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    Title: 台灣電子業董監事及高階管理者連結與公司績效之關聯性研究
    The association between directorates and top management interlocking and corporate performance
    Authors: 王文伶
    Wang, Wen Ling
    Contributors: 陳錦烽
    王文伶
    Wang, Wen Ling
    Keywords: 董監連結
    社會資本
    社會網絡分析
    公司績效
    interlocking directorates
    social capital
    social network analysis
    corporate performance
    Date: 2010
    Issue Date: 2013-09-05 14:27:52 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 台灣董監事及高階管理者連結成為公司治理的重要議題。本研究欲探討某人同時兼任兩間以上公司之董事、監察人及高階管理者職位，所形成之董監連結，對公司經營績效之影響。本研究以董監連結變數作為衡量社會資本之質與量，並首度辨認董監連結之方向，透過社會網絡分析軟體將2010年台灣電子業上市公司之網絡連結狀況予以視覺化。

    　　本研究實證結果顯示，與其他公司連結的數量愈多、兼任比例愈高，可能無法有效監督公司之經營管理，高度連結的狀況將使公司績效變差；公司擔任主要中間媒介的程度愈高，公司績效愈好。惟本研究在探討公司與其他公司的距離、連結至不同產業的種類數與公司經營績效之間的關係時，該部分實證結果並未呈現顯著相關。因此，不同的董監事連結構面對公司經營績效產生不同的影響，公司應適當的監督與控制董監事連結行為，並可以其作為透過策略聯盟提升公司經營績效的途徑之一。
    The interlocking among board members from different corporations has become one of the corporate governance research issues. Interlocking directorates means that firms appoint directors or managements who hold directorships in two or more companies. This study aims to examine the relationships between interlocking directorates and firm performance. This study uses the variable of interlocking directorates to measure the quality and quantity of social capital, and is the first study in Taiwan to identify the direction of interlocking directorates. This study uses the sample of Taiwan listed companies from 2010 to visualize the social network via SNA software.

    The empirical results are summarized as follow. If a firm has higher number of interlocking directorates, or a director has too many directorships, he/she is incapable of effectively monitoring the management of the firm. As a result, the high interlocking situation will hurt a firm’s performance. If a firm serves as the medium in the social network, it will enhance company’s performance. However, if a company has shorter distance to other companies or board of directors from various industries, it does not significantly affect the company’s performance. The above results suggest that different aspects of interlocking directorates have different effect on a company’s performance. Therefore, companies have to adequately monitor and control the behavior of interlocking directorates. In addition, interlocking directorates can be a way to enhance a company’s performance via strategic alliance.
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    Description: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    會計研究所
    98353032
    99
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0098353032
    Data Type: thesis
    Appears in Collections:[Department of Accounting] Theses

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