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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/49560


    Title: 在不同工作特性下，酬勞誘因對組織績效之影響：實地實證研究
    Authors: 李伶珠
    Lee, Ling Chu
    Contributors: 吳安妮博士
    李伶珠
    Lee, Ling Chu
    Keywords: 工作特性
    競賽理論
    經營績效
    績效酬勞
    task interdependence
    performance-based compensation
    tournament incentives
    performance
    Date: 2005
    Issue Date: 2010-12-08 13:50:05 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 傳統代理理論主張，企業可利用績效酬勞激勵員工努力工作，提昇組織績效；而競賽理論則強調，利用同儕競賽，並擴大勝負間的酬勞差距，以達企業利潤極大化目標。績效酬勞與競賽誘因對員工投入的努力皆具正面激勵效果，然而，在不同工作特性下，酬勞誘因隨著員工工作所需的合作程度不同，對組織績效的影響卻有所差異。
    本文首先依據代理理論與競賽理論模型，將績效酬勞與競賽誘因同時納入酬勞誘因制度中，以利分析在不同工作特性的情況下，酬勞誘因對於營業單位經營績效之影響。在績效酬勞對經營績效之影響上，理論分析結果發現：不論對員工工作彼此獨立或對工作需合作的營業單位而言，績效酬勞的增加，都可提高經營績效；當隨機干擾因素增加，因員工獲得酬勞的不確定性增加，進而削弱員工努力的意願，降低營業單位之經營績效。在競賽誘因對組織績效的影響方面，靜態分析結果指出：在不同工作特性的情況下，競賽誘因會出現不同的效果。當員工工作彼此獨立時，擴大競賽後贏家與輸家間的酬勞差距，有利於組織績效之提高。相對的，在員工工作彼此合作的情況下，酬勞差距擴大後，一方面使員工最適個人努力提高，有益於組織經營績效；另一方面卻削弱員工彼此合作的意願，降低協助同儕的努力，兩種效果抵銷之後，使得酬勞誘因對組織經營績效之提昇受到限制。
    本文以一家大型連鎖汽車公司為個案公司，研究期間為2001年至2004年，包括86個營業所及90家汽車修護廠的營業績效資料及中低階層員工之酬勞資料，以實地實證研究法進行實證研究。研究結果發現，當員工工作彼此獨立時，營業單位之個人績效酬勞愈大或收入變異程度愈小者，績效愈好；當員工工作彼此需要合作時，營業單位之團體績效酬勞愈大或收入變異程度愈小者，績效愈好。在競賽誘因方面，當員工工作彼此獨立時，不論是職務間或職務內的酬勞差距的擴大，皆對營業單位之經營績效具有正面提昇效果；相較於工作彼此獨立，當員工工作彼此需要合作時，職務間或職務內酬勞差距的擴大對營業單位績效提昇幅度顯著較小。由此可知，企業在進行酬勞誘因設計時，應同步考量工作特性與酬勞誘因機制間的配適性，俾利於組織績效的提昇。
    Agency theory suggests that organizations can motivate employees to exert their efforts by providing individual-based compensation. Tournament theory argues that, by encouraging competition among employees and increasing the compensation gaps between winners and losers, firms can direct employees’ actions in alignment with the firm’s interests. Both compensation schemes can induce employees’ efforts and increase corporate performance. However, the positive effects on corporate performance vary in the need of cooperation among employees, ranging from independent to interdependent tasks.

    This paper uses a theoretical and empirical analysis of performance-based and tournament-based incentives to examine the impacts of compensation incentives on branch performance. For the impacts of performance-based incentives on branch performance, the performance will increase in the individual performance-based incentives. When employees work independently, the greater the compensation gaps lead to more efforts and higher performance. When employees work interdependently, two contradictory effects of greater the compensation gaps make the performance change unclear. On the one hand, greater compensation gaps will increase employees’ efforts for being winner in the tournament. On the other hand, greater compensation gaps will induce employees not to help their competitors and hurt the performance, although help efforts can contribute firms profits.

    Using four years of data from a large car company with 86 car dealer branches and 90 car repair service branches, we find that for the independent tasks, the branch performance increase as individual performance-based compensation increases or revenue variance decreases. For the tasks needed cooperation among employees, the branch performance is increasing in group-based compensation or decreasing in revenue variance. Besides, we find that the larger the compensation gaps between inter- or intra-jobs, the branch performance for the independent tasks are better. The impacts of the compensation gaps on the interdependent tasks are smaller than on the independent tasks. Therefore, incentive policy rewards the best performances with the complementary fit between tasks design and compensation schemes
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