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    Title: 聯合內閣理論:內閣制下的多黨競爭
    Cabinet coalition theory
    Authors: 陳坤森
    Contributors: 王業立
    陳坤森
    Keywords: 聯合內閣
    憲政體制
    選舉制度
    政黨制度
    新制度主義
    Date: 1999
    Issue Date: 2011-10-14 14:41:22 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 本論文選定十八個民主先進的內閣制國家(佔全世界五十五個內閣制國家的近三成左右)為研究對象,包括英國、紐西蘭、澳大利亞、加拿大、愛爾蘭、法國(含第四共和及第五共和)、德國、奧地利、義大利、盧森堡、比利時、荷蘭、丹麥、挪威、瑞典、芬蘭、冰島、日本。至於研究時間則限定在一九四五年至二○○○年七月初為止,共計五百六十三次內閣的組成結果。
    在方法論上,本論文擷取新制度主義(neo-institutionalism)的研究取徑。在總體制度層面上,主要是採取「法制的和比較的研究途徑」(legalistic- institutional and comparative approach)。本文探究聯合內閣形成之前的制度安排,包括憲政體制和選舉制度之安排,前者界定行政部門和立法部門的互動關係,而後者為政黨競爭的遊戲規則設下法制規範,兩者都間接地影響一個國家政局的穩定性;另外,社會結構的制度因素,尤其是階級、種族、語言、宗教和地域等分歧面向所形成的團體對立,各以政黨為其利益的代言人,進而影響聯合內閣的形成。所以,在從事聯合內閣的比較研究時,實有必要對各國的政府結構、社會結構和選舉制度先行瞭解,以掌握靜態法制面的成因。
    本論文還進行動態的統計數據,針對「有效政黨數目」與其他變項(如「不成比例性」、「議題面向數目」、「內閣存活率」、「內閣型態發生率」等)進行統計的迴歸分析,以找出兩種變項之間的相關性。另外,本文在針對特定主題時(例如選舉制度改革前後的變化時),採取「小數量比較法」(small-N comparison)的研究策略,例如第五章第四節就是專門以紐西蘭、義大利和日本三國為個案比較的小單位,分析這三個國家在選舉制度改革前後,在平均有效政黨數目、不成比例性以及內閣型態發生頻率上的變化。
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