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The costs and benefits of group and non-group firms in Taiwan: evidence from the bargaining power in the syndication loan market
|Issue Date: ||2011-09-29 16:47:47 (UTC+8)|
To examine the costs and benefits of group and non-group firms in Taiwan we first calculated the excess vale of group firms. We find that group firms in Taiwan do not out-perform relative to non-group firms. To find out the reason behind their underperformance, we test five hypotheses, the profit stability hypothesis, the over-investment hypothesis, the cross-subsidization hypothesis, the co-insurance hypothesis, the bargaining power hypothesis, using data from 1998 to 2008. Our sample consists of 16950 firm samples, 208 group sample, and 3013 syndication deal samples. The results show that the group overall borrowing costs are larger than non-group firms and group characteristic does not influence the spread margin in the syndication market significantly. We conclude that cost exceed benefits for firms to operate under group affiliations.
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|Source URI: ||http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0098357021|
|Data Type: ||thesis|
|Appears in Collections:||[財務管理學系] 學位論文|
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