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    Title: 審計委員會報酬與財務報表重編之間有關聯嗎? 股票市場是如何反應的?
    Other Titles: Is Audit Committee Compensation Associated with Restatements? How Does the Market React to It?
    Authors: 俞洪昭
    Contributors: 國立政治大學會計學系
    行政院國家科學委員會
    Keywords: 審計委員會;報酬;財務報導失敗;財務報表重編
    Audit committee;Compensation;Financial reporting failure;Restatements
    Date: 2009
    Issue Date: 2012-06-26 14:58:30 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 近年來發生的財務舞弊與醜聞,造成社會大眾對於審計委員會監督之有效性 的質疑。針對這些質疑,美國的沙氏法案對於審計委員會訂定了許多相關的規 定。雖然過去對於審計委員會的研究非常多,但是較少有文獻探討審計委員會報 酬與財務報導失敗之間的關係,以及資本市場對於該關係的反應。 這兩個議題非常重要的原因有二:首先,雖然新的法令明文規定審計委員會 的成員必須要完全獨立,但是並未針對公司應如何支付審計委員會報酬有所規 範。因此,若公司給予審計委員會股票或認股權,將會導致審計委員會成員僅具 備形式上的獨立,而喪失實質上的獨立。其次,審計委員會通常扮演兩個相互衝 突的角色:管理公司的營運與監督財務報導。為了扮演好前者的角色,審計委員 會成員應給予公司的股票做為報酬;為了扮演好後者的角色,審計委員會成員則 不應接受公司股票,以維持其獨立性。因此,探討審計委員會報酬與其屢行前述 兩種角色之間的關聯性,是非常重要的議題。此外,由於在實務上審計委員會報 酬的種類繁多,而且審計委員會被視為是公司治理中非常重要的一環,因此,瞭 解資本市場在考量審計委員會報酬與其屢行前述兩種角色之間的關聯性之後,如 何對財務報導失敗做出反應,對於主管機關亦具有重要意涵。 本研究之貢獻,即是透過對前述兩個研究議題,提供實證證據,以瞭解審 計委員會報酬與企業財務報導品質之間的關係。
    Recent financial frauds and scandals raise questions about the effectiveness of audit committee in fulfilling its oversight role. Such concerns have led to SOX’s regulations of the audit committee functions. While prior studies have addressed audit committee in various aspects, few attempts have been made to examine the association between audit committee compensation and financial reporting failure and how the capital market reacts to such an association before and after the SOX. These two issues are important for two reasons. First, even though the new regulation explicitly requires that all audit committee members be fully independent, it does not provide rules governing how a company should compensate its audit committee. Therefore, a company may grand stock and stock-option types of compensation to its audit committee members to align the interests of both parties, resulting in audit committee’s independence in appearance but not independence in fact. Second, audit committee generally serves two conflict roles: supervising the business operations (under which the committee members are encouraged to hold stock) and overseeing financial reporting (under which the committee members should not hold stock to maintain independence). Therefore, it is not only imperative to examine how audit committee compensation influences its joint responsibilities, but also necessary to investigate how the capital market reacts to audit committee’s dual roles when real financial failures occur. The latter issue is of particular importance to the regulators because of recent variations of audit committee compensation in practice and the common use of audit committee as an internal corporate governance mechanism. My study contributes to the auditing and compensation literature by providing a first-step understanding about (a) how audit committee incentives interact with its oversight function to impact the effectiveness of the audit committee in enhancing the credibility of financial reporting, and (b) whether and how the capital market reacts to the association between audit committee compensation and financial reporting failures.
    Relation: 基礎研究
    學術補助
    研究期間:9808~ 9907
    研究經費:1011仟元
    Data Type: report
    Appears in Collections:[會計學系] 國科會研究計畫

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