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| Title: | 財務報表重編與董監獨立性/專業性之研究 |
| Authors: | 吳祥福
Wu, Shang-Fu |
| Contributors: | 周玲臺
Chou, Ling-Tai Lynette
吳祥福
Wu, Shang-Fu |
| Keywords: | 財務報表重編
董事會
監察人
獨立性
專業性
法人董事
法人監察人
Financial statement restatement
Board of directors
Supervisors
Independence
Professionalism
Institutional Directors |
| Date: | 2002 |
| Issue Date: | 2009-09-18 |
| Abstract: | 財務報表重編雖不若財務報表詐欺舞弊，但對於財務報表使用者而言，仍代表財務報表資訊品質不佳。因此公司應建立有效的監督治理機制，以防止財務報表重編情形發生，提高財務報表資訊品質。
本研究針對35家財務報表重編公司及35家財務報表未重編公司之董事會、監察人之獨立性、專業性進行研究，獲得以下結論：
一、發生財務報表重編的公司董事會中外部董事比率低於未發生財務報表
重編公司董事會外部董事比率
二、發生財務報表重編的公司董事會中獨立董事比率低於未發生財務報表
重編公司董事會獨立董事比率。
三、發生財務報表重編的公司董事會中法人董事席次比率高於未發生財務
報表重編公司法人董事席次比率。
四、發生財務報表重編的公司法人監察人席次比率高於未發生財務報表重
編公司法人監察人席次比率。
五、發生財務報表重編的公司董事會中關聯性法人董事比率高於未發生財
務報表重編公司關聯性法人董事比率。
The restatement of financial statements does not equal to a financial statement fraud. However, it can reflect inferior quality of information disclosed in financial statements. Consequently, companies should establish an effective mechanism for supervision and governance in order to prevent the occurrence of financial statements restatements and to improve the quality of information disclosed in financial statement. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development（OECD） proposed five principles of corporate governance including strengthening the responsibility of the board of directors. It also required that the board of directors should function effectively. Independent and professional outside directors should be engaged to protect the interest of all shareholders.
The study was conducted to investigate the independence and professionalism of the board of directors and supervisors. The sample included 35 companies which restated their financial statements at the time. Another 35 companies of comparative sizes were selected as the comparison group. The following results were conducted.
1.Firms that restated financial statements had significantly
lower percentages of outside directors on the board than
those which did not restate their financial statements.
2.Firms that restated financial statements had significantly
lower percentages of independent directors on the board than
those which did not restate their financial statements.
3.Firms that restated financial statements had significantly
higher percentages of institutional directors on the board
than those which did not restate their financial statements.
4.Firms that restated financial statements had significantly
higher percentages of institutional supervisors than those
which did not restate their financial statements.
5.Firms that restated financial statements had significantly
higher percentages of affiliated institutional directors on
the board than those which did not restate their financial
statements. |
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| Description: | 碩士
國立政治大學
會計研究所
90353042
91 |
| Source URI: | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0090353042 |
| Data Type: | thesis |
| Appears in Collections: | [會計學系] 學位論文
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