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| 题名: | 地方財政表現對政黨輪替的影響：以台灣21縣市長選舉為例（1989-2005）
The Effect of Fiscal Performance on Party Rotation of Local Government Elections in Taiwan：1989-2005 |
| 作者: | 陳政勤 |
| 贡献者: | 張勝文
陳政勤 |
| 关键词: | 縣市長選舉
政黨輪替
財政表現
經濟投票
local government election
party rotation
fiscal performance
economic voting |
| 日期: | 2005 |
| 上传时间: | 2009-09-18 11:05:29 (UTC+8) |
| 摘要: | 本文討論台灣縣市長選舉中，財政健全程度及收入支出決算狀況會如何影響選舉結果。以台灣21個縣市在1989年至2005年間共5屆的縣市長選舉為實證研究，探討縣市長選舉結果出現政黨輪替的可能因素，在經濟投票及政治意識形態的研究方向以外，就縣市政府財政表現的角度進行分析。實證模型採用Probit model進行估計，本文實證假定為：如果縣市長致力於提升財政健全或是提供符合選民需要的公共支出時，便不容易出現政黨輪替。由實證結果發現，在財政變數方面，選舉年財政健全度及選前一年歲出成長率提高時，有助於執政黨持續執政。然而，選前二年竊案發生率較高的縣市，反而使執政黨被輪替的機率提高。對於與總統相同政黨的縣市長而言，只有在面對較高的選前一年全國及地方失業時，容易受到拖累而出現政黨輪替。競選連任的縣市長具有優勢。桃竹苗區與中彰投區相較其他地區而言，顯然較容易出現政黨輪替。
By the five campaigns from 1989 to 2005 of the 21 local jurisdictions (includes 16 counties and 5 townships) in Taiwan, this paper discusses how fiscal health, revenue and expenditure conditions affect the election results. We analysis that the possible factors that cause election results to appear party rotation. Except for economic voting and other political factors, we mainly examine if fiscal performance results in party rotation. We adopt the Probit model to setup our empirical model. Our hypothesis is that party rotation possibly happens if local officers do not devote in fiscal health or fiscal policy that voters need. For the fiscal variables, the empirical evidence shows that increasing fiscal health in election year and total expenditures growth rate in one year before election help incumbents persist in political power. However higher crime rate on burglaries and larcenies in two year before election will reduce the probability in party rotation. If the president and incumbents are the same party affiliation, incumbents will be implicated while national and local unemployment rate worsen. Besides, incumbents who run for reelection will be in dominant position. The jurisdictions in the northeast and middle areas of Taiwan compare to the others, it is more possible to occur party rotation. |
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| 描述: | 碩士
國立政治大學
財政研究所
93255021
94 |
| 資料來源: | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0932550211 |
| 数据类型: | thesis |
| 显示于类别: | [財政學系] 學位論文
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