English  |  正體中文  |  简体中文  |  Post-Print筆數 : 27 |  Items with full text/Total items : 109952/140891 (78%)
Visitors : 46260920      Online Users : 716
RC Version 6.0 © Powered By DSPACE, MIT. Enhanced by NTU Library IR team.
Scope Tips:
  • please add "double quotation mark" for query phrases to get precise results
  • please goto advance search for comprehansive author search
    •  Adv. Search
    Home ‧ Login ‧ Upload ‧ Help ‧ About ‧ Administer Goto mobile version


    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/55070


    Title: 運輸成本對寡占市場均衡之影響-Hotelling 模型再探討
    Oligopoly in linear city-transportation cost absorbed by firms
    Authors: 王玉澄
    Contributors: 陳國樑
    王玉澄
    Keywords: 運輸成本
    線形城市
    價格歧視
    買賣承諾
    transportation cost
    linear city model
    price discrimination
    commitment
    Date: 2011
    Issue Date: 2012-10-30 15:25:21 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 本研究以Hotelling之線形城市模型為基礎模型，但對運輸成本由消費者負擔之假設改為由生產者負擔，廠商以運送貨物至消費者所在地之形式負擔運輸成本，而非直接補貼消費者之運輸成本。在此新的模型架構之下，本研究對廠商是否能夠向消費者價格歧視，以及是否有買賣承諾存在，兩者組合產生之四種情況分別進行探討。最後得出在廠商不能夠對消費者價格歧視，但無買賣承諾存在時，以及在廠商能對消費者價格歧視，無論買賣承諾存在與否時，兩廠商會設廠於線形城市之1/4及3/4處，達到社會福利極大之均衡。但若廠商不得採價格歧視，而有買賣承諾之存在時，兩廠商會選擇極小化差異，也就是設廠於線形城市之中心點，此時將造成社會的無謂損失。
    This research is based on Hotelling model. The only difference is that the firms have to pay transportation cost in this research. The firms absorb transportation cost in two ways. One way is the firms accept orders from the consumer and send the commodities to them. The other ways is the firms sent the commodities to some chain stores and the consumers will go to buy them in their neighborhoods. Since the transportation cost is decreased almost to zero and thus can be neglected, it is just like the consumers do not have pay it. This research considers four conditions under this new structure -whether the firms can price discriminate or not and whether there exists a commitment between the consumers and firms- combined together. If the firms can price discriminates, the firms will settle down on the 1/4 and 3/4 of the linear city. But if the firms cannot price discriminates, when the commitment exits, they will still choose their location on 1/4 and 3/4, or they will minimize differenciation.
    Reference: Anderson, S. P. and D.　J. Neven, 1991, Cournot competition yields spatial agglomeration, International Economic Review, 32 (4): 793–808.
    Bertrand, J. 1883, Theorie mathematique de la richesse Social, Journal des Savants, 499–503.
    d’Aspremont, C., J. J. Gabszewicz and J.-F. Thisse, 1979, On Hotelling’s “Stability in competition”, Econometrica, 47 (5): 1145–1150.
    Greenhut, M. L. and H. Ohta, 1972, Monopoly output under alternative spatial pricing techniques, American Economic Review, 62 (4): 705–713.
    Greenhut, M. L. and H. Ohta, 1985, Reverse dumping: A form of spatial price discrimination, The Journal of Industrial Economics, 34 (2): 167–181.
    Gupta, B., F. C. Lai, D. Pal, J Sarkar, and Chia-Ming Yu, 2004, Where to locate in a circular city?, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 22 (6):759–782.
    Heywood, J. S. and G. Ye, 2009, Mixed oligopoly and spatial price discrimination with foreign firms, Regional Science and Urban Economics, 39 (5): 592–601.
    Holahan, W. L., 1975, The welfare effects of spatial price discrimination, American Economic Review, 65 (3): 498–503.
    Hoover, E. M., 1937, Spatial price discrimination, The Review of Economic Studies, 4 (3): 182–91.
    Hotelling, H., 1929, Stability in competition, The Economic Journal, 39 (153): 41–57.
    Hurter, A. P. and P. J. Lederer, 1985, Spatial duopoly with discriminatory pricing, Regional Science and Urban Economics, 15 (4): 541–553.
    Kumar, A. and B. Saha, 2008, Spatial competition in a mixed duopoly with one partially nationalized firm, Journal of Comparative Economics, 36 (2): 326–341.
    Matsushima, N., 2001, Cournot competition and spatial agglomeration revisited, Economics Letters, 73 (2): 175–177.
    Matsushima, N. and T. Matsumura, 2004, Mixed oligopoly and spatial agglomeration, Canadian Journal of Economics, 36 (1): 62–87.
    Norman, G., 1981, Spatial competition and spatial price discrimination, Review of Economic Studies, 48 (1): 97–111.
    Pal, D., 1998, Does Cournot competition yield spatial agglomeration?, Economics Letters, 60 (1): 49–53.
    Phlips, L., 1980, Intertemporal price discrimination and sticky prices, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 94 (3): 525–542.
    Phlips, L. and J.-F. Thisse, 1982, Spatial competition and the theory of differentiated markets: An introduction, Journal of Industrial Economics, 31 (1/2): 1–9.
    Phillip, J. L. and A. P. Hurter, 1986, Competition of firms: discriminatory pricing and location, Econometrica, 54 (3): 623–640.
    Salop, S. C., 1979, Monopolistic competition with outside goods, Bell Journal of Economics, 10 (1): 141–156.
    Willig, R. D., 1978, Pareto superior nonlinear outlay schedules, Bell Journal of Economics, 9 (1): 56–69.
    Lu, Y., 2006, Hotelling’s location model in mixed duopoly, Economics Bulletin, 8 (1): 1–10.
    Description: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    財政研究所
    99255006
    100
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0099255006
    Data Type: thesis
    Appears in Collections:[財政學系] 學位論文

    Files in This Item:

    File SizeFormat
    500601.pdf732KbAdobe PDF23905View/Open


    All items in 政大典藏 are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved.


    社群 sharing

    著作權政策宣告 Copyright Announcement
    1.本網站之數位內容為國立政治大學所收錄之機構典藏，無償提供學術研究與公眾教育等公益性使用，惟仍請適度，合理使用本網站之內容，以尊重著作權人之權益。商業上之利用，則請先取得著作權人之授權。
    The digital content of this website is part of National Chengchi University Institutional Repository. It provides free access to academic research and public education for non-commercial use. Please utilize it in a proper and reasonable manner and respect the rights of copyright owners. For commercial use, please obtain authorization from the copyright owner in advance.

    2.本網站之製作，已盡力防止侵害著作權人之權益，如仍發現本網站之數位內容有侵害著作權人權益情事者，請權利人通知本網站維護人員(nccur@nccu.edu.tw)，維護人員將立即採取移除該數位著作等補救措施。
    NCCU Institutional Repository is made to protect the interests of copyright owners. If you believe that any material on the website infringes copyright, please contact our staff(nccur@nccu.edu.tw). We will remove the work from the repository and investigate your claim.
    DSpace Software Copyright © 2002-2004  MIT &  Hewlett-Packard  /   Enhanced by   NTU Library IR team Copyright ©   - Feedback