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| Title: | 論唯物消除論
A Critique of Elimanative Materialism |
| Authors: | 邱盛揚
Chiu, Sen Yang |
| Contributors: | 藍亭
Lane, Tim
邱盛揚
Chiu, Sen Yang |
| Keywords: | 唯物消除論
通俗心理學
命題態度
Eliminative Materialism
Folk Psychology
Propositional Attitude |
| Date: | 2008 |
| Issue Date: | 2009-09-19 12:46:46 (UTC+8) |
| Abstract: | 本篇論文的主要目的是要藉由批判Paul Churchland版本的唯物消除論當中的論證之相關蘊含以及前提，來分析其立場的缺失與不足之處。而為了要達到這個目的，我便將本論文的構成主軸分成兩個部分：第一個部分是由第一章以及第二章所構成，其主要談論過去Churchland (1981)所宣稱的消除論立場以及其論證架構，在這裡除了整理過去眾多哲學家對於他的論證的一些批判與反駁的觀點之外，我也提出自己對於過去消除論之三個主要困境的主張。第二個部分則是由第三章以及第四章所構成，其主要是針對Churchland (2007)現在的唯物消除論之新進觀點來展開論述。當中除了分析他消除論立場的一致性之外，同時也去分析並討論他所提供之支持消除論的新論證，我將之稱作為「動物認知論證」(animal cognition argument) 。我將指出，由於Churchland在該論證當中隱含了一個重要的預設，因而使得該新論證的途徑未必可以合理地推得出其原有的消除論立場。 |
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| Description: | 碩士
國立政治大學
哲學研究所
93154013
97 |
| Source URI: | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0093154013 |
| Data Type: | thesis |
| Appears in Collections: | [哲學系] 學位論文
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