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    政大機構典藏 > 商學院 > 會計學系 > 學位論文 >  Item 140.119/30135
    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/30135


    Title: 董事會、監察人特性與公司績效關聯之再探討
    none
    Authors: 陳迪
    none
    Contributors: 陳錦烽
    none
    陳迪
    none
    Keywords: 公司治理
    董事會
    公司績效
    監察人
    corporate governance
    board
    performance
    Date: 2002
    Issue Date: 2009-09-11 17:19:14 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 摘要
    近來公司治理議題廣受注目。而所謂的公司治理泛指公司的管理與監控機制,其目標在於健全公司營運,追求公司最大的利益並使公司股東、員工、債權人等利益關係人,能得到合理、公平的對待。本研究以敘述性統計分析、迴歸分析,選取民國九十年台灣證券交易所上市的500家樣本公司,探討在我國公司治理機制下,董事、監察人特性與公司績效之關聯。
    研究結果顯示
    (一)董事會規模與公司績效有顯著的負向關係,而監察人規模與公司績效則大
    致呈顯著的正向關係。
    (二)獨立董事的比例除了與公司績效變數的每股經常利益外,其餘皆達到10%的正向顯著水準。而獨立監察人與公司績效雖呈現正向關係,卻未達顯著水準。不過,若將獨立監察人和獨立董事合併來看,實證結果是與公司績效的四個變數都呈現5%的顯著正相關。
    (三)法人董事比例與公司績效各變數分別呈現5%與10%的顯著負相關,此結果可能和我國企業偏好的交叉持股有關,。法人監察人比例亦與公司績效呈現負向關係,然而卻未達統計上的顯著水準。但是如果將法人董事與法人監察人比例合併觀之,則其與公司績效的四個變數皆達1%的負相關。
    (四)董、監持股比率與公司績效的四個變數至少皆達5%的顯著正向關係,證實
    董、監持股比率越高,因其自身財富與公司財務牽連越深,監督管理者的動機越強進而使公司績效表現較佳。此外,本研究亦發現,董事長是否兼任高階經理人,與公司績效之間並無顯著的關係。
    Abstract
    Corporate governance, which includes the management and monitoring of a firm, is one of an important issue in recent years. The goal of corporate governance attempt to achieve the maximum profit of a company, and to treat shareholders, employees, and debtors, etc. fairly and reasonably. This thesis tries to find if there are relations between the characteristics of the board, supervisors and firm performance under the related corporate governance practices of Taiwan. The 500 samples are selected from the public companies listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation in 2001. Here are the main findings:
    1. The scale of the board has a significantly negative relation with the firm’s performance. However, the number of supervisors seems to have a positive relation with it.
    2. The ratio of independent directors may probably have a positive relation with the firm’s performance. The ratio of independent supervisors has a positive relation with the firm’s performance, but is not significantly.
    3. There is significantly negative relationship between the ratio of institute directors and the firm’s performance, but the ratio of institute supervisors and the firm’s value do not have so strongly negative relationship.
    4. The ratio of the stock held by the board and supervisors has significantly positive relationship with the firm’s value. Besides, whether the president serves as the general manager at the same time has no connection with the firm’s performance.
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    Description: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    會計研究所
    90353027
    91
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0090353027
    Data Type: thesis
    Appears in Collections:[會計學系] 學位論文

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