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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/53237

    Title: 沙氏法案實施後為何會發生大量的會計師解聘? 股票市場是如何反應的?
    Other Titles: Why Is There a Substantial Increase in Auditor Dismissals after the Sox? How Does the Market React to It?
    Authors: 俞洪昭
    Contributors: 國立政治大學會計學系
    Keywords: 經濟;沙氏法案;會計師;股票市場
    Date: 2008
    Issue Date: 2012-06-26 14:57:27 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 一直以來,主管機關與準則制定團體即非常關心公司解聘其會計師。主要原因為: 「解聘會計師」可能反應了公司管理當局的投機行為 (如:購買審計意見或盈餘管理)。 從經濟的角度來看,公司在解聘會計師時,通常必需考慮轉換成本與代理成本。最近的 學術研究發現,轉換成本通常會大於因為解聘會計師而帶來的代理好處,因此,在實務 上,會計師解聘的情形不會經常發生。此外,沙氏法案針對公司管理當局的不當行為、 審計委員會之有效性以及內部控制的評估,均做出了非常嚴格的規定。在考慮轉換成本 以及日趨嚴格的法令規範下,公司應該有較少的誘因解聘會計師,以達成其投機行為之 目的。然而,與此論點相反的,最近的一些獨立機構之研究報告均指出,在沙氏法案通 過後,會計師解聘的現象,有逐年大幅增加的趨勢。 有鑑於上述這種理論與實際觀察結果不一致的現象,本研究試圖探討為何公司會在 沙氏法案通過之後,仍大幅解聘其會計師。要回答這個問題,本研究試圖探討三個相關 的議題:(a) 公司是否透過解聘會計師來達成其盈餘管理的目的? (b) 為何downgrade (即:公司從原先的四大會計師事務所變更到非四大會計師事務所) 的會計師解聘在沙氏 法案通過後,發生的頻率最高? (c) 股票市場對於公司的解聘會計師行為,會作出何種 反應? 本研究試圖聯結會計師變更、盈餘管理與市場反應之相關文獻,以實證的方法探 討公司解聘會計師背後的動機以及市場是否能看穿公司的動機,並反應在股價上。本 研究的實證結果,不僅可以探討沙氏法案是否可以有效抑制管理當局之盈餘管理行 為,同時亦可提供有關於會計師解聘以及市場反應之最新證據。
    Regulators and policy-makers have long been concerned about companies’ dismissing their auditors because dismissal sometimes implies management’s opportunistic behavior such as opinion shopping and earnings management. Economically, auditor dismissal usually involves a tradeoff between switching costs and agency costs and recent academic evidence shows that switching costs likely outweigh the agency benefits of changing auditors, consistent with the fact that most companies change auditors infrequently. Also, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (hereafter called SOX) has imposed numerous provisions on top management’s misconducts, the effectiveness of audit committees, and the assessments of internal controls over financial reporting. In light of the costs and more stringent rules to enhance the quality of financial reporting, companies should be less willing to dismiss their auditors for opportunistic purposes. Inconsistent with this argument, recent reports done by outside research institutions have indicated an ever-increasing trend of auditor dismissal after the passage of the SOX. Motivated by this inconsistency, my study intends to investigate an important question as to why the frequency of auditor dismissal increases dramatically in the post-SOX period. To answer this question, I address three related issues: (a) Do companies change their auditors with an attempt to engage in earnings management in the post-SOX periods? (b) Why is there a substantial increase of “downgrade” auditor changes (i.e., a company changes its auditor from a Big 4 firm to a non-Big 4 firm) after the SOX? (c) How do market participants react to these auditor dismissals after the SOX? My study contributes to the auditing literature by linking research in auditor changes, earnings management, and market reactions to empirically explore the intent behind companies’ auditor dismissal decisions and market reactions to such intent. The empirical results of this study shall provide new insight into the effectiveness of SOX in mitigating managers’ earnings management and up-to-date evidence about auditor changes and market’s reactions to them.
    Relation: 基礎研究
    研究期間:9708~ 9807
    Data Type: report
    Appears in Collections:[會計學系] 國科會研究計畫

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