近年來國內外知名公司的會計醜聞引發了各界非常關注董事會有效性與經理人所面臨 的個人利益之誘因，過去有不少研究探討董事會特性與經理人獎酬之關連性，而研究 中所探討的董事會特性通常為董事會規模、董事之獨立性、董事持股比例、以及總經 理是否兼任董事長之職等;亦有文獻分別著重於審計委員會或薪酬委員會之特性，惟至 今尚未有實證研究探討該二委員會之相互影響對高階主管獎酬及其盈餘管理的影響。 本研究將從2000 年至2007 年之corporate proxy statements 中逐筆收集公司薪酬委員會 與審計委員會中董事之資料，以衡量薪酬委員會與審計委員會中董事兼任之程度，並 探討此兼任程度對總經理獎酬與盈餘管理之影響。本研究預期CEO 的獎酬績效敏感度 將與董事兼任此二委員會的程度成負相關，亦預期獎酬敏感度與盈餘管理之關聯性與 董事兼任程度成負相關。本研究期能提升我們對董事會中委員會結構與獎酬契約之瞭 解，進而解釋經理人獎酬與管理階層操縱報表行為之關連性，並提供主管機關於訂定 董事委員會等相關公司治理法規時參考。 Recent corporate scandals have triggered a widespread concern on the effectiveness of the board of directors and the incentives for personal gains faced by executives. There is a large and growing literature that investigates the relation between board characteristics and CEO compensation. Popular board characteristics that have been investigated in the prior literature include board size, directors’ degree of independence, their stock ownership, interlocking, and whether the CEO also serves as the chairman of the board, etc. There are also studies focusing on the characteristics of audit committee or compensation committee, respectively, but no empirical evidence to date examines the interplay of the two committees. In this study, we plan to use hand-collected annual board data from corporate proxy statements from 2000-2007 to measure the degree of director overlap between compensation committee and audit committee and examine the impact of director overlap in setting CEO incentives and earnings management. This study predicts that CEO pay to performance sensitivity is negatively related to the degree of director overlap. We also predict that the association between pay-performance sensitivity and earnings management is negatively related to the degree of director overlap. We believe that this study will enhance our understanding on the board structure and help to explain the unresolved relationship between CEO pay-performance sensitivity and managerial manipulative behaviors. We also believe that evidence from this study will provide policy implication for government regulation in the design of board committees.