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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/53250


    Title: 同業競爭對手迎合或擊敗盈餘預期與經理人獎酬之研究
    Other Titles: The Effects of Rivals' Meeting/Beating Earnings Expectations on Executive Compensation
    Authors: 梁嘉紋;金成隆
    Contributors: 國立政治大學會計學系
    行政院國家科學委員會
    Keywords: 迎合或擊敗盈餘預期;分析師預測;同業競爭對手;相對績效衡量;獎酬契約設計
    meeting/beating earnings expectation;analysts' forecasts;rival firms;relative performance evaluation;incentive contract design
    Date: 2010
    Issue Date: 2012-06-26 14:57:48 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 過去研究顯示,公司經營績效若未達分析師的盈餘預期,會對經理人的獎酬與任期 產生不利之影響,這顯示經理人為了迎合或擊敗分析師的盈餘預測可能會產生盈餘操縱 的動機。另外,相對績效衡量的文獻則指出,在衡量經理人的績效時,同業公司的表現 具有額外的資訊意涵,所以在衡量公司經理人績效時應將同業的績效納入考量。本研究 的目的即在探討當公司盈餘未達分析師預期時,經理人獎酬的減少是否會因競爭對手迎 合或擊敗分析師預測的情況而有所不同。本研究擬從Hoover’s Handbook of Business 及 10-K reports 逐筆收集樣本公司其競爭對手的資訊。研究預期當公司經營績效未能達到 分析師的盈餘預測,若競爭對手迎合或擊敗分析師預測的比例越高時,經理人獎酬會有 越大的負面影響。本研究預期能讓我們對以分析師盈餘預測作為績效衡量之標準 (performance benchmark)有更深入的了解,並有助於我們瞭解這樣的獎酬契約設計可能 造成的盈餘管理動機。此外,本研究亦希望藉由探討公司迎合或擊敗分析師預測與否是 否具有傳達其他同業競爭公司績效的資訊意涵,對相對績效衡量與資訊移轉方面的文獻 有所貢獻。
    Recent studies show that missing analysts’ forecasts has an incremental adverse impact on CEO compensation and CEO retention beyond the general pay-performance sensitivities. This provides evidence on the precise incentives that lead CEOs to manage earnings to meet or beat analysts’ earnings forecasts (MBE). Yet, the relative performance evaluation (RPE) literature suggests that managers should be evaluated on a relative basis because the performance of peer firms reveals additional information about managerial performance. The purpose of this study is to investigate whether rival firms’ meeting/beating analysts’ forecasts affects CEO compensation. In this study, we will hand collect information from Hoover’s Handbook of Business or the firm’s 10-K report to better identify rival firms. We expect that missing analysts’ forecasts has a more adverse effect on CEO compensation when a greater percentage of rival firms meeting/beating analysts’ forecasts. We believe that this study will enhance our understanding on the use of analysts’ forecasts as a performance benchmark for executive compensation and the evidence from this study will contribute to the extensive research in accounting that examines managerial incentives to meet analysts’ forecasts. We also believe that this study will contribute to the relative performance literature and the information transfer literature by examining whether firms’ meeting or missing analysts’ expectations provides information about the performance of other firms in the same industry
    Relation: 應用研究
    學術補助
    研究期間:9908~ 10007
    研究經費:468仟元
    Data Type: report
    Appears in Collections:[會計學系] 國科會研究計畫

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