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    政大機構典藏 > 商學院 > 會計學系 > 學位論文 >  Item 140.119/30154
    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/30154


    Title: 公司治理、盈餘管理與投資人報酬之關連性研究
    Authors: 林家靜
    Contributors: 林宛瑩
    林家靜
    Keywords: 公司治理
    盈餘管理
    投資人報酬
    corporate governance
    earnings management
    stock price return
    Date: 2003
    Issue Date: 2009-09-11 17:21:20 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 隨著1997的亞洲金融風暴、1998下半年陸續發生的台灣上市公司財務危
    機事件,以及2001年底美國大型公司企業弊案的層出不窮,除了一再地打擊投資人的信心,擾亂資本市場秩序外,也使投資者與證券主管機關體認到,完善的公司治理機制(corporate governance),是健全資本市場與吸引國際資金的關鍵因素之一。

    公司組織的代理關係衍生出盈餘操縱與公司治理的相關問題,本研究在
    第一個部分所欲探討的是公司治理的機制是否能抑制管理階層進行盈餘操
    縱?另外,一般投資大眾所關心的是他們的投資標的是否為其帶來優異的報酬,而公司股價報酬率是否能提高,除了外在總體經濟的因素外,不外乎是公司本身的變數,因此本研究以董監事特性、經理人特性、關係人特性及股權結構四個構面之公司治理變數,以及盈餘操縱程度為控制變數,探討公司治理與投資人的股價報酬二者間之關係。

    研究結果顯示:當董事長兼任總經理時,公司盈餘操縱程度較高。超額
    關係人資金往來比例越高,盈餘操縱幅度越高。董事會規模越大,盈餘操縱程度越低。監察人總人數、董監事質押比例、控制權與盈餘分配權的偏離程度、董事會獨立程度、超額關係人進銷貨比例、機構投資人持股比例、大股東持股比例與盈餘操縱的幅度都沒有顯著相關性。

    董事會規模與公司公司股價報酬率呈負相關。監察人總人數與公司股價
    報酬率成正相關。董監事質押比率與公司股價報酬率呈負相關。董事會獨立程度與公司股價報酬率呈正相關。超額關係人進銷貨比例與股價報酬率呈正相關。控制權與盈餘分配權偏離程度、經理人是否由董事長兼任、超額關係人資金往來比例、機構投資人持股比例、外部大股東持股比例均與股價報酬率無顯著相關性。
    Along with Asia monetary crush in 1997, Taiwan business financial crisis happened one after another in 1998 and American large enterprise fraud cases appeared again and again in 2001, not only to beat investors’ confidence and to disturb capital market order, but also make investors and the authorities concerned recognize that a complete corporate governance mechanism is a key factor of healing capital market and attracting international capital.

    The agency relation of business organization derives problems about earnings manipulation and corporate governance. The first part of this research is want to discuss if corporate governance mechanism can restrain management level from
    manipulating earnings. The most concern of common investors is that whether their invest target can bring them well return. If we want to raise the stock-price return of a company, in addition to macro economic factors, the condition of
    business itself is really important. The second part of this research set broad characteristics, management characteristics, related party transaction and equity structure as research variables and earnings manipulation degree as control
    variables to discuss the relation between corporate governance and stock-price return.

    The result of the first portion of research shows that when CEO
    simultaneously serves as Chairman of the board and exceed-ratio of related party capital intercourse is higher, the firms have higher earnings manipulation. There is a negative relation between broad size and earnings manipulation. Total number of
    supervisors, the rate of directors’ and supervisors’shareholdings that are pledged, the deviation between cash-flow right and seating right, broad independence, exceed-ratio of related party purchase and sales, institutional investor holding rate, outside blockholders holding rate have no relation with earnings manipulation.

    The result of the second portion of research shows that total number of supervisors, broad independence and exceed-ratio of related party purchase and sales have positive relation with stock-price return. There is a negative relation between stock-price return and broad size and the rate of directors’ and
    supervisors’ shareholdings that are pledged. CEO simultaneously serves as Chairman of the board, the deviation between cash-flow rights and seating rights, exceed-ratio of related party capital intercourse, institutional investor holding rate, outside blockholders holding rate have no relation with stock-price return.
    Reference: 一、中文部分
    王鼎立,2001,董事會結構與公司盈餘的傳遞效果,東吳大學會計研究所未出版碩士論文。
    王昱欣,2002,新上市盈餘管理與異常報酬之關連性研究,私立輔仁大學會計研究所未出版碩士論文。
    吳庭州,1997,股權結構、盈餘管理與盈餘資訊性之研究,輔仁大學管理學研究所未出版碩士論文。
    何幸芳,2002,獨立董監事對公司價值與盈餘資訊內涵影響之研究,私立輔仁大學金融研究所未出版碩士論文。
    林宜勉,1999,盈餘資訊性與管理者股權之關聯性研究,企銀季刊第23 卷,第1 期。
    林玉霞,2002,臺灣上市公司代理問題、公司治理與股東價值之研究,中原大學會計研究所未出版碩士論文。
    柯承恩,2000,我國公司監理體系之問題與改進建議(上),會計研究月刊173期。
    柯承恩,2000,我國公司監理體系之問題與改進建議(下),會計研究月刊174期。
    馬鳳禧,2003,會計保守性對盈餘品質之影響及與股票報酬之關聯性,台灣大學管理學院未出版碩士論文。
    許崇源、李怡宗、林宛瑩、鄭桂蕙,2003a,「控制權與盈餘分配權之衡量(上)」,貨幣觀測與信用評等42,15-31 頁。
    ______、______、______、______,2003b,「控制權與盈餘分配權之衡量(下)」,貨幣觀測與信用評等43,11-26 頁。
    康榮寶、陳美娥、羅吉台,2003,以財務預警模式強化公司治理價值,會計研究月刊第212 期:105-111。
    陳錦隆,2003,對獨立董事之省思,會計研究月刊第209 期:59-68。
    陳家慧,2000,我國上市公司管理機制與盈餘管理相關性之實證研究,政治大學會計研究所未出版碩士論文。
    陳俊尹,2001,初次上市、櫃公司長期股價報酬與盈餘管理之探討,輔仁大學會計研究所未出版碩士論文。
    張智怡,2001,公司成長機會、高階經理人獎酬與盈餘管理之關連性研究,政治大學會計研究所未出版碩士論文。
    張瑞棻,2002,股權結構與盈餘管理之相關性研究,私立輔仁大學會計研究所未出版碩士論文。
    張俊仁,2002,盈餘管理型態與長期股價報酬之關係,私立淡江大學會計研究所未出版碩士論文。
    彭政錦,2003,董事會特性、股權結構及機構投資人持股與盈餘管理關聯性研究,嘉義大學管理研究所未出版碩士論文。
    葉銀華、李存修、柯承恩,2002,公司治理評等系統,商智文化。
    萬文娟,2003,透視富邦集團的關係人交易玄機,商業週刊:106-112。
    蔡揚宗,2003,落實監察人制度宜公司治理當務之急,會計研究月刊,第212期:12-14。
    ______,2003,從股東會看我國公司治理,會計研究月刊,第210 期:14-16。
    羅陽春,2001,我國上市公司董監改選前盈餘管理行為之研究,政治大學會計研究所未出版碩士論文。
    二、英文部分
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    Austin, J., A. Lee, and D. Warren. 1999. The effect of corporate governance on earnings management. Working paper.
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    Chtourou, S.M., J. N. Bedard, and L. Courteau. 2001. Corporate Governance and Earnings Management, Working paper, University of Sfax.
    Claessens, S., S. Djankov, and L. H. P. Lang. 2000. The Separation of Ownership and Control in East Asian Corporations. Journal of Financial Economics 58:81-112.
    DeChow, P.M., R.G. Sloan, and A. P. Sweeney. 1996. Cause and Consequence of Earnings Manipulation: An Analysis of Firms Subject to Enforcement Actions by the SEC. Contemporary Accounting Research 13:1-36.
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    Fan, J. P. H., and T. J. Wong. 2002. Corporate ownership structure and the informativness oef accounting earnings in East Asia. Journal of Accounting & Economics 33:401-425.
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    Lemmon, L. M., and K. V. Lins. 2001.Ownership Structure, Corporate Governance, And Firm Value:Evidence from the East Asian Financial Crisis.Working Paper.
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    Description: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    會計研究所
    91353036
    92
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0091353036
    Data Type: thesis
    Appears in Collections:[會計學系] 學位論文

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