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    政大機構典藏 > 商學院 > 會計學系 > 學位論文 >  Item 140.119/54908
    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/54908


    Title: Clawback條款、權益基礎薪酬和審計委員會之監督效率性
    Clawback provisions, equity-based compensation, and audit committees' oversight effectiveness
    Authors: 林玉君
    Lin, Yu Chun
    Contributors: 俞洪昭
    Yu, Hung Chao
    林玉君
    Lin, Yu Chun
    Keywords: 審計委員會薪酬
    Clawback 條款
    財務報表重編
    內部控制
    Audit Committee Compensation
    Clawback Provisions
    Restatements
    Internal Control
    Date: 2011
    Issue Date: 2012-10-30 14:21:12 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: This study first examines whether equity-based compensation (i.e., stocks and options) is associated with audit committees’ oversight failures. I then examine whether this association between equity-based compensation and oversight failures is affected when firms initiate the clawback provisions in their compensation contracts. I use the likelihood of restatements, the incidence of internal control weaknesses (ICW), and earnings management measures to proxy for audit committees’ oversight failures. Based on a sample of 129 firms that voluntarily adopt the clawback provisions during 2003-09 and a matched sample created from the propensity score matching technique, I find several important results. First, larger amounts and portions of stocks and options are associated with higher restatement and ICW likelihood and greater earnings management. Second, equity-based compensation appears to harm audit committees' oversight effectiveness. However, the adoption of the clawback provisions significantly mitigates such negative effect. Finally, the clawback provisions are effective in reducing restatements, ICW, and earnings management only when these provisions are triggered by "bad faith" rather than restatements. Overall, my empirical results bear policy implications on audit committees’ compensation practice and the mandatory adoption of the clawback provisions.
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    Description: 博士
    國立政治大學
    會計研究所
    95353503
    100
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0095353503
    Data Type: thesis
    Appears in Collections:[會計學系] 學位論文

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