The most recent revisions of the Securities & Exchange Act have given rise to a growing concern over the conflicts that exist between two corporate governance systems. One is the so-call Anglo-American model, which stressed mechanisms such as independent directors, audit committees, and markets for corporate control. The other is widely known as the Japanese and German system, with cross-shareholdings, long term commitments by interested parties and centralized management. In recent years, growing researches on corporate governance have been developing, yet with conflicting results as to which system is more efficient. The Company law in Taiwan generally follows the Japanese and German model, which can be represented by a powerful board and weakened (relatively speaking) internal control mechanism. The Securities & Exchange Act, however, adopts the basic structure of Anglo-American system. The inter-system conflicts become more severe due to the most recent revisions to the Securities & Exchange Act. Most listed companies, in the long term, will be required to have at least two (or one-fifth of the board members) independent directors and an audit committee which comprises solely independent directors. The purposes of this research thus include the following: 1. exploring overlapping areas regarding duties performed by auditors under the Company Law on one hand, and independent directors and/or audit committees on the other hand, 2. analyzing the hierarchy structure of directors, managing directors and independent directors, 3. the allocation of power among board, audit committees, and managing directors` meetings, 4. assessing the impact resulting from the revisions on power structures of companies as will as dealings between affiliated companies, and 5. measuring the market effects brought by the implementation of such revisions.