|Abstract: ||台灣上市上櫃公司可以使用現金減資與庫藏股減資兩種方式進行支付，在2000 年市場 尚未引進庫藏股制度之前，公司只能以現金減資方式進行支付，但在2002 年之前，並 沒有一家公司曾進行現金減資，反而在庫藏股制度實行5 年之後，也就是2005 年之時， 才有較多的公司開始進行現金減資，而大部分這些公司之前也曾進行過庫藏股減資，為 何公司進行庫藏股減資後，又回頭來進行現金減資呢？本研究試圖解釋此現象。 我們提出三個可能的假說：股票需求彈性、市場擇時、及購回彈性。股票需求曲線 並非是完全彈性，因此，大量的買單將造成股價上揚，因此，若減資支付金額相對較大 時，公司可能會挑選現金減資方式；市場擇時認為股價相對偏低時，公司可能會挑選庫 藏股減資方式，因為它可能是一個有利可圖的投資案；購回彈性認為庫藏股減資方式較 具有彈性，因此，當公司的現金流量不確定性較高時，會挑選庫藏股減資方式。 本研究的另一個目的是評估並比較現金減資與庫藏股減資的宣告效果，現金減資 是確定的公司承諾，因此，它的評價效果應較強；但另一方面，庫藏股減資可能帶來 公司股價低估的訊號，因此，它在此方面的評價效果會較強。本研究將探討影響這兩 種支付方式評價效果的背後因素之特性。|
Taiwanese firms that plan to conduct a capital reduction payout currently can either distribute the cash directly to their stockholders or repurchase their own stocks from the markets. Prior to the introduction of share repurchase programs in the Taiwan stock markets in 2000, only through cash distributions to their stockholders can Taiwanese firms conduct a capital reduction payout. However, even so, none of them had ever done so before the introduction of share repurchase programs, and only until the year of 2002 did some firms begin adopting the cash distributions of capital reduction payout, and after which most of these firms have also conducted at least one capital reduction payout through open-market share repurchases. Why do these firms having conducted a capital reduction payout through open-market share repurchases also adopt the capital reduction payout of cash distributions? This proposal will explore how firms conducting capital reductions choose their payout methods. To address this issue, we propose three hypotheses: the demand inelasticity of stocks hypothesis, the timing hypothesis, and the risk-averse hypothesis. The demand inelasticity of stock hypothesis argues that if the number shares repurchased is relatively greater, repurchasing firms might prefer cash distributions to share repurchases for the completion of their capital reduction payouts to avoid the possible short-term price pressures resulting from their open market repurchasing activities. The demand inelasticity of stock hypothesis thus predicts that firms conducting capital reduction payouts might prefer cash distributions if their repurchasing sizes are relatively large. The timing hypothesis is based on the premise of information asymmetry between managers and outsiders. Empirical evidence reveals that the long-run performance improves after firms have repurchased their own stocks, suggesting that managers are better able than stockholders to judge whether their stock price is too high or too low. Therefore, firms conducting capital reduction payouts are more likely to adopt share repurchase programs if their stocks are too low, which might be reflected in their recent under-performance to the markets. The timing hypothesis thus predicts that when their stock prices are too low, these firms will consider a share repurchase program in order to take advantage of their better information sets. The risk-averse hypothesis posits that in contrast to cash distributions in which a firm is committing to pay out cash to stockholders, repurchases are a much more flexible option for capital reduction payouts, for open market repurchase programs are not a commitment, and from standard option valuation models we know that the greater the volatility of a firm’s stock returns is, the greater is the value of this flexibility. The risk-averse hypothesis thus predicts that firms conducting capital reduction payouts are more likely to go forward with a repurchase program if the volatility of their stock returns is greater and/or the level of their excess cash is lower. A second objective is to investigate and compare the valuation effect of cash distribution payout announcements to that of open market repurchase announcements. A cash distribution payout is a commitment by firms, while a share repurchase is not; thereby we expect that cash distributions, compared to share repurchases, will be more favorably accepted by investors, inducing a greater positive valuation effect. On the other hand, as we have argued above, firms are more likely to go forward with a share repurchase in down markets; therefore, the signal of shares being undervalued is strong in share repurchase announcements, thereby inducing a greater positive valuation effect. This research will try to identify the factors driving the difference in the valuation effects of cash distribution payouts versus share repurchase payouts.