本文從代理理論與資源依賴理論觀點，針對臺灣1999至2008年一般產業之上市（櫃）公司，分析研究發展支出對內部董事與公司經營績效（Tobin's Q）關聯性之影響。代理理論主張，董事會之獨立性有助監督功能之發揮，故預期內部董事席次比率與公司經營績效呈反向關係；資源依賴理論則主張，是董事會資本而非監督機制才對公司經營有較重大的助益，故預期內部董事在企業專屬知識需求較高之公司，內部董事席次比率與公司經營績效呈正向關係。本文以Tobin's Q衡量公司經營績效，以高研發支出作為衡量企業專屬知識需求之代理變數，主要實證結果顯示，研發支出高且其內部董事席次比率高之公司，其經營績效較佳，分析結果支持資源依賴理論。 Based on propositions suggested by the agency theory and the resource-dependence theory, this research empirically investigates the effect of R&D on the association between the role of insider board members and firm performance. The agency theory proposes that the independence of board directors enhances the monitoring function of the corporate board, and a negative relationship between board dependence and firm performance should be expected. As to the resource-dependence theory, it suggests that it is the board capital rather than monitoring mechanism serves the primary function of the corporate board. For companies with high demand for firm-specific knowledge it is better off to have more insider board directors. A positive relationship is therefore expected between board dependence and firm performance. This paper uses R&D investment as the proxy for demand for firm-specific knowledge and Tobin's Q as measurement for firm performance. The primary research findings indicate that for high R&D investment firms, higher the percentage of insider board members, higher the firm performance. Our evidence supports the resource dependence theory.