| Reference: | Alm, J., B. Jackson, M. McKee (1992), “Institutional Uncertainty and Taxpayer Compliance”, American Economic Review, 82(4): 1018-1026.
Alm, J. and M. Mckee (2006), “ Audit Certainty, Audit Productivity, and Taxpayer Compliance.” National Tax Journal 59, 801-16.
Bac, M. (2007), “Optimal Supervision Intensity, Collusion, and the Organization of Work” Canadian Journal of Economics, 40(1): 313-339.
Bag, P.K. (1997), “ Controlling Corruption in Hierarchies.” Journal of Comparative Economics, 25: 322-344.
Caballé, J. and J. Panadés (2005), “Cost Uncertainty and Taxpayer Compliance.” International Tax and Public Finance, 12: 239-263.
Congleton, R.D. (2002). “ Risk-Averse Taxpayers and the Allocation of Tax Enforcement Effort: Law Enforcement or Leviathan? Some Empirical Evidence,” Public Finance Review, 30(5): 456-476.
Finkle, A. and D. Shin (2007), “ Conducting Inaccurate Audits to Commit to the Audit Policy.” International Journal of Industrial Organization, 25: 379-389.
Kaplow, L. (1992), “ The Optimal Probability and Magnitude of Fines far Acts that Definitely are Undesirable” International Review of Law and Economics, 12: 3-11.
Kessler, A.S. (2004), “ Optimal Auditing in Hierarchical Relationships.” Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 160: 210-231.
Macho-Stadler, I. and J.D. Pérez-Castrillo (1997), “ Optimal Auditing with Heterogeneous Incomes Sources.” International Economic Review, 38 (4): 951-986.
Macho-Stadler, I. and J.D. Pérez-Castrillo (2002), “ Auditing with Signals.” Economica, 69: 1-20. |
