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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/5007


    Title: 公共財與共同資源困境的實驗研究:決策架構與群體規模
    Other Titles: An Experimental Study on Public Goods/Goods/Common Resources Dilemmas---Decision Framing and Group Size
    Authors: 徐麗振
    Keywords: 公共財;共同資源困境;決策架構;群體規模
    Public goods;Common resource dilemma;Decision framework;Group size
    Date: 2000
    Issue Date: 2007-04-18 18:25:46 (UTC+8)
    Publisher: 臺北市:國立政治大學財政研究所
    Abstract: 本文探討有門檻的公共財與共同資源賽局中群體規模與捐贈機制對合作行為的影響。我們的實驗數據顯示:(1) 在小群體以及連續捐贈的機制下,公共財與共同資源賽局中的合作行為有很明顯的差異。(2) 在大群體中,連續捐贈的機制明顯提高公共財與共同資源實驗中的合作率。(3) 不論在小群體或大群體,連續捐贈的機制大幅減輕公共財與共同資源實驗中完全免費乘車的動機。(4)在所有的實驗中,有門檻的 Nash 均衡達成的頻率較完全免費乘車的 Nash 均衡高。
    We examine cooperation in threshold public goods and commons games by considering different group sizes and contribution mechanisms. Our experimental evidence shows first that cooperation is significantly different between public goods and commons experiments when group size is small and when contributions are continuous. Second, continuous contributions greatly raise cooperation in both public goods and commons experiments when group size is large. Third, continuous contributions greatly alleviate the incentive of complete free-riding in both public goods and commons experiments, regardless of the group size. Finally, threshold Nash equilibria are reached more often in all experiments than the complete free-riding Nash equilibrium.
    Description: 核定金額:764800元
    Data Type: report
    Appears in Collections:[財政學系] 國科會研究計畫

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