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| Title: | 國際公司治理之探討 |
| Authors: | 何聖隆 |
| Contributors: | 郭維裕
何聖隆 |
| Keywords: | 董事會組成
董事會規模
外部董事
董事及CEO薪酬誘因
CEO改組
外部大股東
外國股東
機構投資人
現金流量權
控制權
金字塔結構
交叉持股
優先投票權
股權集中性
併購
法律制度及執行
法源
會計盈餘
股市報酬率
ROA
ROE
Tobin`s Q |
| Date: | 2006 |
| Issue Date: | 2009-09-18 17:40:39 (UTC+8) |
| Abstract: | 公司治理的研究,其主要的目的是了解董事會組成,董事會規模,外部董事, 董事及CEO薪酬誘因,CEO改組,外部大股東,外國股東,機構投資人,控制權和股權集中性,併購,法律制度及執行,法源…等變數對以ROA,ROE,會計盈餘,Tobin’s Q和股市報酬率所代表的公司績效之影響。與公司治理有關的重要指標包括股份控制權,現金流量權,董監事席次的控制權,控制權與股權的偏離,次大股東,金字塔結構,交叉持股,優先投票權,外部董事比例等。
本論文共計8章40節,引述國外文獻約500篇並由國際公司治理的實證結果來探討我國五家金控：開發金、台新金、復華金、富邦金、兆豐金的公司治理,最後提出九點結論和建議。
第一章 緒論--------------------------------------- 1
第一節 研究動機與目的-------------------------- 1
第二節 論文架構------------------------------- 3
第二章 股權結構和公司價值------------------------- 5
第一節 美國及世界各地之公司股權--------------- 10
第二節 東亞公司之股權結構--------------------- 39
第三節 西歐公司之最終股權--------------------- 49
第四節 大股東對公司價值的影響----------------- 60
第五節 勞工股權和公司價值--------------------- 70
第六節 民營化後之股權變化和公司價值----------- 82
第三章 董事會,多角化和公司價值-------------------- 85
第一節 董事會和公司價值----------------------- 92
第二節 忙碌的董事會是否為有效的監督者？-------152
第三節 高度稀釋的CEO選擇權對公司價值
和股東投票的影響-----------------------161
第四節 董事會多元化和公司價值-----------------181
第五節 公司多角化和公司價值-------------------195
第六節 股東權力和公司價值---------------------217
第七節 治理機制和股權價格---------------------230
第八節 治理機制和舉債成本---------------------246
第四章 公司治理之外部機制-------------------------259
第一節 公司治理之法律因素---------------------261
第二節 外部融資的法律因素---------------------275
第三節 法律保護和公司價值---------------------259
第五章 機構投資人和公司治理-----------------------284
第一節 機構投資人之公司治理理論---------------289
第二節 世界各國機構投資人行動主義-------------301
第三節 公司治理提案和機構投資人行動主義-------313
第四節 機構投資人股權變化和CEO改組----------320
第五節 總體公司治理環境對機構持股的影響-------325
第六章 開發中國家之公司治理-----------------------342
第一節 東亞公司股權結構和公司價值----------------350
第二節 東亞金融危機中公司治理對匯率和股市的影響--357
第三節 東亞金融危機中治理變數和公司價值----------361
第四節 新興市場中非管理人大股東和公司價值--------365
第五節 東亞金融危機中股權結構和公司價值----------369
第六節 新興市場中CEO改組和公司績效-------------375
第七章 銀行之公司治理--------------------------------385
第一節 美國銀行之公司治理------------------------390
第二節 美國銀行控股公司之公司治理----------------404
第三節 銀行產業中CEO薪酬的誘因特性-------------412
第四節 銀行產業中董事的誘因薪酬------------------418
第五節 日本銀行之公司治理------------------------432
第六節 日本公司的銀行股權和公司價值--------------444
第七節 日本銀行的衝擊對借款公司績效的影響--------453
第八節 公司治理和銀行價值------------------------457
第八章 結論-----------------------------------------462
第一節 由國際公司治理看台灣公司治理--------------464
第二節 公司治理制度的發展趨勢--------------------480
英文參考文獻-----------------------------------------486
中文參考文獻-----------------------------------------564 |
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| Description: | 碩士
國立政治大學
經營管理碩士學程(EMBA)
91932120
95 |
| Source URI: | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0091932120 |
| Data Type: | thesis |
| Appears in Collections: | [經營管理碩士學程EMBA] 學位論文
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