme; second, the institutional arrangements of the missile regimes, including export control, transparency and confidence-building measures; third, the contents and dynamics of the principled noncompliance positions taken by China; fourth, the repeated contradictory records of China's compelling compliance; fifth, China's strategy of managing compliance by examining China's recent announced missile export control regulations and control lists; and finally, this article will summarize the analytical results presented in the discussions. The main conclusion will be discussed and related to the theoretical implications of China's regime compliance strategy.