本研究以台灣的國有土地拍賣資料來來測試 Sherman(2005)的資訊蒐集成本模型。本人 曾利用此台灣初次上市競拍資料寫過兩篇文章：” Endogenous entry and partial adjustment in IPO auctions: Are institutional investors better informed?”及”Do Investors Learn from Experience: Learning to Fail? Evidence from Frequent IPO Investors”，分別被 Review of Financial Studies 接受。本次研究將利用我利用在台北市及台北縣的國有土地 拍賣資料來測試 Sherman(2005)的資訊蒐集成本模型。我的初步結果顯示：投標台北市 土地的投標者因為競爭較激烈，比較會蒐集資訊，而且投標行為較理性，較符合理論 的預期。而相對地，投標台北縣土地的投標者較不蒐集資訊，投標行為也較不理性。 希望藉由此研究發掘與文獻不同的解釋，做出貢獻。 I use land auction data in Taipei City and in Taipei County to test Sherman’s (2005) information production theory. Results show that bidders in Taipei City and those in Taipei County have different bidding behavior. I find that bids in Taipei City’s land auctions are generally consistent with the predictions of auction theory for informed bidders. They tend to expend resources to collect information and shave their bids optimally. However, bids in Taipei County exhibit uninformed and overbidding behavior.
