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    Title: 租稅逃漏相關論文集
    Authors: 黃則強
    Contributors: 翁堃嵐
    黃則強
    Keywords: 核課期間
    租稅逃漏
    從價稅
    從量稅
    Date: 2008
    Issue Date: 2009-09-19 13:46:18 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 本論文集包括三個部分,首先探討核課期間對逃漏稅行為的影響。實務上稅法都有核課期間的規定,因此本文將核課期間納入考慮並探討其存在對納稅人逃漏稅行為的影響,並對現行稅法規定提供政策建議。研究顯示:(1) 忽略核課期間的考慮會高估逃漏稅的程度,因而會低估政府的預期稅收;此一結果似乎可用來解答為何實務上觀察到的租稅逃漏稅程度遠比理論模型所預測的輕微這個困惑。(2) 與傳統租稅逃漏模型相較,考慮核課期間後,納稅人的預期效用水準較低。有鑑於目前所得稅法中納稅人面對的核課期間都相同,我們建議一種租稅計畫:只要納稅人願意繳納一筆固定的款項,即可在報稅之後由稽徵機關立即核定其稅額,不再面對嗣後的核課期間;倘若納稅人不願意則面對既定的核課期間。文中並求導最適的租稅計畫,以及分析該計畫相對傳統稅制具有柏瑞圖增進的性質。
    本論文第二部分旨在分析間接稅逃漏的情況下,從價稅與從量稅之優劣。在課徵從量稅時,納稅人選擇低報數量的方式以達逃漏稅的目的。課徵從價稅時,納稅人除了可以低報產量以外,也可以低報價格來逃漏間接稅。因此,從價稅與從量稅之間除了課稅方式的差異之外,也有租稅逃漏行為的差異,而這個差異將使得傳統文獻所得到的結果有所改變。本文分析發現,考慮租稅逃漏之後: (1) 在完全競爭市場之下,從量稅優於從價稅。此一結果與傳統理論認為兩者等價的觀念截然不同。 (2) 在獨占市場之下,從價稅不一定優於從量稅。這個結果也與傳統理論認為從價稅優於從量稅的結果有所差異。
    本論第三部分旨在探討在類似分類所得稅之Dual Income Tax制度下,考量不同來源所得其逃漏稅之難易程度差異,稅率應如何訂定,方符合公平與效率的原則。主要的結果為:從水平公平的觀點來說,應對較容易逃漏的所得應課以較高稅率,對較不容易逃漏的所得應課以較低之稅率。但從效率的角度來看,則反之。
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    Description: 博士
    國立政治大學
    財政研究所
    91255506
    97
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0091255506
    Data Type: thesis
    Appears in Collections:[財政學系] 學位論文

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