政大機構典藏-National Chengchi University Institutional Repository(NCCUR):Item 140.119/36309
English  |  正體中文  |  简体中文  |  Post-Print筆數 : 27 |  全文笔数/总笔数 : 92429/122733 (75%)
造访人次 : 26439845      在线人数 : 277
RC Version 6.0 © Powered By DSPACE, MIT. Enhanced by NTU Library IR team.
搜寻范围 查询小技巧:
  • 您可在西文检索词汇前后加上"双引号",以获取较精准的检索结果
  • 若欲以作者姓名搜寻,建议至进阶搜寻限定作者字段,可获得较完整数据
  • 进阶搜寻


    请使用永久网址来引用或连结此文件: http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/36309


    题名: 從公共選擇觀點探討土地稅稅基之評定
    作者: 張瑞真
    Chang Jui Chen
    贡献者: 林森田
    張瑞真
    Chang Jui Chen
    关键词: 公共選擇
    政治景氣循環
    土地稅稅基
    經濟變數
    政策變數
    政治家
    官僚
    日期: 2002
    上传时间: 2009-09-18 17:57:20 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 論文摘要
    本研究運用公共選擇觀點建立理論模型,探討政府組織之政治家與官僚之互動,並分析經濟發展、房地產景氣等經濟變數與政治過程中人為干預之政策變數對土地稅稅基之影響,其次利用追蹤資料之迴歸模型,檢定理論模型之推論及分析政治景氣循環現象,並提出改進土地稅稅基評定制度之參考點。
    本研究發現,當政治家主導評定過程時,理論模型推導出經濟變數對土地稅稅基有正向影響,人為干預之政策變數對土地稅稅基產生不利影響,並於實證上以台灣省21個縣市,民國76年至民國90年之追蹤資料迴歸分析,證實本研究理論模型之推論,即第一任政治家於選後藉由繁榮地方建設,回饋選民和利益團體於選票上之支持,欲連任之政治家於選前一年和選舉年,透過減輕選民和利益團體土地稅負擔,達到連任之目標,產生土地稅稅基之政治景氣循環現象,尤其是選舉競爭程度愈激烈,愈有誘因操控土地稅稅基之評定。
    綜合上述之分析結果可解釋,當政府的力量未受適當規範及運作過程中制度的缺失,排擠了技術官僚查估地價之專業,產生歷年來土地稅稅基偏低之鎖進效果,欲改善現行規則,需以漸進方式為之。短期而言,(1)藉由資訊的公開,改變經濟與政治相對價格,進而影響政治家與官僚個人偏好的改變;(2)藉由誘因機制,誘使土地稅稅基提高;(3)藉由技術的更新,促進政府組織的改良。長期而言,參考日韓經驗,建立合理有效之土地稅稅基評定制度。
    關鍵詞:
    公共選擇、政治景氣循環、土地稅稅基、政治家、官僚、經濟變數和政策變數
    參考文獻: 參考文獻
    一、西文部分:
    1.Aaron, H. (1974), The Property Tax : Progressive or Regressive? A New View of Property Tax Incidence, American Economic Association, 64(2) , 212~221.
    2.Acocella, Nicola (1998), The Foundations of Economic Policy: Values and Technique, Cambridge University Press.
    3.Aghion, P. and J. Tirole (1997), Formal and Real Authority in Organization, Journal of Political Economy, 105(1), 1-29.
    4.Alesina, A., G. D. Cohen and N. Roubini (1993), Electoral Business Cycle in Industrial Democracies, European Journal of Political Economy, 9(1), 1-23.
    5.Alesina, A., N. Roubini and G.D. Cohen (1997), Political Cycles and the Macroeconomy, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
    6.Alt, J.E. and K. A. Chrystal (1983), Political Economics, University of California Press.
    7.Becker, E. (1996), The Illusion of fiscal Illusion: Unsticking the Flypaper Effect, Public Choice, 86(1-2), 85-102.
    8.Becker, G. S. (1983), A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groupe for Political Influence, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 98 (3), 371-400.
    9.Besley, T. and R. Burgess (2002), The Political Economy of Government Responsiveness: Theory and Evidence From INDIA, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117(14), 1415-1451.
    21. 黃上紡 (1996),選舉與經濟—政治景氣循環,美歐月刊,11(5),頁51-66。
    22.彭建文 (2000),台灣房地產景氣循環之研究—生產時間落差、宣告效果、總體經濟之影響,政治大學地政學系博士論文。
    23.曾巨威 (2002),各項租稅稅基侵蝕之全面檢討,行政院財政改革委員會委託研究計劃,計劃編號: PG9019-0132。
    24.游適銘 (2001),地價及標準地價評議委員會功能定位之探討,人與地,206,頁10-15。
    25.傅彥凱 (2002),民主政治下的經濟政策制定:政治景氣循環理論之分析,中國行政評論,11(3),頁139-163。
    26.熊秉元 (1993),尋找心中那把尺,天下文化出版公司。
    27.熊秉元 (1996),公益彩券、制度經濟學、公共選擇,經社法制論叢,第17,18,頁41-63。
    28.劉明德譯 (1991),C. E. Lindblm著,政策制定過程,桂冠圖書出版公司。
    29.劉其昌 (1994),公共選擇理論分析,今日會計,57,頁29-60。
    30.劉瑞華譯 (1996),D. C. North著,制度、制度變遷與經濟成就,時報文化出版公司。
    10.Borgia, D. J. (1994), How a Land value tax system promotes economic development, Real Estate Finance Journal, 9(4), 89-93.
    31.蔡吉源 (2001),台灣土地稅制的問題、影響與改革,突破當前經濟困境系列座談會,國家政策研究基金會,頁1-5。
    32.蔡雪枝 (1994),淺述規定地價與地價稅制變遷,臺灣地政,98,頁16-23。
    33.鄭瓊秋 (1982),公共選擇與投票行為理論之研究,政治大學財政研究所碩士論文。
    34.鍾英理 (1998),以區段地價指數改進公告土地現值制度之參考,政治大學地政學系碩士論文。
    35.蕭全政 (1994),政治與經濟的整合---政治經濟學的基礎理論,桂冠圖書公司。
    36.蕭錚 (1974),平均地權本義,中國地政研究所。
    37.關秉寅 (1994),誰的公平?誰的正義?--從土地增值稅之爭議談公平與權力之關係,人文及社會科學集刊,6,頁99-133。
    38.蘇志超 (1995),土地行政綱要,文笙書局經銷。
    (二)政府資料庫與出版品
    1.中央選舉委員會歷屆公職人員選舉資料庫: http://210.69.23.189/cec/。
    11.Bourassa, S. C. (1992), Economic Effects of Taxes on Land, American Journal of Economics & Sociology, 51,109-113.
    2.台灣人權政府相關檔案線上展示: http://near.archives.gov.tw/Human_Right/。
    3.國家文官培訓所資料庫: http://www.ncsi.gov.tw/administration/。
    4.中央選舉委員會 (1984),中華民國選舉概況(下篇)。
    5.內政部 (2002),都市地價指數,第18期。
    6.內政部統計處 (2001-2002),中華民國八十九年至九十年內政統計年報。
    7.內政部營建署 (1993),中華民國八十一年臺灣地區營建統計年報。
    8.內政部營建署 (2000),中華民國八十八年臺閩地區營建統計年報。
    9.行政院經濟建設委員會 (1988-2001),都市及區域發展統計彙編—中華民國七十七年至九十年。
    10.臺灣省政府地政處 (1996-1998),臺灣省各縣市(八十五年至八十七年)公告土地現值業務督導考核結果。
    11.臺灣省政府地政處(1997),臺灣省政府地政處志。
    12.Buchanan, J. M. and G. Tullock (1962), The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.
    12.臺灣省選舉委員會 (1994),八十二年、八十三年公職人員選舉台灣省選務實錄。
    13.臺灣省選舉委員會 (1998),八十六年、八十七年地方公職人員選舉臺灣省選務實錄。
    13.Buchanan, J. M. (1959), Positive Economics, Welfare Economics, and Political Economy, Journal of Law and Economics, 2, 124-138.
    14.Buchanan, J. M. (1972), Fiscal Policy and Fiscal Preference, Theory of Public Choice, Eds. : J. M. Buchanan and R. D. Tollison, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.
    15.Buchanan, J. M. (1976), Taxation in Fiscal Exchange, Journal of Public Economics, 6(1-2), 17-29.
    16.Buchanan, J. M. (1985), Liberty, Market and State—Political Economy in the 1980s. New York University Press.
    17.Burman, L. E. and W. C. Randolph (1994), Measuring Permanent Responses to Capital-Gains Tax Changes in Panel Data, The American Economic Review, 84(4), 794-809.
    18.Carlsen, F. (1997), Opinion Polls and Political Business Cycles: Theory and Evidence for the United States, Public Choice, 92(3-4), 387-406.
    19.Carter, W. S. (1982), An Introduction to Henry George, Land Value Taxation : The Progress and Poverty Centenary ,Eds. : Lindholm R. and Lynn A. The University Wisconsin Press, 19-35.
    20.Downs, A. (1957), An Economic Theory of Democracy, New York: Harper and Rowk.
    21.DiPasquale D. and W. C. Wheaton (1992), The Cost of Capital, Tax Reform, and The Future of The Rental Housing Market, Journal of Urban Economics, 31(3), 337-359.
    22.Edwards, J. and M. Keen (1996), Tax Competition and Leviathan. European Economic Review, 40, 113-134.
    23.Fiorina, M. P. (1982), Legislative Choice of Regulatory Forms: Legal Process or Administrative Process, Public Choice, 39(1), 33-66.
    24.Finz, S. A. and S. E. Utink (2001), Closing the Budget Gap through Tax Base Appreciation, Government Finance Review, 17(5), 26-29.
    25.Fuest, C. (2000), The Political Economy of Tax Coordination as a Bargaining Game Between Bureaucrats and Politician, Public Choice, 103(3-4), 357-382.
    26.Galli, E. and S. P. S. Rossi (2002), Political Budget Cycles: The Case of the Western German , Public Choice, 110(3-4), 283-303.
    27.Gans, J. S. and M. Smart (1996), Majority Voting with Single-Crossing Preferences, Journal of Public Economics, 59(2), 219-237.
    28.Gihring, T. A. (1999), Incentive Property Taxation: A Potential Tool for Urban Growth Management, Journal of the American Planning Association, 65(1), 62-79.
    29.Greene, W.H. (2002), LIMDEP Version 8.0 Econometric Modeling Guide, Vol.1, Econometric Software, INC.
    30.Hausman, J. A (1978), Specification Test in Econometrics, Econometrica, 46, 1251-1272.
    31.Hausman, J. A. and W.E. Taylor (1981), Panel Data and Unobservable Individual Effects, Econometrica, 49, 1377-1398.
    32.Hibbs, D. (1977), Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy, American Political Science Review, 71, 1467-1487.
    33.Hoffman, E. (1997), Public Choice Experiments, Perspectives on Public Choice - A Hand Book, Ed.: Mueller, Cambridge University Press, 415-428.
    34.Hunter, W. J. and M. A.. Nelson (1995), Tax Enforcement: A Public Choice Perspective, Public Choice, 82(1-2), 53-67.
    35.Kalwij, A. (2000), Estimating The Economic Return to Schooling on The Basis of Panel Data, Applied Economics, 32(1), 61-71.
    36.Krelove, R. (1992), Do Local Government Use Tax Bases Efficiently?, Journal of Urban Economics, 31(3), 285-300.
    37.Lachlar, U. (1982), On Political Business Cycles with Endogenous Election Dates, Journal of Public Economic, 17(1), 111-117.
    38.Luginbuhl R. and de Vos A. (2003), Seasonality and Markov Switching in an Unobserved Component Time series Model: A Bayesian Analysis of US GDP, Empirical Economics, 28(2), 365-386.
    39.McCluskey, W. J., F. Plimmer and O. P. Connellan (1998), Ad Valorem Property Tax: Issues of Fairness and Equity, Assessment Journal, 5(3), 47-55.
    40.McCallum, B. T. (1978), The Political Business Cycle: An Empirical Test, Southern Economic Journal, 44, 504-515.
    41.Mieszkowski, P.(1972),The Property Tax :An Excise Tax or A Profit Tax?, Journal of Public Economics ,1(1) , 73~96.
    42.Milesi-Ferretti, G. M. and Spolaore, E. (1994), How Cynical Can an Incumbent Be?: Strategic Policy in a Model of Government Spending, Journal of Public Economy, 55, 121-140.
    43.Moesen, W. and P. V. Cauwenberge (2000), The Status of The Budget Constraint, Federalism and The Relative Size of Government: A Bureaucracy Approach, Public Choice, l04(2), 207-224.
    44.Mueller, D. C. (1989), Public Choice II, Cambridge University Press.
    45.Mueller, D. C. (1997), Perspectives on Public Choice, Cambridge University Press.
    46.Mullineux, A., D. G. Dicikinson and W. Peng (1993), Business Cycles: Theory and Evidence, Blackwell.
    47.Musgrave, R. A. and B. Peggy (1984), Public Finance in theory and Practice, New York: McGraw-Hill.
    48.Nash, J. F. (1950), The Bargaining Problem, Econometrica, 18, 155-162.
    49.Nelson, P. (1970), Information and Consumer Behavior, Journal of Political Economy, 78, 311-329.
    50.Netzer, D.(1966), Economics of the Property Tax , The Brookings Institution Washington ,D. C.
    51.Niskanen, W. A. (1971), Bureaucracy and Representative Government, Chicago: Aldine Press.
    52.Niskanen, W. A. (1975), Bureaucrats and Politicians, Journal of Law and Economics, 18(3), 617-644.
    53.Niskanen, W. A. (1991), A Reflection on Bureaucracy and Representative Government, The Budget-Maximizing Bureaucrat: Appraisals and Evidence, Eds. : Blais and Dion , University of Pittsburgh Press, 13-31.
    54.Niskanen, W. A. (1994), Bureaucracy and Public Economics, Edward Elgar Publishing Limited.
    55.Nordhaus, W. D. (1975), The Political Business Cycle, Review of Economic Studies, 42, 169-190.
    56.North, D. C. (1978), Structure and Performance: The Task of Economic History, Journal of Economic Literature, 16(3), 963-978.
    57.North, D. C. (1981), Structure and Change in Economic History, New York, Norton.
    58.North, D. C. (1990), Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, New York: Cambridge University Press.
    59.Oates, W. E. (1999), Local Property Taxation: An Assessment, Assessment Journal, 6(5), 67-69.
    60.Peltzman, S. (1976), Toward a More General Theory of Regulation , Journal of Law and Economics, 19(2), 211-240.
    61.Pitlik, N., G. Schmid and H. Strotmann, (2001), Bargaining Power of Smaller States in Germany’s L nderfinanzausgleich 1979-90, Public Choice, 109(1-2), 183-201.
    62.Price, S. (1997), Political Business Cycles and Macroeconomic Credibility: A Survey, Public Choice, 92(3-4), 407-427.
    63.Price, S. (1998), Comment on ‘The Politics of the Political Business Cycle’, British Journal of Political Science, 28(1), 201-210.
    64.Reid, B.G. (1998), Endogenous Elections, Electoral Budget Cycles and Canadian Provincial Governments, Public Choice, 97(1-2), 35-48.
    65.Roakes , S. L.(1996),Reconsidering Land Value Taxation : The Golden Key?, Land Use Policy , 13(4), 261-272.
    66.Rogoff, K.(1990), Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles, The American Economic Review, 80(1), 21-36.
    67.Sapir, A. and K. Sekkat (2002), Political Cycles, Fiscal Deficits, and Output Spillovers in Europe, Public Choice, 111(1-2), 195-205.
    68.Schultz, K. A.(1995), The Politics of the Political Business Cycle, British Journal of Political Science, 25(1), 79-99.
    69.Silagi, M.(1992), Henty George and Europ: Publicized George’s Ideas in Germany, American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 51(4), 495-501.
    70.Tabellini, G. and A. Alesina (1990), Voting on the Budget deficit, The American Economic Review, 80, 37-49.
    71.Tullock, G. (1965), The Politics of Bureaucracy, Public Affairs Press, Washington, D. C.
    72.Varian, H. R. (1984), Microeconomic Analysis, W. W. Norton and Company.
    73.Wassmer, R. W. (1993), Property Taxation, Property Base , and Property Value :An Empirical Test of the “New View” , National Tax Journal ,46(2), 135~159.
    74.Yinger, J. (1982), Capitalization and the Theory of Local Public Finance, Journal of Political Economy, 90(5), 917-943.
    75.Yinger, J. (1985), Inefficiency and the Median Voter: Property Taxes, Capitalization, Heterogeneity, and the Theory of the Second Best, Perspective on Local Public Finance and Public Policy, Ed.: J. M. Quigely,Vol.2 , JAI Press INC , 3-30.
    76.Yoo, Keum-Rok (1998), Intervention Analysis of Electoral Tax Cycle: The Case of Japan, Public Choice, 96(3-4), 241-258.
    二、中文部分:
    (一)書籍與期刊
    1.王振寰 (1996),誰統治台灣?—轉型中的國家機器與權力結構,巨流圖書公司。
    2.王鐵生譯 (1993),G. K. Wilson著,利益團體,五南圖書出版公司。
    3.朱雲鵬 (2003),就業密集產業之發展,第七屆經濟發展學術研討會論文—當前失業問題探討,1-17。
    4.朱鎮明 (1996),制度、官僚與政策過程—分析政府運作之概念性架構,洪葉文化事業公司。
    5.江明修、劉梅君譯 (1995),J. Forster著,面對權力的規劃,五南圖書出版公司。
    6.林英彥 (2002a),估價師的前途在那裡,土地問題研究季刊,1(3),頁129-131。
    7.林英彥 (2002b),韓國之地價公示與土地等之估價法,土地問題研究季刊,1(4),頁1-4。
    8.林英彥 (2003),日本與韓國實施標準宗地評估制度概說,土地問題研究季刊,2(2),頁50-56。
    9.竺乾威、胡君芳譯 (1991),C. E. Lindblm著,決策過程,五南圖書出版公司。
    10.夏道平譯 (1991),L. v. Mises著,人的行為(上),遠流出版公司。
    11.許松 (1987),重新規定地價有關問題之探討,土地行政,14,頁38-40。
    12.許松 (1994),如何建立地價公信力,臺灣地政,98,頁5-8。
    13.陳奉瑤、梁仁旭 (2003),日本的路線價估價法,土地問題研究季刊,2(2),頁39-49。
    14.陳浩譯 (1990),J. A.. Basso著,壓力團體,遠流出版公司。
    15.陳慶梅 (2000),土地稅稅基公平性之研究(二),現代地政,228,頁37-41。
    16.陳寶瑜 (1987),台灣省重新規定地價問題探討: 探討外在因素對重新規定地價作業影響,土地行政,21,頁17-19。
    17.黃淑惠 (2000),改進我國地價稅稅基評估之研究—兼論無母數迴歸模型之應用,土地經濟年刊,11,頁135-159。
    18.張時應 (1992),土地增值稅評論,台灣土地金融季刊,29(1),頁49-70。
    19.張梅英 (1994),重新規定地價之檢討,臺灣地政,98,頁13-16。
    20.張慈佳 (2001),政治景氣循環現象對房地產價格之研究,政治大學地政學系士論文。
    描述: 博士
    國立政治大學
    地政研究所
    83257503
    91
    資料來源: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0083257503
    数据类型: thesis
    显示于类别:[地政學系] 學位論文

    文件中的档案:

    档案 大小格式浏览次数
    index.html0KbHTML105检视/开启


    在政大典藏中所有的数据项都受到原著作权保护.


    社群 sharing

    著作權政策宣告
    1.本網站之數位內容為國立政治大學所收錄之機構典藏,無償提供學術研究與公眾教育等公益性使用,惟仍請適度,合理使用本網站之內容,以尊重著作權人之權益。商業上之利用,則請先取得著作權人之授權。
    2.本網站之製作,已盡力防止侵害著作權人之權益,如仍發現本網站之數位內容有侵害著作權人權益情事者,請權利人通知本網站維護人員(nccur@nccu.edu.tw),維護人員將立即採取移除該數位著作等補救措施。
    DSpace Software Copyright © 2002-2004  MIT &  Hewlett-Packard  /   Enhanced by   NTU Library IR team Copyright ©   - 回馈