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    政大機構典藏 > 商學院 > 會計學系 > 學位論文 >  Item 140.119/34218
    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/34218

    Title: 獨立董事及監察人之設置與債務資金成本關聯性之研究
    Authors: 劉威廷
    Liu, Wei-Ting
    Contributors: 戚務君
    Chi, Wu-Chun
    Liu, Wei-Ting
    Keywords: 獨立董監
    Independent directors
    cost of debt
    corporate governance
    Date: 2005
    Issue Date: 2009-09-18 09:02:18 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 本研究利用2000年至2004年的資料,分析獨立董事與監察人的設置 (以下簡稱為獨立董監) 與公司債務資金成本的關聯性。在以利息費用除以付息負債做為代理變數的前提之下,本研究的實證結果顯示,無論以當期利率水準、次期利率水準或者利率水準的變化做為被解釋變數,均顯示聘任獨立董監的企業會享有較低的債務資金成本。此外,進一步的分析也發現,無論以簡單的單變量模型、普通最小平方法或者利用縱橫面資料 (panel data) 模型,都得一致性地得到獨立董監得以有助於減緩公司與債權人間代理成本的實證結果。就控制變數而言,與預期相同,較完備的公司治理、較高的企業規模以及較佳的營運績效均與債務資金成本具有負向的關聯性。
    Corporate governance has become an imperative issue recently, especially the
    focus on the independent director system. Securities and Futures Commission has requested that those applying to be listed companies should set up the independent director systems for the purpose of building better corporate governance systems. In the framework of corporate governance formulated by the World Bank, as an essential capital provider or financial statement user, creditor plays an indispensable role. But few literatures has conducted to evaluate the relationship between the cost of debt financing and corporate governance, much less with the independent directors. Therefore, this study based on a sample of listed companies data in Taiwan Economic Journal over the period of 2000 to 2004 is to explore the relationship between independent directors and cost of debt and expected to provide the financial institutions determining the borrowing rate with some empirical results. The results indicate the cost of debt, whether based on the level analysis or change analysis of ordinary least square model or panel data analysis, is inversely related to the independent directors with significance at 1% level, suggesting that the enterprise with independent directors having the lower cost of debt in favor of the hypothesis. The analysis also indicates the relationship of the control variables of board characteristics, such as the ratio of the stock held by the board and supervisors is inversely with cost of debt、the higher ratio of the pledged shares held by the board and supervisors with the higher cost of debt and the enterprise with the combined titles of the chairman and CEO has higher cost of debt, follow our expectation again.
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    Description: 碩士
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0093353004
    Data Type: thesis
    Appears in Collections:[會計學系] 學位論文

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