English  |  正體中文  |  简体中文  |  Post-Print筆數 : 11 |  Items with full text/Total items : 89672/119493 (75%)
Visitors : 23945084      Online Users : 155
RC Version 6.0 © Powered By DSPACE, MIT. Enhanced by NTU Library IR team.
Scope Tips:
  • please add "double quotation mark" for query phrases to get precise results
  • please goto advance search for comprehansive author search
  • Adv. Search
    HomeLoginUploadHelpAboutAdminister Goto mobile version
    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/52810

    Title: 我國高階政務及事務官員調動的模式:以行政院為例,1988~2010
    Transfer modes of high-ranking administrative and executive officers in Taiwan government as seen in the Executive Yuan from 1988 to 2010
    Authors: 陳鴻章
    Chen, Hung Chang
    Contributors: 寇健文

    Chen, Hung Chang
    Keywords: 國民黨
    Executive Yuan
    Institutional-Agency Theory
    Political - Transaction Cost
    Date: 2010
    Issue Date: 2012-04-17 09:25:06 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 為了探討與分析長期以來存在,關於行政院高階政務官、事務官員調動的「普遍說」與「特殊說」爭議,並且探究哪些制度性、組織性因素,對於行政院的高階政務、事務官員更替,會有所影響。本研究嘗試在制度的代理人理論架構,以及相關理論預設之下,以一九八八年第一季到兩千零一十年第四季,時序橫跨李登輝、陳水扁、馬英九等三位總統主政期間,包括行政院本部暨所屬三十二個部會的高階政務、事務官員,作為研究對象,進行實證的分析。




    This reasearch offers an analysis of the long-standing discourse on transferal patterns of government officials in Taiwan, with the focus on the much-debated “general theory” vs. “special theory” approach. We will look at the systemic and organizational factors that influence the appointment, replacement, and transferal of both administrative and executive officers in the higher echelons of government. Specifically, this paper examines the time period from 1988 to 2010, employing a systematic agent framework in combination with related theoretical parameters to explore the concrete situation in the Executive Yuan and its 32 ministries, commissions, and other agencies under three consecutive administrations (i.e. presidents Lee Teng-hui, Chen Shui-bian, and Ma Ying-jeou).

    In the first four chapters, we will outline background and motive of this paper, give an overview of past research on this topic, scrutinize relevant theoretical approaches, and illustrate research problems and models. In the fifth chapter, we explore and analyze the period from the early to the mid-1990s, a time that saw repeated amendments and additions to the constitution that gave the president increasingly greater powers of appointment and removal of cabinet members. These powers have become one of the most important political tools the president wields, allowing the nation’s leader to exert highly effective and immediate control over the Executive Yuan, in particular over its highest-ranking officials.

    In the sixth chapter, we will cover the entire period from the late 1980s to the 2010. During this time, three presidents were successively at the helm (Lee from 1988-2000, Chen from 2000-2008, Ma since 2008), and we will scrutinize the different appointment and transferal modes applied during their terms, in particular as regards their use as a tool of political control. In addition, we will further discuss the first three hypotheses initially proposed in chapter four, and show if and how they are borne out by the data and facts assembled in this research. Chapter seven contains a comprehensive analysis of the entire set of data to facilitate our discussion of hypotheses four to eleven as first proposed in chapter four, and to determine whether or not these are supported by the empirical data. At the same time, we look at the quarterly figures from Executive Yuan ministries and commissions to create a multiple regression model of the cross-section data, which will help us to analyze which specific factors influence the substitution and transferal of high-ranking officials.

    After a thorough analysis of the empirical data, we will find that of the two theories usually applied to the problem of systemic and political control over the higher echelons of the executive, i.e. the general and the special theory mentioned above, the general theory is in fact better supported by the relevant set of data. As for which particular systemic and organizational factors may influence the replacement or substitution of high-ranking administrative and executive cabinet members, the crucial parameters affecting this question are the larger political climate that the president faces, as well as the type and political weight of the concerned ministries and commissions. At times when administrative stability and quality are the paramount considerations, the president will necessarily deemphasize his control over the executive and refrain from making too many personnel changes, while in times of political crisis, or when there is growing concern over the competence and suitability of his entrusted agents (i.e. leading members of the Executive Yuan’s subdivisions) and thus more tolerance for change, one will almost always see large-scale cabinet reshuffles as the president attempts to flush out unfit or unwanted elements.

    Finally, an analysis of the overall data also shows that the two transitions of power Taiwan has seen in 2000 and 2008 respectively were—as a matter of course—accompanied by extensive personnel changes as numerous high-ranking government officials were removed from office to make place for new faces. These far-reaching waves of “political purging” and complete reorganization of the cabinet within short periods of time have come at a considerable political cost for Taiwan’s society as a whole. This has somewhat shaken the population’s faith in democracy as a political system, and here lies a significant potential concern for the future development of Taiwan’s democracy.
    Reference: 中文
    林燕翎,2000,〈吳乃仁:新政府用舊官僚 像請鬼拿藥單〉,《經濟日報》,9/28,2版。
    周玉蔻,1993,《李登輝的一千天 : 1988~1992》,臺北:麥田。
    胡祖慶,2008,〈憲政承諾 馬不宜兼黨主席〉,《聯合報》,8/30,15版。
    許玉君,2002,〈陳總統今接民進黨主席 步入黨政合一新紀元 中執委等也將於全代會選出〉,《經濟報》,7/21,4版。
    許南雄,1988b,〈各國「常務次長」體制之比較 -上-〉,《人事月刊》,26﹙4﹚︰9~21。
    許南雄,1988c,〈各國「常務次長」體制之比較 -下-〉,《人事月刊》,26﹙5﹚︰8~24。
    許南雄,1988d,〈政務官與事務官的責任體制 -上-〉,《公務人員月刊》,27︰57~66。
    許南雄,1988e,〈政務官與事務官的責任體制 -下-〉,《公務人員月刊》,28︰34~50。
    許南雄,1989,〈各國中央行政機關幕僚長體制之比較 -續-〉,《考銓季刊》,17︰72~92。
    許南雄,1997,〈各國公務員分類體系之比較研究〉,《法商學報》,33 :131~185。
    隋杜卿,2002,〈我國現行中央政府體制的定位、爭議與前瞻 〉,《國家政策論壇》,22(2):39~48。
    曾建元等譯,2002,《總統與國會:憲政設計與選舉動力》,臺北:韋伯文化。譯自 Shugart, Matthew S, and John M. Carey. Presidents and Assemblies : Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
    曾建元,2003,〈 台灣憲政體制原理與民主治理實踐 〉,《淡江人文社會學刊》,17:129~140。
    陳敏鳳,2000,〈內閣二三級主管不配合 就調整 扁:願給閣員更多機會 但主管不配合就要檢討不該蹉跎〉,《聯合晚報》,8/28,2版。
    顏秋來,2006,〈政務官與事務官體制運作之研究〉,《國家菁英季刊》, 2 ﹙1﹚:21~38。
    戴安瑋,2002,〈扁不兼主席承諾破局 馬英九:選民早習慣〉,《聯合晚報》,7/21,2版。
    薛承泰,1993,〈事件時序分析法﹙Event History Analysis﹚簡介〉,《人口研究通訊》,14:18~24。
    Aberbach, Joel D. 1991. "The President and the Executive Branch." In Colin Campbell and Bert Rockman, eds., The Bush Presidency:First Appraisals. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, pp. 223~247.
    Akerlof, George A. 1970.“The Market for "Lemons" : Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism.”The Quarterly Journal of Economics 84(3):488~500.
    Arrow, Kenneth J., 1969. "The Organization of Economic Activity : Issues Pertinent to the Choice of Market versus Non-market Allocations," Analysis and Evaluation of Public Expenditures: The PPP System, 1:47~64.
    Bendor, Jonathan. 1988. “Formal Models of Bureaucracy.”British Journal of Political Science, 18(3):353~395.
    Berggren, Niclas and Nils Karlson. 2003.“Constitutionalism, division of power and transaction costs.”Public Choice, 117: 99~124.
    Boissevain, Jeremy. 1966. "Patronage in Sicily."Man, 1(1):18~33.
    Bosco, Joseph. 1992. "Taiwan Factions : Guanxi, Patronage, and the State in Local Politics." Ethnology, 31(2):157~183.
    Brauer, Carl. 1987.“Tenure, Turnover, and Postgovernment Employment Trends of Presidential Appointees.”In The In-and-Outers : Presidential Appointees and Transient Government in Washington, eds. G. Calvin Mackenzie. Baltimore, Maryland:The Johns Hopkins University Press.
    Campbell, Colin. 1986. Managing the Presidency : Carter, Regan, and the Search for Executive Harmony. Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania:The University of Pittsburgh Press.
    Cayer, N. Joseph and Lee Sigelman.1980.“Minorities and Women in State and Local Government : 1973~1975.” Public Administration Review, 40(5):443~450.
    Coase, R. H. 1937.“The Nature of the Firm.” Economica, 4(16):386~405.
    Cohen, Jeffrey E. 1986.“On the Tenure of Appointive Political Executives : The American Cabinet, 1952~1984.”American Journal of Political Science, 30(3):507~516.
    Cohen, Jeffery. 1988. The Politics of the U. S. Cabinet. Representation in the Exec- utive Branch 1789-1984. Pittsburgh:University of Pittsburgh Press.
    Cole, Richard L. and David A. Caputo. 1979.“Presidential Control of the Senior civil Service:Assessing the Strategies of the Nixon Years.”The American Political Science Review, 73(2):399~413.
    Corder, Kevin. 2003.“Structural Choice and Political Control of Bureaucracy : Updating Federal Credit Programs.”In Politics, Policy, and Organizations : Frontiers in the Scientific Study of Bureaucracy , eds. George A. Krause & Kenneth J. Meier. Ann Arbor:The University of Michigan Press.
    Cronin, Thomas E. 1980. The State of the Presidency. Boston:Little, Brown and Company.
    Denhardt, Robert B., and Linda Deleon. 1993.“Great thinkers in Personnel Management.”In Handbook of Public Personnel Management, ed. Jack Rabin, et al. New York:Marcel Dekker, Inc.
    Dickinson, Matthew J. and Kathryn Dunn Tenpas. 2002.“Explaining Increasing Turnover Rates Among Presidential Advisers, 1929~1997.”The Journal of Politics, 64(2):434~448.
    Downs, Antony. 1967. Inside Bureaucracy. Boston:Little, Brown.
    Dolan, Julie. 2000.“Influencing Policy at the Top of the Federal Bureaucracy : A Comparison of Career and Political Senior Executives.”Public Administration Review, 60(6):573~581.
    Dometrius, Nelson C. and Lee Sigelman.1984.“Assessing Progress toward Affirmative Action Goals in State and Local Government : A New Benchmark.” Public Administration Review, 44﹙3﹚:241~246.
    Eisenstadt, S. N., and Louis Roniger. 1980. “Patron--Client Relations as a Model of Structuring Social Exchange.” Comparative Studies in Society and History, 22(1):42~77.
    Eisenhardt, Kathleen M. 1989.“Agency Theory : An Assessment and Review.” The Academy of Management Review, 14(1):57~74.
    Escobar-Lemmon, Maria and Michelle M. Taylor-Robinson. 2005.“Women Ministers in Latin American Government : When, Where, and Why?” American Journal of Political Science, 49(4):829~844.
    Fairlie, John A. 1913.“The President’s Cabinet.”The American Political Science Review, 7(1):28~44.
    Fisher, Linda L. 1987. “Fifty Years of Presidential Appointments.”In The In-and-Outers:Presidential Appointees and Transient Government in Washington, eds. G. Calvin Mackenzie. Baltimore, Maryland:The Johns Hopkins University Press.
    Frees, Edward W. 2004. Longitudinal and Panel Data : Analysis and Applications in the Social Sciences, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.
    Greene, William H. 2003. Econometric Analysis, 5th ed, Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall.
    Heclo, Hugh. 1977. A Government of Strangers : Executive Politics in Washington.Washington, D. C.:Brookings Institution Press.
    Hess, Stephen. 2001.“First Impressions : Presidents, Appointments, and the Transition.” In Innocent Until Nominated : the Breakdown of the Presidential Appointments Process, eds. G Calvin Mackenzie,. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.
    Hess, Stephen. 2002. Organizing the Presidency. Washington, D. C.:Brookings Institution Press.
    Hindera, John J. 1993.“Representative Bureaucracy : Further Evidence of Active Representation in the EEOC District Offices.”Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 3(4):415~429.
    Hölmstrom, Bengt. 1979.“Moral Hazard and Observability.”The Bell Journal of Economics, 10(1):74~91.
    Hsiao, Cheng. 1986. Analysis of panel data, Econometric Society Monographs, no. 11 Cambridge; New York and Sydney:Cambridge University Press.
    Hsiao, Cheng. 2003. Analysis of Panel Data, Cambridge, U.K.;New York:Cambridge University Press.
    Ingraham, Patricia W. 1987.“Building Bridges of Burning Them? The President, the Appointees, and Bureaucracy.”Public Administration Review, 47(5):425~435.
    Ingraham, Patricia W., James R. Thompson, and Elliot F. Eisenberg. 1995.“Political Management Strategies and Political / Career Relationships : Where Are We Now in the Federal Government?”Public Administration Review, 55(3):263~272.
    Kaufman, Robert R. 1974.“The Patron-Client Concept and Macro-Politics : Prospects and Problems.” Comparative Studies in Society and History, 16(3):284~308.
    Kellough, J. Edward. 1990. "Federal Agencies and Affirmative Action for Blacks and Women." Social Science Quarterly, 71:83~92.
    Kettering, Sharon.1988.“The Historical Development of Political Clientelism.” The Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 18(3):419~447.
    Key, V. O. 1964. Politics, parties, & pressure groups. New York:Crowell Press.
    Kingsley, J. Donald. 1944. Representative Bureaucracy. Yellow spring, OH:Antioch Press.
    Kline, Harvey F. 1977. “Committee Membership Turnover in the Colombian National Congress, 1958~1974.” Legislative Studies Quarterly, 2(1):29~43.
    Knott, Jack H. 1993.“Comparing Public and Private Management : Cooperative Effort and Principal-Agent Relationships.”Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 3(1):93~119.
    Kotowitz, Y. 1987. Moral hazard. In The New Palgrave : Allocation, Information, and Markets. J. Eatwell, M. Milgate and P. Newman Eds. New York:Norton: 207~213.
    Lamson, Peggy. 1979. In the Vanguard : Six American Women in Public Life. Boston:Houghton Mifflin Company.
    Lemarchand, René.1972. “Political Clientelism and Ethnicity in Tropical Africa: Competing Solidarities in Nation-Building.” The American Political Science Review, 66(1):68~90.
    Lemarchand, Rene., and Keith Legg.1972.“Political Clientelism and Development : A Preliminary Analysis.” Comparative Politics, 4(2):149~178.
    Lewis, Gregory B. 1990. "In Search of the Machiavellian Milquetoasts : Comparing Attitudes of Bureaucrats and Ordinary People." Public Administration Review, 50:220~227.
    Lewis, David E. 2005.“Presidents and the Politicization of the United States Federal Government,1988~2004.”Paper presented at the 2005annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington,DC.
    Lewis, David E. 2007.“Testing Pendleton’s Premise:Do Political Appointees Make Worse Bureaucrats?”The Journal of Politics, 69(4):1073~1088.
    Lewis, David E. 2008. The Politics of Presidential Appointments : Political Control and Bureaucratic Performance. New Jersey:Princeton University Press.
    Lippman, Thomas W. 1997.“State Department Seeks Gains for Women : Albright is Stressing Rights Concerns in Foreign Policy Agenda.”The Washington Post, March 25, A-1.
    Long, Norton E. 1949.“Power and Administration.”Public Administration Review, 9(4):257~264.
    Mackenzie, G. Calvin. 1981. The Politics of Presidential Appointments, New York: The Free Press.
    March, James, and Johan Olsen. 1989. Rediscovering Institutions : The Organizational Basis of Politics. New York:Free Press.
    Marshall,John M. 1976.“Moral Hazard.” The American Economic Review, 66(5):880~890.
    Martin, Daniel W. 1988.“The Fading Legacy of Woodrow Wilson.”Public Administration Review, 48(2):631~636.
    Martin, Janet M. 1989.“The Recruitment of Women to Cabinet and Subcabinet Posts.”The Western Political Quarterly, 42(1):161~172.
    Martin, Janet M. 1991.“An Examination of Executive Branch Appointments in the Reagan Administration by Background and Gender.”The Western Political Quarterly, 44(1):173~184.
    Meier, Kenneth J. 1975.“Representative Bureaucracy : An Empirical Analysis.”American Political Science Review, 69(2):526~542.
    Meier, Kenneth J., Robert D. Wrinkle, and J. L. Polinard. 1999.“Representative Bureaucracy and Distributional Equity : Addressing the Hard Question.”The Journal of Politics, 61(4):1025~1039.
    Mitnick, Barry M. 1975.“The Theory of Agency : The Policing "Paradox" and Regulatory Behavior.” Public Choice, 24:27~42.
    Mitnick, Barry M. 2006. “Origin of the Theory of Agency : An Account by One of the Theory’s Originators” http://www.pitt.edu/~mitnick/agencytheory/agencytheoryoriginrev11806r.htm
    Mladenka, Kenneth R. 1989.“Blacks and Hispanics in Urban Politics.”The American Political Science Review, 83(1):165~191.
    Moe, Terry M. 1984.“The New Economics of Organization.”American Journal of Political Science, 28(4):739~777.
    Moe, Terry M. 1985.“Chapter Nine:The Politicized Presidency.”In The New Direction in American Politics. John E. Chubb and Paul E. Peterson Eds. Washington, D. C. The Brookings Institution.
    Moe, Terry M. 2002.“Political Control and the Power of the Agent.”Paper presented at the conference for Controlling the Bureaucracy, February, Texas A & M University, College Station, Texas.
    Moe, Terry M. 2003. “The Presidency and the Bureaucracy : The Presidential Advantage.” In The Presidency and The Political System, seven edition, eds. Michael Nelson,. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press.
    Moe, Terry M. 2005. “Political Control and the Power of the Agent.”The journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, 22(1):1~29.
    Moncrief, Gary F. 1998. “Terminating the Provincial Career:Retirement and Electoral Defeat in Canadian Provincial Legislatures, 1960~1997.”Canadian Journal of political Science, 31(2):359~372.
    Moncrief, Gary F, Richard G. Niemi. and Lynda W. Powell. 2004. “Time, Term Limits, and Turnover : Trends in Membership Stability in U.S. State Legislatures.”Legislative Studies Quarterly, 29(3):357~381.
    Nachmias, David. and David H. Rosenbloom. 1977.“Antecedents of Public Bureaucracy : The Case of Israel.”Administration & Society, 9(1):45~80.
    Naff, Katherine C. 1994. Through the Glass Ceiling:Prospects for the Advancement of Women in the Federal Government. Public Administration Review, 54(6): 507~514.
    Naff, Katherine C. and John Crum. 2000.“The President and Representative Bureaucracy : Rhetoric and Reality.” Public Administration Review, 60(2):98~110.
    Nathan, Richard P. 1975. The Plot That Failed : Nixon and the Administrative Presidency. New York:Wiley.
    North, Douglass C. 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance. Cambridge,UK: Cambridge University Press.
    Palmer, Harvey D. and Ronald J. Vogel. 1995.“Political Opportunity for Federal Appointment : The Case of Departing Members of the U.S. House of Representatives, 1961~1992” The Journal of Politics, 57(3):677~695.
    Pfiffner, James P. 1987a. “Strangers in a Strange Land : Orienting New Presidential Appointees.”In The In-and-Outers : Presidential Appointees and Transient Government in Washington, eds. G. Calvin Mackenzie. Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
    Pfiffner, James P. 1987b. “Political Appointees and Career Executives : The Democracy-Bureaucracy Nexus in the Third Century.”Public Administration Review, 47(1):57~65.
    Pfiffner, James P. 1990.“ Establishing the Bush Presidency.”Public Administration Review, 50(1):64~73.
    Pfiffner, James P. 2003.“President George W. Bush and His War Cabinet.” Paper presented at the conference on The Presidency, Congress, and the War on Terrorism , February 7, University of Florida.
    Polsby, Nelson W. 1978.“Presidential Cabinet Making : Lessons for the Political System.”Political Science Quarterly, 93(1):15~25.
    Postlewaite, A. 1987. Asymmetric Information. In The New Palgrave : Allocation, Information, and Markets. J. Eatwell, M. Milgate and P. Newman Eds. New York:Norton:35~39.
    Powell, John Duncan. 1970.“Peasant Society and Clientelist Politics.”The American Political Science Review, 64(2):411~425.
    Rector, Robert and Michael Sanera, 1987. Steering the Elephant : How Washington Works. New York Universe Books.
    Rehfuss, John A. 1986.“A Representative Bureaucracy? Women and Minority Executives in California Career Service.”Public Administration Review, 46(5):454~460.
    Rosenbloom, David H. and Jeannette C. Featherstonhaugh. 1977. "Passive and     Active Representation in the Federal Service : A Comparison of Blacks and Whites." Social Science Quarterly, 57:873~882.
    Ross,Stephen A. 1973.“The Economic Theory of Agency : The Principal’s Problem.” The American Economic Review, 63(2):134~139.
    Rourke, Francis E. 1978. Bureaucratic Power in National Politics. 3rd ed. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company.
    Salisbury, Robert H. and Kenneth A. Shepsle. 1981.“Congressional Staff Turnover and the Ties-That-Bind.”The American Political Science Review, 75(2):381~396.
    Saltzstein, Grace Hall. 1986.“Female Mayors and Women in Municipal Jobs.”American Journal of Political Science, 30(1):140~164.
    Schroeder, Patricia, and Olympia Snowe. 1994.“The Politics of Women’s Health.”In the American Woman : 1994~95, eds. Cynthia Costello and Anne J. Stone. New York:W.W. Norton & Company.
    Scott, James C. 1972.“Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia.”The American Political Science Review, 66(1):91~113.
    Selden, Sally Coleman., Jeffrey L. Brudney., and J. Edward Kellough. 1998.“Bureaucracy as a Representative Institution : Toward a Reconciliation of Bureaucratic Government and Democratic Theory.”American Journal of Political Science, 42(3):717~744.
    Shapiro, Susan P. 2005.“Agency Theory.”Annual Review of Sociology, 31:263~284.
    Shin, Kwang S. and John S. Jackson, Ⅲ. 1979. “Membership Turnover in U.S. State Legislatures : 1931~1976.”Legislative Studies Quarterly, 4(1):95~104.
    Sowa,Jessica E.,and Sally Coleman Selden. 2003.“Administrative Discretion and Active Representation : An Expansion of the Theory of Representative Bureaucracy.” Public Administration Review, 63(6):700~710.
    Stein, Lana. 1986.“Representative Local Government : Minorities in the Municipal Work Force.” The Journal of Politics, 48(3):694~713.
    Stiglitz, Joseph. 1987. Principal and Agent. In The New Palgrave : Allocation, Information, and Markets. J. Eatwell, M. Milgate and P. Newman Eds. New York:Norton:241~253.
    Stillman, R. J., 1987. The American Bureaucracy. Chicago:Nelson-Hall.
    Subramaniam, V. 1967.“Representative Bureaucracy : A Reassessment.”The American Political Science Review, 61(4):1010~1019.
    Svara, James H. 1985. “Dichotomy and Duality : Reconceptualizing the Relationship between Policy and Administration in Council-Manager Cities.” Public Administration Review, 45(1):221~232.
    Svara, James H. 1998. “The Politics-Administration Dichotomy Model as Aberration.” Public Administration Review, 58(1):51~58.
    Svara, James H. 1999. “The Shifting Boundary between Elected Officials and City Managers in Large Council-Manager Cities.” Public Administration Review, 59(1):44~53.
    Svara, James H. 2001. “The Myth of the Dichotomy : Complementarity of Politics and Administration in the Past and Future of Public Administration.” Public Administration Review, 61(2):176~183.
    Tashakkori, Abbs and Charles Teddlie. 1998. Mixed Methodology : Combining Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches. Thousand Qaks, Calif.:Sage Publications.
    Theodore C. Sorenson. 1963. Decision-Making in the White House : The Olive Branch of the Arrows, New York, Columbia University Press.
    Thielemann, Gregory S., and Joseph Stewart, Jr. 1996.“A Demand-Side Perspective on the Importance of Representative Bureaucracy : AIDS, Ethnicity, Gender, and Sexual Orientation.”Public Administration Review, 56(2):168~173.
    Thompson, Frank J. 1978. “Civil Servants and the Deprived : Socio-political and Occupational Explanations of Attitudes Toward Minority Hiring.” American Journal of Political Science, 22(2):325~347.
    Waldo, Dwight. 1952. “Development of Theory of Democratic Administration.” The American Political Science Review, 46(1):81~103.
    Wang, Chin-Shou. 2004. Democratization and The Breakdown of Clientelism in Taiwan, 1987~2001. Ph.D. dissertation. University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
    Waterman, Richard W., and Kenneth J. Meier. 1998.“Principal-Agent Models : An Expansion?”Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 8(2):173~202.
    Weingrod, Alex. 1968. “Patrons, Patronage, and Political Parties.” Comparative Studies in Society and History, 10(4):377~400.
    Weisberg, Herbert F. 1987.“Cabinet Transfers and Departmental Prestige : Someone Old, Someone New, Someone Borrowed.”American Politics Quarterly, 15(2):238~253.
    Whitford, Andrew B. 2005.“The Pursuit of Political control by Multiple Principals.”The Journal of Politics, 67(1):29~49.
    Wilson, Woodrow. 1887.“The Study of Administration.”Political Science Quarterly, 2(2):197~222.
    Wilson, Woodrow. 1941.“The Study of Administration.”Political Science Quarterly, 56(4):481~506.
    Wilson, Charles. 1987. Adverse Selection. In The New Palgrave : Allocation, Information, and Markets. J. Eatwell, M. Milgate and P. Newman Eds. New York:Norton:31~34.
    Williamson, Oliver E. 2000.“The New Institutional Economics : Taking Stock, Looking Ahead.”Journal of Economic Literature, 38(3):595~613.
    Wood, B. Dan. 1988. “Principals, Bureaucrats, and Responsiveness in Clean Air Enforcements.”The American Political Science Review, 82(1):213~234.
    Wood, B. Dan and Brian Cook. 1989. “Principal-Agent Models of Political Control of Bureaucracy.” The American Political Science Review, 83(3):965~978.
    Wood, B. Dan and Richard W. Waterman. 1991. “The Dynamics of Political Control of the Bureaucracy.” The American Political Science Review, 85(3):801~828.
    Wood, B. Dan and John Bohte. 2004.“Political Transaction Costs and the Politics of Administrative Design.”The Journal of Politics, 66(1):176~202.
    Wu, Nai-Teh. 1987. The Politics of A Regime Patronage System : Mobilization and Control Within an Authoritarian Regime. Ph.D. dissertation. University of Chicago.
    Yaffee, Robert. 2003.“A Primer for Panel Data Analysis.”Social Sciences, Statistics & Mapping. Produced by New York University : Information Technology Services.﹙http://www.nyu.edu/its/pubs/connect/fall03/pdfs/yaffee_primer.pdf﹚
    Description: 博士
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0094252504
    Data Type: thesis
    Appears in Collections:[政治學系] 學位論文

    Files in This Item:

    File SizeFormat
    250401.pdf5143KbAdobe PDF925View/Open

    All items in 政大典藏 are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved.

    社群 sharing

    DSpace Software Copyright © 2002-2004  MIT &  Hewlett-Packard  /   Enhanced by   NTU Library IR team Copyright ©   - Feedback