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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/53259

    Title: 股東投資期間長短與穩健會計之研究
    Other Titles: Shareholder Investment Horizons and Accounting Conservatism
    Authors: 梁嘉紋;金成隆
    Contributors: 國立政治大學會計學系
    Keywords: 管理;股東;投資;會計
    shareholder investment horizons;accounting conservatism;agency problem;institutional investors
    Date: 2011
    Issue Date: 2012-06-26 14:58:03 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 穩健會計乃因公司對好消息與壞消息認列之標準不同而造成之淨資產低估,其存在 的主要原因之一是穩健會計能縮小管理者與股東之間現存的代理問題。由於公司經營權 與控制權的分離,經理人有動機將股東之財富轉移成自己的財富。過去文獻指出,通常 經理人在責任與任期有限的情況之下,其自利的動機更大。但是,各公司的股東投資期 間長短並不相同,因此並非所有股東的都希望極大化公司的長期價值。本研究之目的乃 探討股東對穩健會計的需求,是否會因股東投資期間長短不同而有不同。由於短期持股 的股東目標在極大化短期內的交易利得,故對穩健會計的需求較少;而長期持股的股東 則希望減少代理問題所造成的無謂損失(deadweight costs),監督公司的動機及能力較 強,亦能耐心等候好消息在未來認列,故對穩健會計的需求較大。因此,我們的假說預 期若公司股東投資期間為短期,對穩健會計的需求較少;反之,公司股東若投資期間為 長期,則財務報表會更為穩健。我們相信此研究有助於吾人了解股東投資期長短的差異 如何影響會計穩健性及會計品質。我們亦相信此研究將有助於我們了解經理人與股東間 利益的不一致性所造成對穩健會計的需求之不同。
    Accounting conservatism is the differential verifiability required for recognition of profits versus losses that generates an understatement of net assets (Basu 1997; Watts, 2003).One of the prime explanations for the long existence of accounting conservatism is that such mechanism facilitates efficient contracting between managers and shareholders in the presence of agency problem. The separation of ownership and control of firm operation provide managers incentives to transfer wealth to themselves from shareholders. Prior studies recognize that these incentives are magnified in the presence of managers’ typically limited liability and limited horizons, which are presumably shorter than shareholder horizons. However, shareholder investment horizons vary across firms and it is no longer clear that all shareholders wish to maximize long run firm value. The purpose of this study is to examine whether the demand for accounting conservatism differs with shareholder investment horizons. Our hypothesis predicts that we should observe less accounting conservatism for firms with shorter shareholder investment horizon and more accounting conservatism for firms with longer shareholder investment horizon. We believe that this study will shed light on how shareholder heterogeneity in investment horizon impacts accounting choice. We also believe that evidence from this study will enhance our understanding on how the disparity of managers’ and shareholder’s interests differs the demand for accounting conservatism.
    Relation: 應用研究
    研究期間:10008~ 10107
    Data Type: report
    Appears in Collections:[會計學系] 國科會研究計畫

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