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    题名: 關稅與配額等價性:政治獻金之應用
    The equivalence of tariffs and quotas: an application of political contributions
    作者: 蔡騰緯
    Tsai, Teng-Wei
    贡献者: 王智賢
    Wang, Jue-Shyan
    蔡騰緯
    Tsai, Teng-Wei
    关键词: 政治獻金
    關稅
    配額
    關稅與配額等價性
    Political Contributions
    Tariffs
    Quotas
    the Equivalence of Tariffs and Quotas
    日期: 2009
    上传时间: 2010-12-09 16:01:08 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 本文採用 Grossman and Helpman (1994) 所建立的政治獻金模型為架構,來分析國內外廠商如何透過政治獻金的捐贈,以達到影響政府對於貿易管制政策中關稅或配額政策的偏好,進一步我們可得出關稅與配額等價性成立與否之結論。本文研究發現,首先,在兩國廠商皆無政治獻金遊說的情況下,關稅與配額等價性的命題不會成立。其次,在兩國廠商有政治獻金遊說的情況下,除了一個特例的情形外,本國政府均會偏好採用從量關稅政策,此時,關稅與配額等價性的命題將無法成立。
    This paper applies the original model of Grossman and Helpman (1994) and analyzes how the domestic and foreign firms may influence the incumbent government’s choice of trade policy via political contributions. Besides, we can examine whether the arguments for the equivalence of tariffs and quotas, may in fact hold or not given the political contributions. It is shown that in the case of no campaign contributions, the equivalence of tariffs and quotas will not hold. Furthermore, when the firms in the two countries lobby by political contributions, the domestic government will adopt a tariff policy except some special case. Then the equivalence of tariffs and quotas will not hold.
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    3. 吳世傑、楊雅博、黃鴻 (2002),「外籍廠商之技術授權:關稅與配額政策之比較」,《經濟論文叢刊》,30(1),49-75。
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    描述: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    財政研究所
    97255002
    98
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    数据类型: thesis
    显示于类别:[財政學系] 學位論文

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