The premise of the intentional model of split-ticket voting is that some voters split their tickets simply because they prefer divided government and believe in constant “checks and balances”. This article examines whether this premise stand firm in an emerging democracy like Taiwan. That is, by using survey data in Taiwan, we explore whether one’s attitude toward divided or unified government is “real”. We hypothesize that a citizen’s attitude toward “checks and balances” is subject to change, and conditional on whether her preferred party is in power. Specifically, we speculate that a citizen would tend to hold the balancing perspective or favor divided government, if her preferred party is in opposition. However, if her preferred party becomes the ruling party, she would be more likely to oppose (hold) the balancing (non-balancing) perspective or favor unified government. We then utilize panel survey data embedded in Taiwan’s Election and Democratization Studies (TEDS) to verify our hypothesis.
Conference Group of Taiwan Studies, Annual Meeting of American Political Science Association