本研究探討國內特有的法人董監制度對公司財務績效之影響。世界多數國家均規定企業 董事會的成員必須是自然人，台灣是准許法人可以是董事的極少數國家之一。法人可以 為董事，原先的目的是方便政府對公股的管理、鼓勵法人投資及維護法人股東的合法權 利。但我國公司法准許法人股東可以由其代理人或代表出任董事，造成一個法人股東可 以有數名代表出任董事，與自然人股東僅能擔任一席董事，有所不同，有違公平原則， 並易造成董事會被同一集團所控制。此外，法人背後之實質經營者可隨時更換其代表 人，破壞公司內部監控之設計，甚至可作為逃避董監責任之手段。因此，准許法人董事 之設置對公司績效之利弊得失，實為一值得探討之實證議題。國內有關法人董事之相關 研究，多數從法律學理上進行探討，較少學術研究從法人董監制度對財務績效之影響的 角度做深入的研究。本研究擬對法人董事是否為控制家族成員等變數加以控制，並從董 事長與總經理是否為法人，公司董事會法人代表人之多寡、組成特色等觀點出發，實證 探討法人董事角色與公司財務績效的關係。預期此一研究之結果對法人可為董事之利弊 得失可以提出更明確的證據，且可提供作為未來公司法條文修正之參考。 This study investigates the role of board representative of juristic persons act as shareholders and its effect on firm performance. Taiwan is one of the very few countries in the world which allow representatives of a juristic person to be director or supervisor of the board. The origin of such system was due to the concern for a company’s shares held by the government. Only by allowing a government agency to sit on the board, can it monitor operations of companies. This system, however, is then applied to shares held by juristic persons. Proponents suggest that such system protects the right of a juristic person investor and will thus accordingly encourage its investment. According to the Company Act of Taiwan, where a government agency or a juristic person acts as a shareholder of a company, it may be elected as a director or supervisor of the company provided that it shall designate a natural person as its proxy to exercise, in its behalf, the duties of a shareholder. The Act also stipulates that the authorized representative may also be elected as a director or supervisor of the company; and if there are a plural number of such authorized representatives, each of them may be so elected. The number of board seats held by a specific juristic person is determined by the percentage of shares owned. This is very different from natural person (or individual) shareholders. Each one of them can hold only one seat on the board. Opponents indicate that not only the system is not fair to individual shareholders; by allowing juristic person shareholders to have more than one seat on the board may also result in the company can be easily controlled by a business group. As a juristic person shareholder is permitted to change its representatives on the board any time, the internal control and monitoring system of the company may be weakened. Also, this system can be harmful if the responsibility of the person behind the juristic person and its representatives can not be clearly distinguished. Whether it is advantageous to allow a juristic person acts as shareholder and designates representatives to sit on the corporate board is an empirical issue. Most extant studies, however, discussed such issue from a legal viewpoint. Limited research has yet provided empirical evidence. This study intends to examine the effect of the board representatives of juristic persons act as shareholders on financial performance of a company, after controlling for the role of controlling family. The results of this study will provide empirical evidence as to pros and cons for the effect of this prevalent system. The result will also be helpful for revision of the Company Act in the future.