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    Title: 以權力與代理交互效果審視民間參與交通建設所需用地制度之研究
    Other Titles: A Review of Private Participation in Public Transportation Projects in Terms of the Interactive Effects of Authority and Agency
    Authors: 簡龍鳳;賴宗裕
    Contributors: 政大地政系
    Keywords: 民間參與;自償能力;權力與代理;配置效率
    Private participation;Self-liquidating ratio;Authority and agency;Allocation efficiency
    Date: 2007-06
    Issue Date: 2013-09-13
    Abstract: 「促進民間參與公共建設法」賦予民間機構從事開發交通建設所需用地,藉以提高交通建設之財務自償能力。回顧目前國內所推動之高速鐵路及捷運建設BOT案,均藉由土地開發收益以挹注建設成本,誠然所引發公共論壇的焦點環繞在「土地開發利益」議題上。由於政府與民間機構存在對土地市場價值資訊不對稱,衍生權力宰制與委託代理問題。本文嘗試在權力與代理交互效果下,建構政府、民間機構和土地所有權人三方關係,重新詮釋資源配置效率問題。研究顯示,政府倘若為滿足民間機構獲利之需求,因而向土地所有權人徵收「超額交通建設所需用地」,將加劇土地資源配置效率問題。
    The "Law for Promotion of Private Participation in Public Infrastructure Projects" provides a mechanism for the private sectors to develop the land for any public infrastructure project in order to increase its self-liquidating ratio. The concept behind build-operate-transfer (BOT) projects in Taiwan, such as the Taiwan High-Speed Rail (HSR) and Taipei`s subway, the mass rapid transit (MRT) system, is to recoup the cost of the infrastructure project through land development revenues. Indeed, the public tends to be most concerned with the revenues, which depend on the institution and scale of development. As an asymmetry of information exists between the public and private sectors, issues concerning authority and agency may arise. This paper attempts to explore the allocation efficiency of resources among the government, the private sector, and landowners in terms of the interactive effects of authority and agency. I find that, should the government expropriate more land in order to meet the private sector`s demand for land development, the allocation of land resources will be less efficient.
    Relation: 東吳政治學報, 25(2), 179-217
    Data Type: article
    Appears in Collections:[Department of Land Economics] Periodical Articles

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