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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/52143

    Title: 內生 Cartel 形成下之 Cartel 價格動態
    Other Titles: Cartel Pricing Dynamics with Endogenous Cartel Formation
    Authors: 陳國樑
    Contributors: 行政院國家科學委員會
    Keywords: Cartel 價格動態;Cartel 內生形成
    Date: 2012-10
    Issue Date: 2011-11-16 15:11:39 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 解決cartel 問題所面臨最大的挑戰在於,一般的cartel 皆為私人廠商間違法運作之秘密協定。就產業競爭政策的角度而言,價格操控理論 (a theory of price fixing) 所能帶來最之貢獻在於對促使勾結產生條件的鑑別、了解勾結下的價格特性、以及察覺是否有 cartel 在市場中運作。雖然現有文獻已經就此些問題有相當多的討論,但目前研究皆忽略了一個相當重要的面向—由於勾結行為的非法性,cartel 成員不僅要制定內部穩定 (internally stable) 的價格來提升利潤,更要避免使人產生價格操控的懷疑。換言之,cartel 成員避免價格操控的懷疑以迴避偵查與cartel 內部的穩定性,實為同等重要的課題。本研究計畫之設計在當cartel 選擇價格以迴避偵查的情況下,增進對cartel 價格動態的認識。相較於多數文獻假設cartel 形成為外生決定,本研究計畫明確的處理cartel 之內生形成。本研究—內生cartel 形成下之cartel 價格動態—目的在於提出內生cartel 形成之模型,以及在cartel 形成後,在成本波動及內生查獲機率下之cartel 價格模式。*本研究主主要的挑戰再於買方對cartel 在進行價格操弄的懷疑以及cartel 形成兩者之內生化。就前者而言,本人目前正在進行中之研究計畫—內生查獲機率下之 Cartel 價格動態 (NSC # 99- 2410-H-004-053-)—即是針對此一問題進行探討。針對cartel 之內生形成,本研究提出一個簡單的解決辦法。為使模型中廠商得內生形成cartel,本人建議將非勾結解設為隨機。此一做法的用意在於,當非勾結情況下之報酬低於一定水準時,廠商會選擇成立cartel。除了理論上的貢獻外,就競爭政策的角度而言,一個成功的模型不應僅止於cartel 的內生形成,更重要的是比較cartel 的價格模式與cartel 形成前非勾結情況下的價格模式。最後,本研究計畫之成果不僅補足現有產業組織文獻在勾結價格研究上忽略了 cartel 成員積極迴避偵查誘因的漏洞,也為本人未來之待研究項目,例如了解競爭政策之有效性以及建立cartel 偵測機制等課題,奠定重要的基礎。
    The major challenge to stopping cartels is that they are shrouded in secrecy. From an antitrust perspective, the essential tasks for a theory of price-fixing are identifying conditions that facilitate collusion, characterizing the properties of collusive pricing, and towards discerning the presence of a cartel. Although there is a large theoretical literature addressing these issues, work has generally failed to take account of an important dimension to this problem. Due to the illegality of collusion, firms not only want to achieve internally stable prices to raise profit but also want to avoid creating suspicions that a cartel is in action. In other words, avoiding detection is as crucial as deterring deviations by cartel members. This research project is designed to increase the body of knowledge of the dynamics of cartel pricing when cartels choose prices to actively avoid detection by the antitrust authorities. In different to the bulk of studies on this subject which assumed exogenous cartel formation, I deal with the incentive of cartel formation explicitly. Specifically, this project—Cartel Pricing Dynamics with Endogenous Cartel Formation—intends to develop an adequate model of endogenous cartel formation where a cartel, once a coalition is formed, prices to avoid detection by the antitrust authority in an environment with cost variability and endogenous buyer belief formation.* The main difficulty of this exercise is that both the buyer belief and cartel formation are endogenous. My ongoing project—Cartel Pricing Dynamics with Endogenous Probability of Detection (NSC#99-2410-H-004-053-)—is specifically dealing with the buyer belief formation part. As to the part of endogenous cartel formation, the idea is simple. In order to generate cartel formation, I propose to make the non-collusive solution stochastic so that cartel formation would occur when the non-collusive solution is sufficiently competitive. In addition to theoretical contribution, from an antitrust perspective, the task does not simply end at coming up with a model that successfully endogenizes cartel formation, but rather at using the model to simulate price paths that describe properties of the cartel price path and properties of the non-collusive price path preceding cartel formation. Finally, the successfulness of this research project not only fill in the hole in the current literature of collusive pricing which ignores the important incentive of cartel members price to avoid detection, it also lays out the foundation to future projects on my research agenda, such as accessing the effectiveness of antitrust practices and developing screening mechanism for the existence of a cartel.
    Relation: 基礎研究
    研究期間:10008~ 10107
    Source URI: http://grbsearch.stpi.narl.org.tw/GRB/result.jsp?id=1928137&plan_no=NSC100-2410-H004-078&plan_year=100&projkey=PF10006-0893&target=plan&highStr=*&check=0&pnchDesc=%E5%85%A7%E7%94%9F+Cartel+%E5%BD%A2%E6%88%90%E4%B8%8B%E4%B9%8B+Cartel+%E5%83%B9%E6%A0%BC%E5%8B%95%E6%85%8B
    Data Type: report
    Appears in Collections:[財政學系] 國科會研究計畫

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