二○○一年增訂公司法第一五六條第五項所涉及的問題極為複雜，包括股東出資種類、董事會與股東會之分權、經營團隊與股東間之利益衝突、公司控制權移轉、股東優先認股權之存廢，以及公司負責人受託義務等面向。本文研究發現，股份交換制度排除了許多規範之適用，法規範密度的不一致卻將破壞現行規範架構體系。本文從董事會發行新股之動機出發，將股份交換依可能涉及之利益衝突態樣，區分為四種類型：【類型一】涉及公司控制權移轉之股份交換、【類型二】經營團隊用以作為敵意併購防禦措施之股份交換、【類型三】交易相對人為公司關係人之股份交換，以及【類型四】日常營運決策（ordinary business decision）之股份交換。本文針對不同類型之股份交換，逐一分析可能的規範模式，並提出修法建議，同時對於閉鎖型公司與開放型公司下董事於新股發行時之受託義務是否應為不同密度之法規範設計進行思考。本文重新思索與安排經營團隊於發行新股時之行為標準，以及董事會與股東會之分權設計，期能達到法規範促進有效率新股發行，遏止無效率新股發行之目的。 First introduced in 2001, Section 156 (6) of the Taiwan Company Law, also called the share exchange mechanism, presents complex issues. The share exchange mechanism involves the fundamental issue in a company law: the conflict of interests between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. It also engages in the policy debate between the shareholder primacy and the director primacy, the change of control transactions, the role of preemptive rights in protecting shareholders against dilution, and the directors’ fiduciary duty in the context of issuing stock. This paper first classifies the share exchange into four models with respect to the motives that directors carry in each particular model. These four models are: Model I share exchange involving change of control transactions; Model II share exchange as a defensive tactic; Model III share exchange with insiders of the company; Model IV share exchange classified as an ordinary business decision. This paper then proposes a comprehensive statutory reform. The purpose of this paper is to reconsider the role of statutes and the judiciary in the matter of stock issuing, and to establish a framework to encourage value-increasing stock issuing while preventing value-decreasing stock issuing.