Since becoming a ruling party in 1949, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has been distraught by a chronic problem: An unbalanced power distribution between the Party and the state. While trying to maintain the status of the power structure, the CCP has been trying to cope with the problem of adaptability by making trivial amends. These small measures of reform have exposed contradictions between forces supporting tradition and modernity. The emphasis of "Chinese characteristics" and "self-perfecting" has left many "reserved areas" inside the party and the state. Under the constraint of the "four cardinal principles", China has been strained between a promise to democratize and consolidating one- party dictatorship. Relying on historical institutionalism and the concept of involution, this article discusses the problem of adaptability in terms of the CCP's organization and institutions. Specifically, the article explores the policy of inclusion that the CCP has used to enlarge its basis of support, including the issue of allowing the capitalist class into the party and inner-party democracy. The article also analyzes the difficulties that the Party has faced in the process of transition. The purpose is to provide an analytical framework to reflect the dynamic process of change that the Party has encountered since the introduction of market economy.