English  |  正體中文  |  简体中文  |  Post-Print筆數 : 27 |  Items with full text/Total items : 109952/140887 (78%)
Visitors : 46297936      Online Users : 1315
RC Version 6.0 © Powered By DSPACE, MIT. Enhanced by NTU Library IR team.
Scope Tips:
  • please add "double quotation mark" for query phrases to get precise results
  • please goto advance search for comprehansive author search
    •  Adv. Search
    Home ‧ Login ‧ Upload ‧ Help ‧ About ‧ Administer Goto mobile version


    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/58871


    Title: 資本稅及環境政策之政治經濟分析
    Political Economy on Capital Tax and Environmental Policies
    Authors: 鄭竹君
    Contributors: 賴育邦
    鄭竹君
    Keywords: 政治經濟
    資本稅
    環境政策
    Date: 2012
    Issue Date: 2013-07-11 18:06:39 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 忽略政治干預將導致政策設計失當。本篇論文試圖強調在政策制定過程當中政治力量扭曲之重要性。我們發展3個包含不同政治經濟學議題的模型，例如利益團體與談判，以闡明其對資本稅或環境政策之影響。更明確來說，第2章我們說明當存在遊說行為時，嚴格的查緝政策(提高查緝率或罰則)可能導致汙染排放量增加，而使社會福利惡化，而當污染廠商擁有相對高的政治影響力時尤然。第3章我們發現，若廠商可透過遊說行為影響租稅政策，不論是單一國家放寬對國際租稅規劃之法令限制，或全球共同合作打擊租稅天堂，均無法保證福利改善。第4章則發現，國際排汙權交易制度並不一定能降低全球汙染量。我們強調跨國汙染與不同交易機制對於汙染結果之影響。本篇論文主要發現為強調政治因素在政策制定最終結果中扮演重要角色。
    Reference: 1. Andreoni, J. (1991). Reasonable doubt and the optimal magnitude of fines: should the penalty fit the crime? Rand Journal of Economics, 22, 385-395.
    2. Becker, G. S. (1968). Crime and punishment: an economic approach. Journal of Political Economy, 76, 169-217.
    3. Bernheim, B. D. and Whinston, M. D. (1986). Menu auction, resource allocation, and economic influence. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 101, 1-31.
    4. Bommer, R. and Schulze, G. G. (1999). Environmental improvement with trade liberalization. European Journal of Political Economy, 15, 639-661.
    5. Bontems, P. and Bourgeon, J-M. (2005). Optimal environmental taxation and enforcement policy. European Economic Review, 49, 409-435.
    6. Brooks, N. and Sethi, R. (1997). The distribution of pollution: community characteristics and exposure to air toxics. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 32, 233-250.
    7. Brown, L. M., Hnafi, A. and Petsonk, A. (2012). The EU emissions trading system: results and lessons learned. Environmental Defense Fund, Washington DC.
    8. Bucovetsky, S. and Wilson, J. D. (1991). Tax competition with two tax instruments. Regional Science and Urban Economics, 21, 333-350.
    9. Chichilnisky, G. and Heal, G. (1995). Markets for tradable CO2 emission quotas: principles and practice. OECD Working Papers. Paris: OECD.
    10. Coase, R. H. (1960). The problem of social cost, Journal of Law and Economics, 3, 1-44.
    11. Cremer, H. and Gahvari, F. (2002). Imperfect observability of emissions and second-best emission and output taxes. Journal of Public Economics, 85, 385-407.
    12. Damania, R., Fredriksson, P. G., and List, J. (2003). Trade liberalization, corruption, and environmental policy formation: theory and evidence. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 46, 490-512.
    13. Dasgupta, S., Laplante, B., Maningi, N. and Wang H. (2001). Inspections, pollution prices, and environmental performance: evidence from China. Ecological Economics, 36, 487-498.
    14. Deily, M. E. and Gray, W.B. (1991). Enforcement of pollution regulations in a declining industry. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 21, 260-274.
    15. Desai, A., Dyck, A. and Zingales, L. (2007). Theft and taxes. Journal of Financial Economics, 84, 591-623.
    16. Dharmapala, D. and Hines, J. R. Jr. (2009). Which countries become tax havens? Journal of Public Economics, 93, 1058-1068.
    17. Foulon, J., Lanoie P. and Laplante, B. (2002). Incentives for pollution control: regulation or information? Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 44, 169-187.
    18. Fredriksson, P. G. (1997). The political economy of pollution taxes in a small open economy. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 33, 44-58.
    19. Fredriksson, P. G. (1999). The political economy of trade liberalization and environmental policy. Southern Economic Journal, 65, 513-525.
    20. Gersbach, H. and Winkler, R. (2011). International emission permit markets with refunding, European Economic Review, 55, 759-773.
    21. Gordon, R. H. (1986). Taxation of investment and savings in a world economy. American Economic Review, 76, 1086-1102.
    22. Greenberg, J. (1984). Avoiding tax-avoidance. Journal of Economic Theory, 32, 1-13.
    23. Grossman, G. M. and Helpman, E. (1994). Protection for sale. American Economic Review, 84, 833-850.
    24. Grossman, G. M. and Helpman, E. (2002). Interest groups and trade policy. Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ and Oxford UK.
    25. Harford, J. D. (1978). Firm behavior under imperfectly enforceable pollution standards and taxes. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 5, 26-43.
    26. Harford, J. D. (1987). Self-reporting of pollution and the firm’s behavior under imperfectly enforceable regulations. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 14, 293-303.
    27. Harrington, W. (1988). Enforcement leverage when penalties are restricted. Journal of Public Economics, 37, 29-53.
    28. Haufler, A. and Runkel, M. (2009). Firms’ financial choices and thin capitalization rules under corporate tax competition. CESifo Working Paper Series 2429.
    29. Helm, C. (2003). International emissions trading with endogenous allowance choices. Journal of Public Economics, 87, 2737-2747.
    30. Heyes, A. G. (1996). Cutting environmental penalties to protect the environment. Journal of Public Economics, 60, 251-265.
    31. Heyes, A. G. (2000). Implementing environmental regulation: enforcement and compliance. Journal of Regulatory Economics, 17, 107-129.
    32. Heyes, A. G. (2002). A theory of filtered enforcement. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 43, 34-46.
    33. Heyes, A. G. and Maxwell, J. (2004). Private vs. public regulation: political economy of the international environment. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 48, 978-996.
    34. Hillman, A. L. (1982). Declining industries and political-support protection motives. American Economic Review, 72, 1180-1187.
    35. Hillman, A. L. (1989). The political economy of protection. Harwood Academic Publisher, Chur. Reprinted 2001, Routledge, London.
    36. Hines, J. R. Jr. and Rice, E. M. (1994). Fiscal paradise: foreign tax havens and American business. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109, 149-182.
    37. Holtsmark, B. and Sommervoll, D.E. (2012). International emissions trading: Good or Bad? Economics Letters, 117, 362-364.
    38. Hong, Q. and Smart, M. (2010). In praise of tax havens: international tax planning and foreign direct investment. European Economic Review, 54, 82-95.
    39. Innes, R. and Sam, A.G. (2008). Voluntary pollution reductions and the enforcement of environmental law: an empirical study of the 33/50 program. Journal of Law and Economics, 51, 271-296.
    40. Kambhu, J. (1989). Regulatory standards, non-compliance and enforcement. Journal of Regulatory Economics, 1, 103-114.
    41. Kennedy, P. W. (1999). Learning about environmental damage: Implications for emissions trading. Canadian Journal of Economics, 32, 1313-1327.
    42. Lai, Y. B. (2010). The political economy of capital market integration and tax competition. European Journal of Political Economy, 26, 475-487.
    43. Lai, Y. B. and Hu, C. H. (2005). Trade liberalization and transboundary pollution. Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, 7, 1-14.
    44. Lyon, T. and Maxwell, J. (2003). Self-regulation, taxation, and public voluntary environmental agreements. Journal of Public Economics, 87, 1453-1486.
    45. Macho-Stadler, I. (2008). Environmental regulation: choice of instruments under imperfect compliance. Spanish Economic Review, 10, 1-21.
    46. Macho-Stadler, I. and Pérez-Castrillo, D. (2006). Optimal enforcement policy and firms’ emissions and compliance with environmental taxes. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 51, 110-131.
    47. MacKenzie, I. A. (2011). Tradable permit allocations and sequential choice. Resource and Energy Economics, 33, 268-278.
    48. Michaelis, P. (1994). Regulate us, please! On strategic lobbying in Cournot-Nash oligopoly. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 150, 693-709.
    49. Montero, J. P. (1997). Marketable pollution permits with uncertainty and transaction costs. Resource and Energy Economics, 20, 27-50.
    50. Montgomery, W. D. (1972). Markets in licenses and efficient pollution control programs. Journal of Economic Theory, 5, 395-418.
    51. Nicodème, G. (2009). On recent developments in fighting harmful tax practices. National Tax Journal, 62, 755-771.
    52. Nowell, C. and Shogren, J. (1994). Challenging the enforcement of environmental regulation. Journal of Regulatory Economics, 6, 265-284.
    53. OECD (1998). Harmful tax competition: an emerging global issue. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris, France.
    54. OECD (2000). Towards global tax cooperation: progress in identifying and eliminating harmful tax practices. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris, France.
    55. OECD (2000). Average effective tax rates on capital, labour and consumption. OECD ECO/WKP (2000) 31.
    56. Pesic, D. J., Blagojevic, M. D. and Glisovic, S. M. (2011). The model of air pollution generated by fire chemical accident in an urban street canyon. Transportation Research Part D, 16, 321-326.
    57. Poterba, J. M. (1998). Public finance and public choice. National Tax Journal, 51, 391-396.
    58. Raymond, M. (2004). Regulatory compliance with costly and uncertain litigation. Journal of Regulatory Economics, 26, 165-176.
    59. Russell, C. S. (1990). Monitoring and enforcement, in Public Policies for Environmental Protection, DC: Resources for the Future.
    60. Sandmo, A. (2002). Efficient environmental policy with imperfect compliance. Environmental and Resource Economics, 23, 85-103.
    61. Shiota, N. (2008). Tax compliance and workability of the pricing and standards approach. Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, 9, 193-211.
    62. Slemrod, J. and Wilson, J. D. (2009). Tax competition with parasitic tax havens. Journal of Public Economics, 93, 1261-1270.
    63. Tahvonen, O. (1994). Carbon dioxide abatement as a differential game. European Journal of Political Economy, 10, 685-705.
    64. Weck-Hannemann, H. (2008). Environmental politics, in Readings in Public Choice and Constitutional Political Economy. Springer, New York.
    65. Zodrow, G. R. and Mieszkowski, P. (1986). Pigou, Tiebout, property taxation and the underprovision of local public goods. Journal of Urban Economics, 19, 356-370.
    Description: 博士
    國立政治大學
    財政研究所
    96255503
    101
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0096255503
    Data Type: thesis
    Appears in Collections:[財政學系] 學位論文

    Files in This Item:

    File SizeFormat
    550301.pdf4760KbAdobe PDF2181View/Open


    All items in 政大典藏 are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved.


    社群 sharing

    著作權政策宣告 Copyright Announcement
    1.本網站之數位內容為國立政治大學所收錄之機構典藏，無償提供學術研究與公眾教育等公益性使用，惟仍請適度，合理使用本網站之內容，以尊重著作權人之權益。商業上之利用，則請先取得著作權人之授權。
    The digital content of this website is part of National Chengchi University Institutional Repository. It provides free access to academic research and public education for non-commercial use. Please utilize it in a proper and reasonable manner and respect the rights of copyright owners. For commercial use, please obtain authorization from the copyright owner in advance.

    2.本網站之製作，已盡力防止侵害著作權人之權益，如仍發現本網站之數位內容有侵害著作權人權益情事者，請權利人通知本網站維護人員(nccur@nccu.edu.tw)，維護人員將立即採取移除該數位著作等補救措施。
    NCCU Institutional Repository is made to protect the interests of copyright owners. If you believe that any material on the website infringes copyright, please contact our staff(nccur@nccu.edu.tw). We will remove the work from the repository and investigate your claim.
    DSpace Software Copyright © 2002-2004  MIT &  Hewlett-Packard  /   Enhanced by   NTU Library IR team Copyright ©   - Feedback