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    政大機構典藏 > 商學院 > 會計學系 > 學位論文 >  Item 140.119/30262
    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/30262


    Title: 集團企業關係人交易與公司會計績效之關聯性研究-從資源分配角度探討
    Authors: 陳孟賢
    Chen, Meng-Sian
    Contributors: 李怡宗
    陳孟賢
    Chen, Meng-Sian
    Keywords: 關係人交易
    集團企業
    公司績效
    公司治理
    Related Party Transactions
    Group Companies
    Companys’Performance
    Corporate Governance
    Date: 2008
    Issue Date: 2009-09-11 17:33:24 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 關係人交易與公司績效之關係,在過去文獻上並未獲得絕對一致的結論,惟過去文獻並未考慮集團內進行關係人交易的公司,不同公司特徵所誘發進行關係人交易不同之交易動機。因此,本文利用Sharma et al.(1981)及 Le et al.(2006)之調節性多元迴歸分析方法(moderated multiple regression;MMR),考慮集團內個別公司不同特徵下之關係人交易與公司績效之關聯性。基於本文實證結果,發現在集團內不同公司特徵之關係人交易與公司績效的確有不同的關聯性,並且發現集團內具有以下三項特徵的公司,所進行的關係人交易有利公司績效,分別是:1.較高的董監持股 2.較高的機構投資人持股 3.較高的流動比率。而集團內具有以下六項特徵之公司,所進行的關係人交易不利公司績效,分別是:1. 經理人兼任的董監席次較多 2.金字塔股權結構 3.集團的核心公司 4.較高的負
    債比 5.較高的長期負債比 6.較低的利息保障倍數。
    The relationship between related party transactions and company’s performance in the past literature has not reached absolutely unanimous conclusion, but the past literature has not considered the different characteristics of individual company in the group and different related party transactions’ motive induced by those characteristics. Therefore, moderated multiple regression(MMR)that adopted by Sharma et al.(1981) and Le et al.(2006)is employed in this study in order to discuss the relationship between the transactions made by individual company with different characteristics in the group and the individual company’s performance. According to the empirical results in this paper, there are indeed different relationships between the transactions made by individual company with different characteristics in the group and the individual company’s performance. On the one hand, the results indicate that there is a positive relationship between the related party transactions made by the individual company with the three characteristics in the group and the companies’ performance. The three characteristics are as follows: 1. higher board shareholdings. 2. higher institutional investors’ holdings. 3. higher the current ratio. On the other hand, the results show that there is a negative relationship between the related party transactions made by the individual company with the six characteristics in the group and the companies’ performance. The six characteristics are as follows: 1. managers as more seats in the board. 2. pyramidal ownership structure. 3. the core companies in the group. 4. higher the liabilities ratio. 5. higher the long-term liabilities ratio. 6. lower the time interest earned.
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    Description: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    會計研究所
    96353048
    97
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0096353048
    Data Type: thesis
    Appears in Collections:[會計學系] 學位論文

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