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    題名: 為什麼初任公務人員職位配置採用「分發」制度?一個歷史回顧分析
    其他題名: Why is the Job Position of the Newly Appointed Civil Servant Centrally Assigned? A Historical Perspective Analysis
    作者: 蘇偉業;黎世輝
    So,Bennis Wai-Yip;Li,Shi-Hui
    貢獻者: 政大公行系
    關鍵詞: 分發;遴用;考銓二分;政治途徑;管理途徑
    job placement by central assignment;selection by public manager;examination-appointment dichotomy;political approach;managerial approach
    日期: 2011-12
    上傳時間: 2013-09-06 11:49:09 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 在我國百年歷史中,對初任公務人員大多採用「分發」方式進行實際工作職位配置(placement),世界其他國家政府的人事進用罕有如我國般採用如此大規模的「分發制度」,其亦成為我國初任公務人員進用管理其中一個重要環節。「分發」是相對於「遴用」制度,代表用人機關並沒有參與人才進用之過程,特別是最後之進用人選決定。這是有違一般人力資源管理之做法,也否定了用人機關管理者的人事權。但為何我國對此制度如此堅持?本文嘗試以歷史角度出發,從中國古代科舉考銓二分制度解釋自古以來官員配置制度之承襲根源。而民國初建時必要之「國家滲透」(state penetration)工程及現實所面對之龐大阻力,則強化人事管理上透過分發達至政治控制。國民政府遷台後,大陸時期的相關論述,特別對用人機關的不信任,一直延續。雖然政府逐漸注意到用人機關的需求立場,但人民投考及任公職之權益保障及公平分配要求更受到重視。在權衡各種利益矛盾及在多次「試錯」(trial-and-error)學習後,「分發」制度成為多種因素制約下的剩餘選擇。本文利用經修飾過的 David H. Rosenbloom 提出的政治途徑(political approach)及管理途徑(managerial approach)來分析以上的人事政策取向,並指出政治途徑(political approach)思維一直佔據著支配性的地位,掩蓋管理途徑(managerial approach)。本文利用文獻分析作為研究方法,當中蒐集了大量民國建立以來的各類原始文獻,調理出本議題的歷史脈絡,並就官方及民間輿論進行論述分析(discourse analysis),以詮釋制度背後及時人之價值取向及認知。
    During the 100-year history of the Republic of China (ROC), the job position for the newly-appointed civil servants has been mostly centrally assigned by the Examination Yuan. The government personnel systems around the world are seldom engaged in such a large scale of centralized job placement, but that is one of the most significant staffing procedures in Taiwan. This practice excludes those government agencies that appoint the new staff from the selection of freshmen, and works against the common practice of human resource management. It also deprives of a significant personnel authority of public managers. Why has the government in Taiwan been insisting on this practice? This paper tries to trace the historical root of the current job placement system back to the civil service examination in ancient China. In the early years of the ROC, the need for state penetration justified the central assignment in order to realize the political control. Those policy discourses against the personnel authority of public managers continued, which developed in the Mainland China, continued during the era of the ROC on Taiwan. Even though the government has gradually recognized legitimacy of the authority but it is overruled by the constitutional rights for citizens to take a civil service examination and public office in a fair manner. Under the trade-offs among different interests and trials-and-errors, the placement by central assignment seems to become a sole alternative.This paper adopts the political and the managerial approaches, modified from the theme of David H. Rosenbloom, to examine the personnel policies concerned in Taiwan. The author argues that the political approach has been taking a prevailing status, overruling the managerial approach. The research mainly relies on documentary analysis, in which huge primary sources of documents since the founding of the ROC have been utilized for building the historical path of the issue. An analysis for official and private discourses is taken to interpret the value judgment behind the institution and the then people.
    關聯: 行政暨政策學報, 53, 25-64
    資料類型: article
    顯示於類別:[公共行政學系] 期刊論文

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