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    政大機構典藏 > 商學院 > 企業管理學系 > 學位論文 >  Item 140.119/34938
    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/34938


    Title: 上市公司公司治理,經營績效與機構投資人投資行為關聯性之研究
    Authors: 丁秀儀
    Ting, Hsiu-I
    Contributors: 陳隆麒
    沈中華

    Chen, Long-Chie
    Shen, Chung-Hua

    丁秀儀
    Ting, Hsiu-I
    Keywords: 代理成本
    公司治理
    經營績效
    機構投資人投資行為
    機構投資人持股週轉率
    Agency Cost
    Corporate Governance
    Firm Performance
    Institutional Behavior
    Institutional Turnover
    Date: 2003
    Issue Date: 2009-09-18 13:22:32 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 本研究採1992年至2002年首度上市的樣本公司為研究樣本,並依據同產業規模相當且上市五年以上的原則挑選配對公司,檢驗公司治理、經營績效與機構投資人投資行為之關聯性。與先前研究不同之處在於,本研究深入探討公司治理對經營績效的影響,解釋在不同經濟條件與公司特性下,將影響公司治理機制效率的發揮,使公司治理與績效呈正相關。

    本研究利用樣本公司上市當時的公司治理變數,檢驗公司治理對上市後半年的會計績效影響與上市後30天、90天與180天的市場報酬,再進而驗證經營績效對上市後一年機構投資人投資行為的影響,此外,並比較有價證券上市審查準則規定前後的公司,在公司治理與經營績效上是否有差異。透過相關分析、T檢定、迴歸分析與聯立方程式,檢驗三大研究假說,實證結果獲得以下主要結論:

    1.樣本公司與配對公司的特性
    樣本公司的公司治理機制較健全,會計績效表現也較佳。
    2.公司治理程度不同的公司特性
    公司治理程度高的公司其市場績效表現較佳,且年齡較小。
    3.景氣與產業,對公司治理與經營績效關聯性的影響
    產業特性會加強公司治理程度對會計績效的影響;經濟景氣,會加強公司治理程度對市場績效的影響。
    4.當經濟景氣差、代理成本高與轉投資家數多時,更突顯公司治理的重要性,公司治理對績效有正向的影響
    5.無參與管理的公司,更突顯公司治理的效果,公司治理對績效有正向的影響
    6.機構投資人持股比例與週轉率呈正相關
    7.經營績效與機構投資人投資行為呈正相關
    市場績效對機構投資人持股比例有正向的影響;會計績效對機構投資人週轉率也有正向的影響,顯示績效與機構投資人投資行為呈正相關。
    8.法令規範後,公司治理與經營績效表現較佳
    9.金融業的公司治理表現較佳
    This paper examines the relationship between the corporate governance, firm performance, and institutional behavior of Taiwanese TSE-listed companies from 1992 to 2002. This paper approves the positive effects of corporate governance to firm performance, and firm performance to institutional behavior as well. Different from the previous studies, this paper addresses the importance of corporate governance under poorer economic conditions, higher agency costs, and a more complicated company structure. Corporate governance mechanism could work effectively when the executives of companies realize the importance of the corporate governance.
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    Description: 博士
    國立政治大學
    企業管理研究所
    89355510
    92
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0089355510
    Data Type: thesis
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