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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/59126

    Title: The demand for judicial sanctions: voter information and the election of judges
    Authors: Ho,Yi-Cheng;Steven G. Craig;Alan J. Satterlee
    Contributors: 政大財政系
    Keywords: Empirical voting model;Judges;Demand for judicial sanctions;Voter information
    Date: 2008-07
    Issue Date: 2013-08-26 16:10:04 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: We examine 20 partisan judicial elections over an 8-year period to determine whether judge specific information shows in election results. We find demand for judicial sanctions looks much like other voting processes. Among voters, Democratic incumbent judges, who tend to be lenient, are rewarded for being harsh, while Republican incumbent judges, who generally are harsh, are rewarded for being lenient. Voters are not found to be a random sample of the population, and we find that straight ticket votes obscure information from selective voters.
    Relation: Economics of Governance, 9(3), 265-285
    Data Type: article
    DOI 連結: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10101-007-0042-3
    DOI: 10.1007/s10101-007-0042-3
    Appears in Collections:[財政學系] 期刊論文

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