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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/54881


    Title: 不完全資訊和雙重改變下的分群模型
    Grouping with Heterogeneity: Incomplete Information and Double Mutation
    Authors: 邱彥閔
    Contributors: 莊委桐
    邱彥閔
    Keywords: 分群模型
    異質人群
    不完全資訊
    改變
    隨機潛能
    長期均衡
    grouping
    heterogenous population
    incopmplete information
    mutation
    stochastic potential
    equilibria in long term
    Date: 2011
    Issue Date: 2012-10-30 14:04:49 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 本文首先構建了在完全資訊下的異質分群模型。當玩家可以觀察其他玩家的類型，則均衡必定是非隔離的：大多數玩家將無意移動，這是因為他們的夥伴可以為他們帶來最好的報酬。均衡狀態將會是一個有效率的狀態。
        然後，我們構建另一個分組模型:訊息不完全和雙重改變下的分群模型。結果表明，雖然非隔離的均衡有可能是在短期的穩定均衡，但只有隔離的均衡狀態可以在長期維持穩定。這是因為在長期下，大多數非隔離狀態可以輕易地切換到隔離狀態的緣故。
    This paper first constructs a grouping model with heterogeneous population under the setting of complete information. When player can observe other`s type, the result isnon-segregation: most players have no intention to move and they can match with the one who brings them the best payoff in the original group. The equilibrium state is always efficient.
    We then construct another grouping model with incomplete information and double mutation. The result shows that, although non-segregation equilibria may emerge as stable equilibria in the short run, only segregation equilibria can be stochastically stable in the long run. This is because most of non-segregated states can switch to the others by the same re-sistance and some of them can easily switch to segregated state, but it is hard to switch back.
    Reference: 1. Borgers, T. and Sarin, R. "Naive Reinforcement Learning with Endogenous Aspirations," International Economic Review, 2000, vol. 41, no. 4, pp. 921-950.
    2. Carrington, William J., Detragiache, Enrica, and Vishwanath, Tara. "Migration with Endogenous Moving Costs," American Economic Review, 1996, vol. 86, pp. 909-930.
    3. Castillo, Marco and Petrie, Ragan. "Discrimaination in The Lab: Does Information Trump Appearance," Games and Economic Behavior, 2010, vol. 68, pp. 50-59.
    4. Currarini, Sergio, Jackson,Matthew O., and Pin, Paolo. "An Economic Model of Friendship: Homophily, Minorities, and Segregation," Econometrica, 2009, vol. 77, No. 4, pp.1003-1045.
    5. Foster, D.P., Young H.P. "Regret testing: learning to play Nash equilibrium without knowing you have an opponent," Theoretical Economics, 2006, pp. 341-367.
    6. Hart, Sergiu and Mas-Colell, Andreu. "A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium," Econometrica, 2000, vol. 68, no. 5, pp. 1127-1150.
    7. Hoff, Karla and Sen, Arijit. "Homeownership, Community Interactions, and Segreagation," American Economic Review, 2005, vol.95, pp. 1167-1189.
    8. Jackson, Matthew O. and Watts, Alison. "Social Games: Matching and The Play of Infinity Repeated Games," Games and Economic Behavior, 2010, vol. 70, pp. 170-191.
    9. Milchtaich, Igal. "Stability and Segregation in Group Formation.” Games and Economic Behavior, 2002, vol. 38, pp. 318-346.
    10. Schelling, Thomas C. "Models of Segregation," American Economic Review, 1971, vol. 59, pp.488-493.
    11. William T. Bielby and James N. Baron, "Sex Segreagation With Occupations," American Economic Review, 1998, vol. 76, pp. 43-47.
    12. Young H.P. “Individual strategy and social structure: An evolutionary theory of institutions." Prinston, 2001.
    Description: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    經濟學系
    99258018
    100
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0099258018
    Data Type: thesis
    Appears in Collections:[經濟學系] 學位論文

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