English  |  正體中文  |  简体中文  |  Post-Print筆數 : 27 |  Items with full text/Total items : 91280/121421 (75%)
Visitors : 25397343      Online Users : 102
RC Version 6.0 © Powered By DSPACE, MIT. Enhanced by NTU Library IR team.
Scope Tips:
  • please add "double quotation mark" for query phrases to get precise results
  • please goto advance search for comprehansive author search
  • Adv. Search
    HomeLoginUploadHelpAboutAdminister Goto mobile version
    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/56928

    Title: 敵對國家建立互信之研究:昂貴信號模式
    Building trust between enemies: a costly signaling model
    Authors: 張廖年仲
    Chang Liao, Nien Chung
    Contributors: 鄭端耀
    Cheng, Tuan Yao
    Chang Liao, Nien Chung
    Keywords: 昂貴信號
    costly signaling
    cross-Strait relations
    international relations theory
    strategic reassurance
    Date: 2012
    Abstract: 本論文主要探討敵對國家之間如何化解敵意、建立互信,進而達到合作的可能。本研究比較現實主義、新自由主義、建構主義等國際關係理論關於國家之間建立互信的途徑,提出昂貴信號(costly signaling)的模式,主張敵對國家之間可以運用昂貴信號來向對方展現誠意,以克服彼此的互不信任,因而達到相互合作的可能。
    This dissertation asks: why and how can some rival states overcome their deep suspicions and achieve trust and cooperation? To what extent will power asymmetry and different regime type influence their trust-building process? The argument is: when a common adversary emerges or when resources are constrained, enduring rivals with power disparity and different regime types are able to build mutual trust by exchanging costly signals that demonstrate their cooperative intentions. This thesis attempts to advance the existing literature of reassurance by analyzing the effect of costly signals on trust-building between enemies.

    Distinguishing between ex ante and ex post costs, this study outlines a set of costly signal mechanisms, including military forms such as self-restraint, arms control, confidence-building measures, and de-alignment; as well as non-military forms including symbolic gestures, domestic reform, diplomatic recognition, and territorial concessions. The costly signaling model (CSM) developed in this project identifies the causal conditions under which states employ costly signals: first, the less vulnerable the state, the more likely it is to initiate costly signals; second, nondemocracies, like democracies, can also conduct costly signals to reassure other states.

    The CSM is further applied to five empirical cases of dyadic adversarial relations: the Egyptian-Israeli peace process from 1974 to 1979, the relationship of the two Koreas from 1998 to 2008, the Sino-US rapprochement from 1968 to 1972, the end of the Cold War from 1985 to 1992, and the current development of cross-Strait relations. The evidence shows that if one state sends costly signals to the other state, and then the receiving state, rather than taking advantage, instead reciprocates with its own costly signals, a trusting relationship can be established between them. The implications of this research enrich the study of trust-building in international relations theory in the hope of exploring the possibilities for peace and reconciliation across the Taiwan Strait.
    Description: 博士
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0094260502
    Data Type: thesis
    Appears in Collections:[東亞研究所 ] 學位論文

    Files in This Item:

    There are no files associated with this item.

    All items in 政大典藏 are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved.

    社群 sharing

    DSpace Software Copyright © 2002-2004  MIT &  Hewlett-Packard  /   Enhanced by   NTU Library IR team Copyright ©   - Feedback